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THE OUTLOOK IN EUROPE.

AN admirable brochure published twice monthly by Chatham House dissects in its leading article the contemporary item of foreign events which is affecting critically the relations of the four or five important European governments to each other. A mere recital of the names heading each article reminds us of the number, and confounds us by the complexity, of the problems with which the Government and people of England are daily confronted in their search and desire for quiet security. In quick succession during the present year have followed announcements, disputes, or demands as to Danzig; the Danubian economic problem; Belgian foreign policy; the domestic and external orientation of Austria; the revolt in Spain; Palestine and Jewish migration; German commercial policy; Freedom of the Mediterranean; Colonies and Mandates; China and Japan, Japan and Russia; and, least noted hitherto but as important as any, American neutrality policy in time of war certainly, but in time of peace just possibly. None of these issues can we afford to overlook, nor can one of them be treated entirely on its own merits, or on its direct value to us. On each we must have an informed opinion, and on each we must be willing to take action, positive or negative, if we are to keep that place in the world which history and geography assign to us, and which Mr. Eden the other day assured us we had partially regained. If we are properly to play an adequate part on the stage we are largely responsible for setting, we must have a clear conception of our interests, our duties and our powers as well as of the dangers and obstacles in our road. At present we seem so much obsessed by the latter as to have lost sight of the former. In attempting to define our policy I should wish to be thought a supporter rather than a critic of the present Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, whose conduct of policy has been in general essentially sound, and whose difficulties cannot be fully known to his critics.

Our first and greatest need, to which only national safety cannot be subordinated, is a tranquillity of atmosphere in

which can be re-created that foreign power of purchase which is essential to the restoration of our export trade. On that in turn depends the maintenance of our social legislation, our freedom from internal disturbance, and the disappearance of our depressed areas. It is not merely the absence of actual warfare which is needed, for there has not been any armed collision in Europe for the past sixteen years. It is not the fact but the fear of war, the universal unrest and suspicion, alike in religion, in industry, in politics, and even in social life, which paralyses enterprise, which prevents the adventure of capital, which lays an embargo on the expression of thought, which enforces a watch for personal security, and denies continuance of legitimate and necessary commerce. It finds particular expression in economic nationalism, carried to extremes in Italy and Germany under dictators, and yet is present under more democratic forms of government such as our own. In Europe it has created, maintained and subsidised unnatural and unprofitable industries. In America by the destruction of commercially superfluous food and commodities it has denied them to European peoples desperate from privation. In certain countries it assails religion and religious organisations or asserts the infallibility of one single political doctrine. It drives dissent underground and so in half the countries of Europe the opposition, at present silent because muzzled, is rehearsing revolution instead of devising reform. In an atmosphere tense with apprehension, education and poverty, we are called on both by our own necessities and by the wishes of the remaining European democracies to give a lead to a world in which at present we hold a foremost position, but which a modicum of courage and a sufficiency of vision could convert into a beneficent and dominant authority. To any entity, nation or individual, aspiring to leadership must belong certain attributes such as sincerity and impartiality, consistency and determination, willingness to run a worth-while risk, ability to see the other point of view. Can anyone maintain that either the English people or their Government have exhibited such a sufficiency of these qualities during this past year as to enable them to lead Europe, much less a League of Nations, along the path of wisdom ? A year ago the previous Foreign Secretary committed the supreme act of folly for which Europe is still making atonement. The people of England indeed demanded and the

Government conceded his instant resignation, yet a little later they acquiesced in his reappointment to the Cabinet. Such episodes render difficult to Continental minds a belief in our trustworthiness and sincerity.

At this moment we have a second chance of giving a strong lead to Europe in that economic co-operation of which a month ago the present Foreign Secretary spoke so strongly and so justly to Germany. If our people and Parliament, exercising their paramount authority once again, will insist on the Government's acceptance of the opportunity afforded by the proposal of the Dutch Prime Minister, Dr. Colijn, to reassemble the Oslo Conference, we can give a practical illustration of the benefits to be gained by taking our own advice. We shall also take a second step on the road of financial recovery of which the first was the joint declaration by France, U.S.A., and Great Britain of " Exchange " solidarity. Not long ago the low-tariff governments in Europe—Holland, Belgium and Scandinavia—got together to see if they could create in a continent riddled and ruined by quotas, tariffs, currency restrictions and embargoes, a group of countries prepared to restore freedom of trade, to themselves and to any others who would join the group, by mutual reduction of tariffs and like restrictions. The project was wrecked on the British " most favoured nation " clause, an examination of which is out of place in a survey such as this. Within the last few weeks the Dutch Prime Minister has reopened the question, and a vigorous inquiry has been set on foot with the object of cutting free from the bonds by which " self-sufficiency " is strangling the world.

Owing to recent devaluation of the franc France has announced her association with a lower tariff policy, and M. Bastid, Minister of Commerce in France, has expressed his confidence in a general improvement in world commercial relations. He had already, at the moment of devaluation, stated the necessity for lowering French tariffs in order to keep down the cost of living. On January 19th, he went on to declare that not merely commercial but external policy and friendship for Britain and the United States must encourage France to remove obstacles which restrict international trade. To such an invitation and challenge a British Government ought not to turn a deaf, mechanical ear. These daring protagonists of a return to sanity are all neighbours of

each other and our own, maritime powers well able without difficulty or delay to give each other substantial support by sea or land. While none of them are separately of the first importance, Norway has the fourth largest mercantile marine in the world, Holland has great colonial dominions and wealth, and collectively they are not only our best customers, but their total trade exceeds that of any single country save Great Britain and the U.S.A. If France joins her star to theirs the new group becomes an economic and commercial force of the first rank. Nothing but those mysterious and menacing "interests" to which Mr. Morrison referred so timidly at Geneva in December seems to stand in the way of England once again pointing out the road, and leading the attack on the fiscal follies which have checked commercial development and fostered international ill will. The evils which have arisen from the deliberate segregation of nations by their own rulers are the consequence of the revival of economic doctrines which every finance minister in the world admits to be wrong. The chance has come to examine the obstacles built up by the ingenuity of chauvinist governments, to lay bare the poverty these barriers have caused, to advise as to the speediest means of removing them, and to exercise for their reduction all the power so strong a combination of wealth, territory, transport power, and raw materials can command. There must be difficulties as to production, distribution, manufacture and transport of commodities at any conference of nations possessing such varied resources, primary and secondary, as do the Oslo group. Otherwise there would be no need for a conference, for mutual concessions and adjustments. If our Government have the will to co-operate, they have greater power than any other to adjust. They have urged others to consider the general good, they should set an example of action themselves. At the end of January Mr. Runciman visited the President of the United States. Commercial co-operation for freer international trade was "unofficially" discussed and seems in principle to have been agreed to. Presidents of the U.S.A. are notoriously uncertain. The torpedoing of the Economic Conference is not forgotten. If, however, Parliament and Congress contain sufficient common sense, they have now the chance of giving expression to it without delay. Treaties of low-tariff commerce, on which Scandinavia, Holland and Belgium, France, Britain and the United States

had agreed, would have a decisive effect on the customs duties of the rest of the world.

The path of co-operation is not so clear in political as in economic problems. For one thing Great Britain has not the same proportion of power. But we possess in real prestige an asset more valuable and more usable than we seem to know, not indeed to be constantly brandished as a club, but to be utilised on occasion. No continental government will permit itself the luxury of an irretrievable quarrel with Great Britain, none who have done so during the last two hundred years having profited by their experiment. Since the time of the elder Pitt, England has never deliberately sought war, though more than once she has become involved in war. The declaration of Herr Hitler that there has only been one war between Germany and England, and that there will never be another, represents, I believe, the profound conviction of the German people and army. This conviction does not imply fear, but does denote respect. It would not force Germany to commit some act of which she disapproved, but it would, I am assured, hold her back from actions or from a policy to which we had expressed real objection. How could it be utilised at the present time ? I recited at the beginning of this paper a list of issues responsible at the moment for the disturbance in Europe. Nearly all can be traced back to Germany, some to her fault, some to her misfortune. But over all hangs the sword of Germany, sheathed for the time, but with the hilt conveniently near Herr Hitler's hand. It is almost as if the " shining armour " had been left behind in the move to Doorn, and was now being refurbished for the new All Highest War Lord.

Yet there is in truth a very real difference between the circumstances of 1914 and those of 1937. About the time of the Agadir crisis German bankers informed the Kaiser that German trade could not finance a war, so there was no war. After a brief period of financial preparation, including a capital levy, Germany thought herself ready for, and accepted at the hands of Austria, what she intended to be a short war. She had committed herself instead to a prolonged war, financed on accumulated wealth, on foreign securities, on good financial credit, and on the Spandau treasure. To-day she has no credit, no treasure, no free foreign securities and practically no gold. She is notoriously unable to buy foreign, or herself to produce, fat or wheat sufficient for her civil population,

or raw materials for her industries. Her export trade, falsified by statistics rendered inaccurate by her system of barter, is insufficient to make good these necessities. The new American doctrine of neutrality is certain to refuse supplies to any belligerent even on the " cash and carry " principle. We can ask ourselves in considering German power of offence on land and sea, from what source she can draw a *sustained* power of mobility. Germany will be very hard put to it to give an answer satisfactory to Nazi diplomacy. Nor has she amongst her domestic resources many of the natural products essential to modern warfare. Between those things she cannot buy, and those things she cannot produce, Germany is far from being the danger to a clear-minded opponent that she wishes herself to be thought. If England said plainly to-morrow that no more foreigners should reach Spain by sea, we should provide the Führer with material for vigorous oratory, Dr. Schacht with cause for gratitude which he could not express, and the German General Staff with reasons for very real thankfulness. When Germans eventually were permitted to know that they were no longer liable for Spanish service, not even General Goering could stir them to resentment against such intervention. If Russians were at the same time held back by France, Italy would not interpose to prop up single-handed General Franco's enterprise. The fact is that all this Nazi oratory is for home consumption. Germany is profoundly grateful to Herr Hitler for dragging her out of the slough of contempt into which France at and after Versailles had stupidly, indeed wickedly, thrust her. He has raised her from the depths of despair and abasement to be the apparent arbiter of destiny in Europe. He has protected her from France and he has saved her from anarchy. His methods are, most probably, less alien to German mentality than to ours. While his position is therefore very strong, it is not impregnable. The army has not forgiven the murder of General von Schleicher, the Catholic and Protestant Churches are deeply moved by the new State paganism. Taxation is crushing, and food for man and beast is insufficient. Only an iron control of the Press keeps discontent ignorant of its strength, and provides such a picture of foreign perversity and ill will as enables the country to remain thankful that a strong man keeps guard over the frontiers of a threatened homeland.

If this account of German conditions is accurate, and I have

taken some pains to verify it, the course which a British Government can and ought to pursue seems plain. It need not be afraid of a Germany confronted on the east by the solidarity of the Little Entente, and of the Balkan Entente numbering 65 millions of people in all; of a Germany which has just wasted £20 millions on the Spanish revolt; whose sole ally in Europe is almost as hard up as herself for cash, and greatly preoccupied in Abyssinia; and whose sole client is the Government of Greece recently come into power after the customary biennial *coup d'état*. We can speak much more plainly to Germany as to the limits of our patience, while we accept without any reserve her legitimate desire and intention to resume her position in the front rank of world powers. We can remember that the cause of all, and the word is used deliberately, the disturbance in Central and Western Europe is the policy of France during the interval between the Ministries of M. Briand and M. Blum. We were afraid to speak frankly to France ten years ago on behalf of Germany: now we hesitate to speak frankly to Germany on behalf of Europe. German correspondence with other countries before the war reveals the freedom of language of German statesmen. They understand and accept blunt realism. We might now and then take a leaf out of their book. After M. Blum's speech at Lyons, the German Press, which is almost the German Government, attacked him as suggesting a set-off of French economic concessions against German political collaboration. Yet that is precisely the meaning of Herr Hitler's speech on January 11th, 1937, to the Diplomatic Corps at Berlin. If Germany will not take into immediate and effective consideration the delay and injury caused to world economic recovery by rearmament expenditure, and come to the international council table with sincere and friendly intentions, what treatment does she deserve but that of an unbenevolent neutral? The form and conditions of Government in Germany are the concern solely of Germany. But if her policy endangers our commercial and political safety, we have a right and a duty to Europe to warn her of possible consequences. Germans believe that, if England had spoken bluntly before the war in 1914, there would have been no war. It may be so, though then, as now, they were afraid, not of England, but of Russia. But for lack of foresight, of courage, of Cabinet unity, do not let us again be chargeable with untimely reticence. This

Cabinet has advantages over that of 1914. They know the certain dimensions and results of any quarrel. They know the cost to civilisation. They know much of the difficulties in Germany. Such knowledge enlarges their responsibility, which becomes a responsibility of rejection quite as much as of acceptance.

The list of hazards is still long. There is trouble as to colonies and mandates, and there is also Spain. Some acquaintance with the country and its people makes me certain that Spain will not permit a successful General Franco to give away or loan or alienate any square yard of Spanish land. If the Government win I think they will withdraw from all Moroccan territory save the presidios of Ceuta, Melilla and Alhucemas (which are Spanish freeholds). This leased territory would lapse to France, whose occupation of the Mediterranean littoral would raise serious questions for England and Italy. The employment of Moorish troops in Spain itself during the Civil War leaves no alternative, save evacuation, to perpetual bloodshed between the Republic and the native population.

The International Brigades in Spain are fairly matched on either side, Russians and French against Italians and Germans. Their joint numbers are almost certainly smaller than excited partisan reporters tell us, while the German and Italian desire for their withdrawal *in toto* suggests that it would be more detrimental to the Government than to the insurgents. The insurgent forces are quite as really Spanish as those of the Government and a better fighting force collectively. In this internecine struggle we have assumed it is our duty to keep the ring, and to let Spaniards fight Spaniards to the death. It is difficult to see what other course is open to any nation. We are all suspect to each other. The replies of Italy and Germany to the British Note are satisfactory enough, if they submit their supplementary suggestions at once, and will pass the necessary legislation forthwith. If, as they imply, Russia will find reason for delay, their own speed in fixing an early date for " control " will establish their good faith. Both replies lay stress on the withdrawal or removal of all foreign participants from Spain. With the disappearance of Italians from the Balearic Islands, of German airmen from Melilla, of the International Brigades from Spain, and the Russian Ambassador (so called) from Valencia, the probability of

peace elsewhere in Europe will have greatly increased. The peace of exhaustion may even descend on Spain, and she will sink back into international obscurity. If " control " has been established and been successful, its authors will make haste to close it down, for nothing is so trying to international tempers as military international co-operation.

On the supposition that disarmament is *hors concours* for the moment, German claims for colonies are the next on our list. Herr Hitler, like a pyrotechnist at a fête, lets off his squibs one by one. He retains public attention and applause longer than by a simultaneous discharge. Expansion of the Army, Anglo-German Naval Treaty, Reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Kiel Canal, the War Guilt Clause, each keeps Germany guessing. Colonies are not actually on the carpet, but their imminence is certain. English advocates of retention or of rendition have all the arguments before them. It shortens discussion if we acknowledge that Dominion Mandates will neither be given up to the League, nor to the Empire, and certainly not to Germany. Japan has already flatly refused to give up any of her Mandates. The only territory which even seems to come within the scope of real discussion is Tanganyika. But the map of Tanganyika shows the strategic value of an air force stationed in that central region in Africa. Any country intent on territorial expansion would of course give the most stringent pledges of inaction, abstention, etc. How long would these be observed, how long could they be observed? The first internal disturbance would demand, perhaps justify, an air force of the first quality and size. Equally justified would be the new suspicion and alarm. On the other hand, Germany, if and as a Member State, is entitled to attend any League Conference on freedom of access to raw materials, freedom of purchase on terms of equality, and currency validity. If necessity and not arrogance is the urge, membership of the League will affect her purpose. The League has begun its function again in its proper capacity of a political clearing-house. Our foreign policy, we are told, is a League of Nations policy. This is but a catchword unless we give it an orientation of co-operative action towards economic and military disarmament. We are expected to lead. We can lead, our lead is ever welcome. But how often have we failed Europe because we leant on others, instead of relying on ourselves?

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

THREE SPANISH LESSONS.

LESSONS are never likeable at any age. And, to-day, Spain is to us as much a word of fear as it was to our ancestors in the age of the Armada and Inquisition. We see in nightmares Spain as an advanced base for armadas of Mussolinian airplanes over-running our country or for " cells " of Muscovitic inquisitors undermining our Constitution. But such nightmares are the retribution for daily doping ourselves with partisan newspapers. Go to Spain and you will find the revolution a revelation.

That sounds as though I had gone there and had got an attack either of scarlet fever or of rose rash—of which the other name is German measles. But both Spain and I have outgrown those childish disorders. My first acquaintance with Spain was as a diplomatist at Madrid when we were nearly blown up by an anarchist bomb on marrying the King to a British Princess. My latest was last Christmas, when as proprietors of the village manor house the Anarchist Committee appeared in the *patio* to congratulate us on the Roman Catholic marriage of our daughter.

Moreover, I am using the word " revolution " as equally applicable to the result whichever wins of the conflicting camps in the present civil war. While the revelation comes from a realisation of the ideals inspiring either side. For though the ruthless destruction by either side is horrific, the reckless devotion is no less heroic. Heroism such as the desperate defence of the ruined Alcazar at Toledo for weeks by a handful against a host, or such as the audacious charge of cars up the broad Rambla of Barcelona hurling militia armed only with knives and pistols against a field battery of regulars, is more deserving of our attention than denunciations of Bolshevist or Fascist bogies. The Nationalist *Campeadors* are far fewer in number than either of their opponents—the Socialist *Cameradas* or the Syndicalist *Campaneros*. Moreover, they are supported by big battalions of German and Italian mercenaries. But we had better not hold up hands of horror at this, for those hands are not clean. Gibraltar is ours, thanks to Hessian mercenaries and to the Italian immigrants with which we replaced the native Spaniards. It was the British and French navies who suppressed the Southern Communes in 1873. And that the Nationalists are very few in number

need not deprive them of our sympathies. Democracy means majority rule as between voters, but not necessarily as between votaries whose platform is the firing-step and whose polling booth is the grave.

Why then do most of us British and many Spaniards condemn this civil war and incriminate whichever side we do not support? Because murderous and mercenary campaigns for material interests, camouflaged as crusades for moral ideals, have made us reluctant to risk our livelihood, still less our lives, for any cause; and we fear lest Spain may infect us with its heroisms and hecatombs. So we turn from the "atrocities" of the Spanish war, thanking our Seven Stars, like "old Tom Baddleham, down at Long Caddleham":

> Number seven, number seven,
> Some volks likes t'other place, but I likes Heaven,

and forgetting the Mayor of Chicago who said, on arriving in the other world: "Why, heaven is just like Chicago," upon which his neighbour observed: "But this isn't heaven." Indeed, anyone who should go straight from the back streets of North England or South Wales to the front trenches of Madrid or Malaga would learn that life can be worse than death, and that death can make life worth living.

But I am not preaching war, I am only protesting against the presumption that because creeds and causes have occasioned war therefore there is nothing to learn from them. And a comparison of my conclusions come to from inside insight into Spanish, Portuguese, Irish, Turkish and Russian revolutions, suggests that they are instructive to us English in that order; and that the Spanish should be for us the most instructive of all. For the personal temperament and political tradition of the Englishman is more like those of the Spaniard than any other race. Both are ingrained individualists. Both have a firm faith in traditional trends of public opinion that can be overlaid, but never undermined by Press propaganda or other ephemeral influences. And both will fight to a finish for their faith in their own laws and in their own liberties, though the Spaniard fights more recklessly and ruthlessly because he is as passionate and precipitate in action as the Englishman is patient and prudent. It is, moreover, interesting to note that the philosophies and procedure of the principal Spanish parties are examples, however extreme in their

expression, of the corresponding parties in Great Britain. So much so that our parties can learn from them the lines along which they may be led either to civic work of reconstruction or to a civil war between revolution and reaction.

In a book on Spain published in 1933, I argued that the Republic had in two years effected a reconstruction by means of parliamentary party government that showed democracy, as we elaborated and exported it, to be capable of making the ethical and economic, constitutional and collectivist developments indispensable nowadays, if a country is going to compete and co-operate with other communities. The Republican reconstruction was, in my opinion, a most encouraging example for us. But that experiment has now failed, possibly finally ; and both the reasons and the results of that failure contain lessons for the British people in general and for British party politicians in particular.

Let us first learn what lesson Spain has for our Conservatives. The Spanish Republican "revolution" of 1931 was merely a shift of the centre of political power to a lower level in the social pyramid ; a shift comparable to that which gave us a Labour Government on sufferance in 1923. And the Republic made a far better start in reconstruction than either of our Labour Governments. But, like them, it was disunited, and dissipated its initial impetus. Like them it was misrepresented and maltreated by a Conservative Press and by capitalist pressures. So that it was, after two years, thrown out by a conservative-clericalist reaction. There ensued two years of a moderate Centre government, not unlike our National Government, being constructive in its professions, but conservative in its proceedings. Moreover it alienated conservatives by not venturing on any real reaction, and antagonised progressives by suspending all reconstruction. Thereby the rhythm of reconstruction was broken and the old incompetence and corruption crept back. What then was the result in Spain, a country less patient and passive than Great Britain ? In October 1934 an attempt at a general rising ended in the rebellion of the Asturian miners and their repression by Moorish troops. This subjection by Moors in the cause of the Church of the only region in Spain where Christianity had never succumbed, followed by the imprisonment of some 30,000 workers, deprived the egregious Lerroux, the emollient Gil Robles and the ebullient Primo de Rivera of all popular

support other than that of convinced clericalists, conservatives and capitalists.

The clericalist centrist, Gil Robles, nevertheless claimed the Premiership as leader of the largest party in the Cortes. But the President, Alcalá Zamora, would not concede it, as clericalist acceptance of the Constitution was doubtful. And as there was no doubt at all in this respect as to leaders of other Right factions and as the Radical leader, Lerroux, was compromised by monetary scandals, eventually the President—after an abortive attempt to form a new Centre Party which should amend the Constitution in a clericalist and conservative interest—dissolved the Cortes. Azaña, the successful Premier and promoter of reconstruction, then returned to power at the head of a united Popular Front of reformers and revolutionaries (February 1936), and though the Government consisted wholly of radical reformers and contained no socialist even—let alone syndicalist or communist—the two years' stoppage caused reconstruction to start off again at a revolutionary rate of knots.

What did the Spanish Conservatives then do ? Co-operate constitutionally and cordially with the Spanish reconstructionists in restraining the dare-devils, repressing the disorders, and in relieving the distresses ? No, they treated an outbreak of strikes and the atmosphere of storm and stress, which were really the consequences of their own inactive reaction, as the commencement of an activist revolution, and as the collapse of all constitutional government. Plans for a militarist *coup d'état*, which had been long prepared, were at once proceeded with and promoted not only by Royalists and reactionaries, but by conservative and clericalist Moderates. With the result that last July the army and navy officers, with a few exceptions, called out their commands in insurrection. There was no intention of starting a civil war. If only because control of the whole military, police and naval forces, as well as of all arsenals and supply centres seemed secured. But the unexpected and apparently impossible happened. Though the army and navy recruits were young farm and fishery workers, the least politically conscious of the population, many regiments deserted or destroyed their officers ; while the majority of the new Guards of Assault and a minority of the old Civil Guard and most of the Air Force, obeyed orders from the Government. In a few days the Insurgents were either

defeated or driven from urban centres onto the defensive in country districts.

Thus ended the first phase of the civil war. The second phase was the invasion of Spain by the Moors and other mercenaries of the Foreign Legion in Morocco. These were marched north from the Straits of Gibraltar, and after some fighting, made contact with the southern advance of the regiments retained by the insurgent officers, and of the volunteers recruited from the middle and upper classes and from the clericalist regions of Navarre and the north. These Nationalists were, moreover, powerfully reinforced by German Junker and Italian Caproni airplanes. This combination secured control of the less populous and prosperous western half of Spain, with the exception of the northern coastal strip of the Basque Socialist proletariat and the southern coastal strip held by the Andalusian anarchist-syndicalist peasantry. An advance was made by the Moors and other Nationalists against Madrid, but repulsed by the militia. For the militia were by then beginning to get munitions in spite of the non-intervention embargo, and military organisation in spite of their guerrilla traditions. This second phase of the war would have been won in a few weeks by the Government but for its entering a third, the " foreign " phase.

Just as the Insurgent officers had no intention of involving Spain in civil war, so the Insurgent politicians had no idea that they would involve Spain in an invasion by German and Italian armies. This invasion led to the Government forces becoming dependent on the supplies and services of sympathisers abroad. But this support of the Government was individual in respect of personnel and international in respect of policy. The German and Italian on the Nationalist side came under orders, often without knowing where he was or why he was there. The Germans and Italians on the Government side came freely to fight internationally for liberties which they had lost nationally. The Spanish civil war was thus rapidly developing into a European class war with a capitalist and communist world war to follow.

But what, you will say, has this cautionary tale to do with our Conservatives ? Yet this catastrophe might repeat itself in England. Because once a party, even for the most patriotic motives, commits itself to *coups d'état* and power politics, it must, whether it wins or no, lose contact with the traditional

spirit of the community and control of the true course of events. Our Conservatives have already committed themselves more than once to this dangerous divergence from their responsibility as a ruling class. That an Irish civil war was avoided in 1914 and an English class war in 1926, was not owing to a Conservative control either of proceedings or of propaganda. There is nothing absurd in an analogy in which Scottish Home Rulers would replace the Catalans, Welsh the Basques, Irish the Portuguese and a British Labour-Socialist Government the Liberal-Radical Government of the Popular Front. Troops and ships rashly used for police purposes against a general popular movement and against the policy of the Labour Government would be resisted and would become unreliable. Red local organisations would appear. The Commander-in-Chief in India would embark Sikhs and Gurkhas and land them at Devonport and Portsmouth. The local militias of armed workers would come into conflict with them. International finance and fascism would launch foreign navies and land foreign armies in a war for civilisation against British Communism. For the main international menace to-day is not Communist ; and a fanatical fascistic Nationalist who exploits his political creed in the interest of his propertied class will end by exposing his country to foreign Imperialism.

What about Labour ? Has the Spanish civil war any lessons for a party that has developed from being a Forlorn Hope for the Rights of Man into becoming a Finishing School for Trade Union officials—a party occupied with heresy hunts that only reinforce an incipient Communism and with a hate *Hetze* that only advertises an insignificant Fascism—and with a whole-hoggish herding that will reanimate a moribund Liberalism ? Like them, the Spanish reformist Republican Government was haunted and hag-ridden by nightmares due to an indigestion of unassimilated authority too hastily acquired. In a vain attempt to base itself on the non-political middle mass, the Republican Radicals enfranchised the women who voted against them, and excommunicated the Socialists of the Left and the Syndicalists in a lump, who in consequence did not vote at all. The result was the anti-reconstruction reaction of 1933 which ended in the insurrection of 1934. By the next election (1936) all Spanish progressives had united in a " Popular Front " that returned them to office. But it was too late. Wherefrom we Labourites may learn that unless we

can now for purposes of constitutional reconstruction unite all progressives from the Centre to Communism, both inclusive, they will in due time unite themselves, without our assistance or authority, for purposes of coercive revolution. It is true that one or two minority Labour Governments cannot remake society, any more than one swallow can make a summer. But in this country, whether summer comes or no, winter does, and where will the swallow be then, poor thing?

Last, and, in this connection, not least, come the Liberals, and for them Spain has a message of hope. For Spain is their spiritual home whence they got their name, and where their nature has taken a more drastic growth and a deeper root. Spanish Liberalism in the lower class has not been smothered by the propertied interests of a large *laissez-faire* middle class. Rather it has been toughened and spread through being cut down again and again by persecution and impoverishment. Sprung like our Liberalism from seed sown by Rousseau, Godwin and Bentham, it put out under Bakhunin, the opponent of Marx, the first red flowers of local anarchist autonomies in the Southern Communes of 1873. Now, as the Anarchist Syndicalism of the F.A.I. and the C.N.T., it is bearing for the first time a fruit that like the oranges of Syndicalist Eastern and Southern Spain is suitable for export. It is only occasionally a blood orange, and though somewhat sharp flavoured could be made into a good British marmalade.

For the principle of Syndicalism, like that of Liberalism, is that it is the individual that matters not the institution, that the less government the better, and that democracy should be rebuilt from the bottom up, brick by brick—not filled in from the top down like the steel structure of a Communist constitution. It is interesting to note that the economic and defence organisations of the Syndicalists on the Southern front, organising from below, are as vigorous for their particular purposes and more vitalised than the Socialist organisations on the Central fronts. Moreover, the Syndicalists, partly because they can be more individually aggressive, have more appeal for the lowest and least organised class of workers and for the land workers. They are consequently more numerous than the Socialists; and no reorganisation of Spanish society can take root unless it represents their requirements. The new régime will be a Federation of Republics, each of which will be a frame for more or less

autonomous *Ayuntamientos*, which again will be a façade for active individuals. It will be as remote from Muscovitism as from Mussolinism.

Here then is a lesson for British Liberals. They need not throw bombs at royal coaches, but they will have to throw an occasional squib under the chariots of the proud. They need not lead Norfolk labourers in raids on the land or hoist the red-and-black flag over village churches. But they will have to realise that voluminous paper programmes of milk-and-water socialism mean less to the farm worker than Three Acres and a Cow.

These then are the lessons of Spain. And if they interest you at all, you can pay for them to Viscount Churchill, 19 Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, W.C., for the "University Unit" ambulances in Spain. You will save some wounded men from having to be left to die of exposure, gangrene or the more merciful bayonet.

> Such men of old
> Were England's native growth; and throughout Spain
> Thanks to High God, forests of such remain.
> Then for that country let our hopes be bold;
> For matched with these shall policy prove vain
> Her arts, her strength, her iron and her gold.

GEORGE YOUNG.

GERMANY AND GENEVA: A NEW SETTLEMENT.

THE drift towards war in Europe can only be averted and reversed by a change in German foreign policy. The standard of life in that country is so low that Herr Hitler must either find means to raise it, or try to distract attention from it by adventures abroad. An adventurous foreign policy must, sooner rather than later, lead to war. If, however, poverty in Germany began to be replaced by plenty, Herr Hitler could afford to suspend his restless search for honour and glory by way of territorial expansion and an "independent economic existence." He might be glad to accept a general settlement including among its terms that the League of Nations would be equipped with effective machinery for promoting justice as well as for protecting peace; that Germany would return to the League with complete equality of rights and obligations; and that German armaments would be reduced, along with the armaments of other Powers, to however low a level would suffice for the uses sanctioned by the Covenant. In return for such a redirection of German policy, coupled with sufficient guarantees that the new general settlement was going to last, it would be well worth while for Britain, France, Russia and other loyal Members of the League to restore the economic and financial situation in Germany; and this, with Germany's help, they are well able to do. The co-operation of the United States of America would, of course, ease their task enormously, and would probably be forthcoming.

But an offer from the League—perhaps in conjunction with the U.S.A.—to effect the economic and financial rescue of Germany as part of a general settlement ought to be accompanied by a reminder that the apparent sacrifices involved for Germany and the other Powers concerned in a peaceful settlement are immeasurably less than must result from the use of force as an instrument of German policy. The point would be brought home by Britain, France, Russia, and other Members of the League reaffirming their determination to maintain their preponderance of power and (in the words of Annex F of the Locarno Treaties to which some of these States are already committed) to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any

act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with the military situation of each of them and takes its geographical position into account. This formula limits the *share* of each League Member in the common effort against aggression, particularly at the outset of the struggle. It does not, however, give the aggressor any reasonable ground for imagining that the League Members form a limited liability company over which he may hope to win a victory by the use of unrestricted violence. The *total* collective effort knows no limit except what is necessary to stop the aggressor. If, nevertheless, he is so ill advised as to resort to arms, the Members of the League, once engaged on its behalf, must inevitably go on to use more and more of their resources until the law-breaker is eventually overwhelmed.

The League's communication should make it clear to the German Government that, in so far as it is seeking the real advantage of the German people by a forward policy, that object can more surely be reached by peaceful means. The proposal for a peaceful settlement, if it is to capture the imagination of the German people, must be, obviously as well as really, to their advantage. The Members of the League must therefore offer not only generalities, moral advantages, enhanced prestige and expressions of goodwill, but concrete blessings that will be of immediate value to the German people in their economic distress. The sense of encirclement felt by them may or may not be justified ; but it certainly exists and has to be taken into account. The belief that their economic and financial difficulties are due to foreign States who will do nothing to help Germany is widespread among her people. If we are to overcome that belief, we must make an appeal that will recapture the spirit of the Fourteen Points—but this time to avert a war, not to end one—the spirit that in 1918 could surmount the war censorship and that to-day could do so again.

Just as this offer must be real and seem to be real, so it must clearly be made out of strength and not out of weakness or fear. It must be, and must seem to be, not an instalment of Danegeld to avert disaster, but an attempt to restore a limb of the living body of the world, so that the limb may regain its vigour and the whole body recover fullness of life. That is why the offer must be made, not by one country whose motives might be misinterpreted, but by a Concert possessing

a preponderance of power ; and that combination should be none other than the League, whose concern indeed it is not only under Article 11 but also under the League's wider obligations to promote international co-operation.

What then should be the terms of this offer ? It must clearly reaffirm our determination to allow to Germany the benefits that should be the heritage of the whole world since the signing of the Covenant, the benefits that we may describe as Justice, Liberty and Truth. Justice here implies a determination to make Article 19 effective, and, by a process of peaceful change, to give to States great and small just redress for proved wrong. Liberty means freedom to fulfil a common purpose for the welfare of the whole society of nations, and especially freedom from the menace of war ; freedom founded upon a reliable system of collective defence and upon disarmament. Truth includes the removal of disputes of all kinds from the arena of assertion and counter-assertion by the provision of Commissions of Inquiry set up to receive particulars of all grievances and proposals relating to such problems as access to raw materials, the opening of markets for trade, colonial questions, movements of populations and territorial readjustments.

Besides these general or prospective advantages, the League Powers should (as we said) offer particular and immediate material benefits. These should include both a loan to Germany and the lowering of tariff barriers against foreign, including German, goods. Germany would then be provided with the means of purchasing food supplies and raw materials from League Members or from colonial territories under their control. Participation on equal terms in the capital development as well as in the trade of mandated territories should be open to Germany ; and this equality of economic opportunity should be extended until it applies to all non-self-governing colonies.

It is true that this will seem to some a high price even for world peace. But in the first place such material losses as would fall upon League Members, and particularly upon the great colonial powers among them, would be far less than the damage they would suffer from war. In the second place such losses would only be temporary. They would indeed be quickly transformed into considerable gains. A world-wide or even a League-wide economic union is capable of producing

far greater wealth for all its constituent parts than can possibly result from the sub-division of the larger unity into smaller sections each aiming at an independent economic existence.

A general settlement with Germany must extend beyond material interests to include equality in matters of honour and prestige. The war-guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty should first be repealed. Then Germany must be enabled to look forward to a process of peaceful change, giving her the means to become the equal in all respects of the great world powers of to-day. A start should be made by transferring the sovereignty of Germany's former colonies and the other ("A" and "B") mandated areas from the Allied and Associated Powers to the League itself as trustee for the inhabitants of those territories until they are able to stand alone. By rejoining the League, Germany would then be able to share the sovereignty and the trusteeship. The process need not end with the mandated territories. Why should not the sovereignty over such non-self-governing colonies as might some day become Members of the League follow suit and be vested in the League in trust for the inhabitants until they can stand alone, govern themselves, and take over the sovereignty of their territory? They would then be free to link up again with any other State or group of States. Thus the League's exercise of trustee-sovereignty need not impair nor hardly interrupt the development of the British Commonwealth of Nations, while it would open the door to a peaceful evolution of other groups of a similar kind.

Meanwhile there is the problem of equality of opportunity for Members of the League in the administration of the territories placed under League sovereignty during their adolescent phase. Two different solutions present themselves. One is an extension of the present mandate system whereby individual nations administer on the League's behalf and subject to a certain amount of supervision by the League. If that plan were followed, Herr Hitler's government would no doubt be entrusted with responsibility for the ex-German colonies. But where would there then be room or opportunity for Scandinavians, Poles, Swiss, Czechs and others to exercise whatever gifts they may possess as colonial administrators? And are we anxious to transplant into Africa and Asia all the conflicting ideologies that characterise the governments of Western Europe?

A more complete solution of the equality problem is to be found in international administration. It is true that the sudden replacement by an untrained international personnel of the present British, French, Dutch and Belgian colonial services would be almost the worst that could happen to an African or Asiatic colony. The interests of the inhabitants require that the administrators should possess a tradition and an *esprit de corps*. The transition from the present régimes would therefore have to take place gradually over a long period of years. During that time Scandinavians, Swiss, Germans and others might gradually be introduced into the administrations until, after the lapse of some fifteen or twenty years, a League corps of colonial administrators would have come into being. There is, however, no sufficient reason why Germany's equality of rights in the field of colonial administration should not be acknowledged from the outset by transferring to her the administration of, say, Togoland, a former German colony now administered, without greater advantage to the inhabitants, partly by Britain and partly by France.

The conflict of policy between Nazi Germany on the one hand and the loyal Members of the League on the other is too sharp to admit of any hope that inaction will result in anything but catastrophe and chaos. The policy of Germany is clear enough—no collective engagements, certain bilateral alliances, the alienation of Great Britain from France, and the break-up of the League ; then *die Vernichtung Frankreichs* and Europe in the possession of the German race. Inaction means for Britain the same as isolationism and has all the marks of a typically disastrous policy. At every crisis it advocates the easy course with certain destruction at the end, when the British Empire is left alone without a friend and rightly despised by the friends it has betrayed.

Thus the present conflict between the policy of Germany and of the League can be resolved only by action, and action may take the form either of persuasion or of fighting it out. A conditional offer by the League to Germany on the lines here suggested might, if made promptly, solve the conflict by persuasion and save the world from war.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

FURTHER THOUGHTS ON PLANNING IN INDUSTRY.

THOSE who oppose the proposals usually known as Planning are greatly handicapped by the widespread misunderstanding of what the economic controversy of our time is really all about: a misunderstanding which greatly increases the dangers into which the world is being led by the great army of "Planners" of all kinds in all countries. It is urgently necessary to emphasise that there is no such thing as an "Anti-Planner." There is not, never has been, and never could be for twenty-four hours, an economic structure that was not planned. All economic activity in England, just as in Russia, is planned everywhere and always and in all its details. And, funnily enough, it is just because those who call themselves "Planners" do not sufficiently realise this that they are so dangerous. It is because none of them have yet begun to plan *enough* that the economic results are so disastrous when they dislocate the delicate, though not perfect, planning machinery we already possess. The essential choice before us is not between plan and no plan, but between Monetary Planning and Planning by Decree. The first, our present system, is essentially decentralised, elastic, and leads to liberty and enterprise; but, unless checked, it leads also to inequality, and to instability. The latter implies autocracy, rigidity and bureaucracy; but it also makes it very easy to satisfy non-economic ends (good and bad) and to avoid great extremes of wealth. But all these points are secondary. So is also the whole question of the motives which inspire economic action, which can be completely altruistic or completely selfish in either régime. All these points, however important, are secondary to the vital economic question posed above—namely what is the method by which the economic processes of society are to be planned? Are they to be planned by price in a market or by quantitative decisions by an authority?

Now the more one reads the proposals of the planners, and such accounts as that by Mr. Webb of Russian experience, the more one is struck by the fact that they simply have not begun to appreciate what it is that they have got to plan, nor have asked themselves how anyone is to plan it. Economic planning, properly considered, has so far not been

seriously attempted even in Russia. So far from the threat of war, etc., making their task more difficult, it alone makes it quite simple, because it renders irrelevant the really important task which our monetary machine is set to solve, and which must be solved ultimately somehow. Anyone with a fair amount of administrative drive can organise a nation for a single end, regardless of whether that end represents the most valuable use of the nation's resources, and the most economical way of so utilising them. In that simple sense England in 1918 was infinitely more of a planned society than Russia has ever been—and so is Germany to-day. But it was not planned as an alternative and superior way of achieving economic ends. Far from that being so, we and they nearly ruined ourselves economically, for non-economic reasons which seemed sufficiently imperative.

The appalling economic wastes arising from these proceedings are not by any means solely nor mainly due to the disorganisation of what I may call ultimate consumption, nor can they in the least be remedied by allowing money to circulate in the hands of ultimate consumers. It is in the intermediate calculations and processes that the really serious results pile up cumulatively. Let the reader picture to himself industry operating under a system where, not here or there but everywhere, the supply and demand for every intermediate process—from a steel girder or crude copper to the output of a public works contractor or a motor haulage firm—were determined quantitatively according to a prearranged schedule; however honestly, expeditiously and wisely drawn up and however easily modified. The evil is not at all to be found in the appalling practical difficulties (though we may well think of the old priority lists and rationing schemes of the war controls). It is the cumulative real economic costs in waste, due to uneconomic use of resources, in a world where the homely analysis and measurement of competing estimate, at every stage and day by day, is deliberately made impossible. The fundamental failing of the planners is that economic planning in their sense of the word as against, say, strategical planning, is a contradiction in terms, because economic aims are not one but many. And in the absence of the only common measure—money—not only in the hands of ultimate consumers, but at every stage in the process, and commanding all the factors of

production, from risk-bearing to labour, there is no meaning in economic planning. You are trying to decide which is the better, a pound of butter or four o'clock—with the result that there is no butter and you are always late. We are not here concerned, the reader will note, with any question of illegitimate gains to anybody. We will assume (another large assumption!) that a quick and practical check is available on prices and profits as far as cost-accounting after the event is concerned. The real snag from the national point of view is that no one may be making undue profits—or any profits at all. In fact they may all be (and probably will be) depending on Government subsidy to carry on at all, and yet the resources of the country will be more and more diverted into uneconomic uses owing to the impossibility of knowing what the really economic uses are. A steady fall in the standard of life and a steadily increasing dependence of all industry on the State are theoretically inevitable and do in fact happen. This is what had to be destroyed all over Europe in the eighteenth-century movement of economic liberation which made modern standards of life possible. It is this which is being reconstructed in Central and Eastern Europe to-day, and the intolerable pressure of it on all society is, before our eyes, rapidly leading to an explosion.

Now let us consider the question a little further and as dispassionately as possible on its merits. The least important point, though it seems to be the only one which enters into the mind of the extreme collectivist planners, is the question of motives. In the remarkable, though often disgracefully unfair, work of the Webbs on Soviet Russia, there is to be found a clear statement of the advantages which may accrue (and exactly the same thing, though they do not say so, can be seen at work in Fascist countries) when a whole nation can be given a clear goal at which to aim ; to which all the arts of propaganda and mass enthusiasm can be directed. It cannot be denied that there must be a definite, though not easily measurable, loss in a country condemned by its economic structure to a comparative national aimlessness as against those other systems. The reply is twofold. First, in actual economic fact, the real as against the spectacular and superficial effectiveness of the individual motives at work in our society seems so far the greater, whether measured by our standard of production or by our standard of life.

Secondly, it is not necessary to do more than refer to the dark side of these other motives: the unhealthy, hectic atmosphere which has to be perpetually fed—in which every economic decision runs dangerously near to high treason. Life is punctuated by more or less fantastic accusations and counter-accusations of "sabotage." We must also remember the effect that fear must have on managerial and inventive capacity, the progressive subordination of the courts to the administrative machine necessitated by the complexity of the task, together with the loss of the rights of all such bodies as trade unions and minorities of all kinds, and so on. So much for the possible advantages in economics of non-economic motives.

Next, let us turn for a moment to the question of non-economic aims. It is perfectly obvious that attention must be given to these in all societies. A purely economic society has never existed, nor will. But we need not exaggerate the weakness of our present system in this regard. In fact it is arguable that its very superiority in dealing with purely economic problems makes it easier for our society to see where the shoe pinches, and, therefore, to deal with non-economic matters. And it is an obvious fact that its greater production gives it the means to do much more if it wants to. The vast structure of the voluntary and statutory social services surely disposes of the allegation that "capitalism" is unable to escape from the narrowest interpretation of desirable objectives in a community.

There are three other aspects of this part of the problem which require a word or two because they are the sort of consideration most potent here and now, in recommending some sort of planned intervention in industry. The first is the class of problem conjured up by the words Distressed Areas. Here political, sociological and humanitarian considerations quite palpably (though exceptionally) begin to take precedence over the deductions apparently to be made from the working out of the industrial machine. Yet there is no departure in principle in applying ourselves to relieve these exceptional areas any more than in paying unemployment benefit. Such experiments as trading estates under Government encouragement and so on are obviously taken within a framework constructed on other lines. The point is, what do we take as our normal from which we make exceptions? It

is the normal and the ideal which gives any society its distinct colour, not the occasional and reluctant deviations. A danger we always have to watch for and to guard against is lest in the process of dealing with this or that exception we do such damage to the normal as to defeat our own object. The lesson of 1931 only needs to be referred to, and the whole vital question of business confidence comes once again here to the forefront.

Two other subjects present themselves which are related to these non-economic judgments which we pass upon different economic systems. First, the apparent injustice of the great inequality in incomes, and the even greater inequality of capital wealth, that result under our system. This is often felt to be sufficient in itself to condemn the practical working out of our system. Many statements on this matter, when allowance is made for taxation and savings, etc., are of course exaggerated and misleading. But much remains after all allowances have been made on this score. But it should be remembered that the extent to which incomes can be levelled, if so desired, without damaging the working of our industrial system is largely a matter of custom and public opinion and is obviously variable. For those who attach vital importance to greater equality, the extension of the recent process of ever-increasing taxation of large incomes and ever-increasing social services like pensions and unemployment benefit, as may be found from time to time practicable, are at any rate as promising a line of advance as reconstructing the whole productive process. Moreover, it is of great importance to appreciate the extent to which even in order to make their creaking machinery go sufficiently fast to avoid actual famine, the Soviets have had to introduce inequality of income. These inequalities are already about 1 to 20, and if we take the much higher standard of all incomes in England that would allow, at twenty times the unskilled labourer's rate of, say, 50s. a week, an income of some two to three thousand a year in the higher ranks of industry. And the usual Russian argument here turns against themselves, for they have only allowed the Stakhanov systems, piece work, etc., to operate for the last three or four years. After a generation it remains to be seen whether the "spread" in collectivist Russia will be so very different from what is rapidly becoming the normal in capitalist countries with high rates of taxation.

The second subject is the alleged possibility under a completely planned system of abolishing unemployment. In a sense this is obviously true : it is merely the other way of saying that independent trade unions, like independent employers, are a contradiction in terms under a planned society. At any given moment there is a certain amount of the wealth being produced which is available for current consumption. If the consumers *qua* workers agree, as in Russia, that the standard rate of wages is to be the quotient obtained by dividing this among those who wish to work, there can clearly *ex hypothesi* be no involuntary unemployment. Of course, we are not concerned here with the unemployment due to changes of jobs, malingering, illness, etc. But is that what is commonly understood by abolishing unemployment ? It would be as true and as reasonable to claim that a prison or an army had no unemployment. There is surely here the same trick being played on us as in the similar question of reduced hours of labour : are wages to remain unaffected ? Involuntary unemployment can only arise because the standard rate of wages demanded (probably quite wisely—this argument has nothing to do with any criticism of trade union policy) is *not* calculated solely as a proportion of current production. On the contrary, under our system, while that is taken into consideration in reasonable negotiations, the labour representatives also consider the preservation of old or the acquirement of new standards of living for the employed. And this is done even at the expense of concentrating the cost upon a minority in the shape of unemployment. If it were found that the Russian method led to a higher standard of living than ours, then indeed there would be substance in the claim.

Having briefly considered non-economic aims and motives we return to the purely economic problem. And we are at once faced with a problem which is very difficult to deal with, either theoretically or practically : the extent to which a monetary economy such as ours may, whether we like it or not, be destroyed by the impact of foreign totalitarian structures, planned more or less completely on a non-monetary basis. This goes much deeper than any mere question of dumping, to use that much abused word. Probably, only history will be able to decide. Suffice it to say that old-fashioned Conservatives, with their own frequent leaning towards economic

nationalism, seldom seem to appreciate sufficiently how closely the breakdown of international exchange is related to the consequent progressive transformation of the internal industrial structure into something indistinguishable from State socialism, not only in Russia but equally in Germany and Italy. It would be an exaggeration, but one enshrining a very important and neglected truth, to say that the urgent choice before Europe to-day is between the reconstruction of an effective gold standard and universal economic dictatorship, whether it calls itself Communism or Fascism.

There are thus grave economic, sociological and political dangers in the totalitarian planning of society, while the ever-increasing British conception of industry as a social service in itself does now, and will still more in the future, allow us to gain most of the alleged advantages without the disadvantages of such a change. On top of all this, the practical difficulties and cumulative economic derangements are far more serious in a highly developed society like ours, where the higher standard of life and the dependence on world markets and savings makes rapid change desirable and, indeed, necessary. It would be unwise and it is unnecessary to go so far as to say that the difficulties in complete planning of industry are insurmountable. Though the dangers are greater here, on the other hand our skill and experience and resources in every rank of society and in all the organs of government are also much greater. And the two might cancel out. But it is certainly true that the dangers are far greater and more fundamental than the happy planners have ever realised, and all the theoretical objections can be seen coming rapidly and urgently to the surface in every society controlled by decree in all parts of Europe.

So much for the general problem. There remains a more immediate but narrower suggestion to consider. Is there a half-way house within the capitalist system, directed to partial reconstruction of our monetary planning in favour of administrative planning? It is the view of a small number of Conservatives that such an alternative does exist. It goes by various names, but its essential characteristic is that, abandoning with more or less completeness and understanding the monetary planning of the economic machine, they desire to substitute producers' control, made effective by statutory powers. This is usually, though quite improperly, summarised

by the phrase "self-government in industry"; the whole to be facilitated and accelerated by some sort of Enabling Act. The opponents of this policy submit that, so far from being an acceptable half-way house, it has all the vices of complete State socialism, as well as some purely economic objections of its own.

The production of wealth cannot be planned or controlled by producers: for the old homely reason that, just as you can take a horse to the water but you cannot make him drink, so you can take his rider shopping but you cannot make him buy. British farmers please copy! If there is one thing quite certain it is that if and in so far as non-monetary planning in industry becomes operative in England, it will be taken out of the hands of the producers and put into the hands of the only tolerable bodies for the purpose, namely the elected State and local authorities, possibly acting in part through the consumers' co-operative societies. Why is such a development inevitable? Before going into general arguments it is rather amusing to see that the very parts of England from which the archpriest of planning, Mr. Harold Macmillan, descends upon us, those very depressed areas in whose favour it is so often advocated, have at once discovered the truth of it by bitter, practical experience. The Jarrow steel-works controversy is still recent history and the desperate appeal to the Government against the semi-official Statutory Producers' "self-governing" ring. In passing, this also exposes the whole misrepresentation of that precious phrase, "self-government in industry," for what these people are governing is not themselves but the lives of whole districts and the purchases of whole nations. We have so much experience by now that it is sufficient to summarise the case in a series of categorical statements. Producers' control by statutory monopoly is vicious, first because, like all monopolies, wherever it can it reduces production; secondly, it therefore increases unemployment; thirdly, it hinders development, especially by new and small men; fourthly, it raises prices to the detriment of the consumer; fifthly, it always raids the Exchequer for subsidies, open or concealed; sixthly, as a consequence, it opens up grave opportunities for electoral corruption; and seventhly, it encourages economic nationalism and currency disorganisation by the most mischievous devices such as quotas, and strengthens the worst, while weakening the best, forces arising

from a tariff system. Finally, these results are so unassailable in theory and so universally experienced in practice, that the experiment is always short-lived. Either the insufferable jungle of blood-suckers is swept away, or it is transformed into a socialist machine under public control.

The deduction from all this is not that there are no new fields in which, whether by public utility society or by State ownership or in any other way, an advanced community such as ours may decide to take the task of planning the provision of certain services into the realm of authority as against the monetary decision of purchasers. We might, for example, decide to provide milk through the Metropolitan Water Board—or beer. The true deduction is, however, that we are compelled to make up our mind in each particular case exactly what we are planning for and how far we are prepared to go : if we are not on a balance of considerations prepared to communalise a given industry, or at the very least limit its profits and control its prices and production, we must not put the country into the intolerable position of having exactly its most important economic processes taken out of its own hands as expressed by the homely present method of purchasers' control and put into the hands of statutory monopolies without effective check.

I. M. Horobin.

JAPAN'S POLITICAL CRISIS.

IT is not easy to explain the recent political crisis in Japan to those unfamiliar with that nation's traditions and history. With regard to Japan it is one thing to know the facts and quite another thing to interpret them. The crisis of January last is only one of the many through which Japan has been passing in the last six years. With the rise and fall of Cabinets as an almost annual event since 1931, when the military bureaucracy took the bit in its teeth, the nation has been in a constant state of crisis, that word being the most common on the lips of leaders and in the press during the period named.

It would be a mistake to suppose, as there is a disposition to do in Western countries, that in the latest crisis the Hirota Cabinet was overthrown by the revolting political parties, by their refusal to hear ministers in the Diet and their increasingly critical attitude toward the whole administration. The largest political party, the Minseito, or liberals, have a membership of 205 in the Diet, and the next largest party, the Seiyukai, conservatives, number 171, influence outside these being of no importance. Though these parties accused the Cabinet of failure in diplomacy, especially in negotiations with Russia over the Fisheries Treaty, and with China over the North China question, they were in no mood to invite a dissolution of the House, precipitating a general election, in which the Government would be returned at the polls in spite of them, and they would nearly all lose their seats in the Diet, and hence their salaries, a matter of importance to men who are not well off.

No, the real cause of the latest crisis was the refusal of the War Minister, General Terauchi, to tolerate a Cabinet led by a civilian who had, with the sympathy of most of his colleagues, refused, or failed, to carry out the terms on which the War Office nominated a Minister of War when the Cabinet was hastily created after the assassinations of February 1936. These terms were vague, but everyone knew what they implied. The Administration was to create a new committee, or authority, that would tend to legalise the attitude of the military bureaucracy in approaching the Throne directly without reference to the Cabinet, and thus seem to countenance the action of the army in taking a free hand in

Manchuria in 1931 when it set out upon a conquest of the country, and drove out the Chinese Government and created an independent State. The army had been indirectly responsible for many of the assassinations perpetrated to cow statesmen into approving this independent attitude ; and the War Minister could not afford to allow the Cabinet to ignore his policy.

In overthrowing the Cabinet the military bureaucracy had two main objects : to force upon the Diet the largest budget in the nation's history and to eliminate the civilian Prime Minister, who not only tried to curb the ambitions of the army but was not in sympathy with a policy that tended to isolate Japan internationally. By forcing the Cabinet to resign, an easy thing to do simply by refusing to function as War Minister, General Terauchi was enabled to assist the General Staff in creating a Cabinet, with a general from the War Office at its head, and a nominee from the same source as War Minister, thus giving the bureaucracy complete control of the Government. Having disrupted the Cabinet, General Terauchi could not have retained his post without losing face, but, with a general at the head of the Government and a nominee from the War Office as Minister of War, the change meant implicit gain to the military element. Having thus forced military control over the Cabinet, the Government will be able to function even independently of the Diet, unless that body is reckless or patriotic enough to risk a dissolution and a general election by passing a vote of impeachment.

The Cabinet could carry on in spite of the Diet's refusal to sanction the colossal budget, simply by adopting the usual tactics in such cases, and falling back on the budget of the previous year ; but, as that is much less than the budget presented this year, the army and navy could not accept it. The budget compiled by the army and navy, or under their direction, amounts to the unprecedented sum of 3,038,591,000 yen (nearly £180,000,000), which is 727,000,000 yen more than that of last year. About 1,400,000,000 yen of this was to be sunk in army and navy ; and some 900,000,000 yen of it would have to be raised by flotation of loans at a time when loan issues were reaching a point of saturation. Not only the Diet, but all Japan, is seriously alarmed at the way in which the national debt has been increasing since the military hand

appeared in national politics. The debt has risen from 7,000,000,000 yen four years ago to over 10,000,000,000 yen to-day, involving an outlay in interest of about 550,000,000 yen annually. Still more alarming is the spirit in which this enormous debt is regarded by the military bureaucracy who argue that, even if failure to meet the interest leads to confiscation of capital, capitalists and financiers are as much in duty bound to suffer sacrifices for their country as are soldiers and sailors, a view in which, needless to say, practical business men are not inclined to acquiesce. It is probable that the new Cabinet will proceed cautiously in order to win public confidence, until the new budget is passed and the nation's finances and external policy are more stabilised, if that be at all possible ; but with the nation opposed, the future must remain problematical.

To render the situation still more acute there is a great degree of social as well as political unrest throughout the country. Heavy taxation and low prices leave the agrarian population in distress, and the Government has been too slow in granting relief. So much of the national revenue going to war purposes, with no war in sight, creates general dissatisfaction. Only the merchants and munition-makers are prosperous. There is fear of fascism and communism, between which the average man sees little difference. Many thousands of young Japanese men and women have been arrested on charges of communist propaganda in the last six years, and a large proportion of them have been sent to prison. It is believed that considerable numbers of these are not guilty, especially the young women. Owing to poverty, many farmers have had to dispose of their daughters. When General Araki was Minister of War he suggested that the farmers had as much right to suffer for their country as the army and navy men ; and shortly afterwards a conspiracy was unearthed among rural folk for the assassination of the War Minister.

For other reasons, too, the Cabinet has been made the butt of public censure. Being suspected as an instrument of military chicanery alone would have been sufficient to condemn the Cabinet in public opinion, but it was frequently accused of being reckless in finance and failing to stabilise Japan's external relations. Prince Konoè, President of the House of Peers, openly charged the Government with having neglected to ameliorate Japan's international isolation since her defiance

of the League of Nations ; and also with having blundered in negotiating with Russia, and bringing negotiations with China to a deadlock. The new agreements with fascist Powers in Europe, he contended, were prone to compromise Japan's relations with her old and tried friends, Britain and the United States. He admitted that these agreements were intended only as checks to communist propaganda and the influence of the Third International in the Far East, to which Britain and America are equally opposed. But the Cabinet's sudden and mysterious method of action tended to prejudice relations with the non-fascist nations. Then, Dr. Ogawa, Minister of Trade and Commerce in the last Cabinet, declared that Japan's isolationist propensity was reducing her yearly exports by prejudicing foreign nations to raise quotas against them. These criticisms were supported by both of the great political parties. These parties will now be more restless than ever, since the new Premier has practically ignored them and seems bent on the exclusion of party politics from the Japanese Cabinet.

It will doubtless appear something of a mystery that the late Cabinet should have been blamed for failing to negotiate successfully with Nanking, not only over North China questions but in regard to the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Chinese Republic, by the so-called " Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang, former war-lord of Manchuria. Ever since the Japanese army drove Chang out of his country it has been trying to win his confidence in vain. Even after he succeeded his father, the notorious Chang Tso-lin, as viceroy of Manchuria, he was constantly playing off Japan against Nanking to gain his own ends. These tactics ultimately so incensed the Japanese General Staff that it resolved to root him out altogether. His bribery of Japanese officials had been securing him greater freedom ; but when this was discovered by the army it led to the assassination of the Japanese Prime Minister in May 1934, and the overthrow of the Cabinet. The secret of the bribery came out in this way. When Chang was driven out, and his mansion at Mukden was searched by army officers, actual receipts for the bribes were found among his official papers. Some suspect that there is still a tendency on Chang's part to play off Tokyo against Nanking, of which the capturing of China's President was a symptom. But it is too much to suppose that Japan will ever be willing to allow the " Young Marshal " to succeed Emperor Kang Té on the

throne of Manchukuo; but Chang might further Japan's cause by being made a sort of viceroy in North China, where he could more easily play off one country against the other. When war-lords are in the saddle no one can tell what may happen, in any country.

It is not too much to say that, with the assumption of power by a new military Cabinet in Tokyo, the nation's unrest will not be allayed, and fear may prove a menace to peace. The public mind is ever conscious of the fact that this military revolt is against constitutional government; that the military bureaucracy has been indirectly responsible for the assassination of two Prime Ministers in the last six years, and an attempt on the life of a third, as well as for the assassination of several of Japan's greatest statesmen, and the exiling of all the rest to retirement. Poverty of leadership is a weakness of all countries: in this Japan is not singular; but Japan suffers more from it, since wise and efficient leadership is more imperative in a country without long political experience. One of Japan's most distinguished scholars, the late Dr. Hiroyuki Kato, wrote: "Public opinion is not necessarily wise or correct, nor can it be otherwise so long as there are no more than fifty or sixty men of distinguished ability in the whole of Japan." After so many assassinations, there are still fewer to-day, and even these are muzzled.

Since the assassinations of February last year, the Tokyo régime has been in all but name a military government: its policy has been formulated and enforced under impetus of the War Office, and the national budget compiled under its direction on a war basis. That the bureaucracy attempted to camouflage the real nature of the Government by placing a civilian at the head did not deceive the public in the least. Each member of the Cabinet had to be a mouthpiece of the General Staff or quit, and finally all had to quit together. But in spite of its audacious manipulation of government, the War Office hesitates frankly to take over full responsibility for inviting from the nation the accusation of fascism by proclaiming a military régime and undertaking all the intricate details of State administration. The dastardly tragedies of the last three years were, on the admissions of those tried and executed, for the purpose of establishing a military government; and consequently a military government is associated in the public mind with some form of

terrorism, the goal of which is fascism. As that would be plainly a violation of the Imperial Constitution it could only be legalised by winning consent of the Throne, by fair means or foul, as in Italy.

To most friends of Japan, who know the country well, it will seem unfortunate that the first name the Emperor was advised to nominate for Premier, General Kazushige Ugaki, should have been rejected by the War Office. His marvellous transformation of Korea while Governor-General proved him in possession of the character and ability equal to presiding over the Cabinet. He was, moreover, the popular choice of the nation, which had been expecting him to be raised to this office for some years. Distinguished both as a soldier and a statesman, he ought to have commanded the confidence of the bureaucracy. But the army could not forget that, while Minister of War in 1930, he had approved the London Naval Treaty ; that he was in the Cabinet which tried to curb the army in Manchuria and that he approved a policy of friendly co-operation with the old friends of Japan in Western countries. Such a man would have proved a thorn in the side of unconstitutional militarists. The right of the War Office to nominate the Minister of War gives the bureaucracy the power to wreck any Cabinet at will. Like Baron Shidehara, one of Japan's greatest Foreign Ministers, Ugaki was driven into exile after the army gained the whip-hand, and so he retired to Korea. His recent surrender of the post there was understood to mean that he was destined to be the next Prime Minister of Japan. The War Office made sure that this was not to be.

It must not be supposed, as some have intimated in England, that this was discourteous to the Throne, whose nominee General Ugaki was. The Emperor is a personage wholly removed from the sphere of politics and all such mundane things. His Majesty never selects a Prime Minister. He asks the *Genro* (Elder Statesmen) to nominate a man, and then summons the nominee to form a Cabinet. If the name thus submitted proves unacceptable to the political parties, or the nominee unable to form a Cabinet, the *Genro* submit another name. In this instance, General Hayashi was the only name that the War Office would accept. This was indicated by the refusal of any general of the army to accept the post of Minister of War under any other leader than General Hayashi.

The new Prime Minister was Commander-in-Chief of the army in Korea at the time of the Manchurian incident in 1931; and, without waiting for the consent of the Tokyo Cabinet, sent reinforcements to assist in the conquest of Manchuria. He returned to Japan to assist in purging the army after the assassination of Premier Inukai in May 1932, when Admiral Saito became Prime Minister. He succeeded General Araki as War Minister in the Saito Cabinet in 1934, and continued to retain his post in the Okada Cabinet which came into power some six months later. He remained Minister of War until the assassination of the Inspector-General of Military Education, General Nagata, in the summer of 1935, when he resigned over that unfortunate affair. This was supposed to put a stop to the Cabinet's attempt to meddle in army affairs. But the murderer was brought before court martial and, after a protracted trial, was on the eve of being sentenced to death when the Tokyo regiments, thinking that the Cabinet had not sufficiently learned its lesson in spite of the assassinations, rose in revolt on February 26th last year and assassinated several Cabinet Ministers and attempted the lives of several other statesmen. In due course the leaders of the mutiny were placed on trial before a military court and sentenced to death or imprisonment, fourteen of them facing a firing squad in the Tokyo military prison yard.

Smarting under this humiliation and disgrace the military bureaucracy was expected to lie low and keep in the background; but it assumed an attitude more challenging than ever.

The most serious aspect of this reinforcement of the military bureaucracy in Tokyo is the difficulty it will have to face in ensuring the economic stability of the nation and still to pursue a policy of enormous armamental expansion. It will also have to maintain amicable relations with nations interested in the peace of the Pacific, by maintaining a policy of isolation while promoting a race in armaments. A leading spokesman of the Japanese navy, Admiral Suetsugu, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the combined squadron, recently declared that Japan needs more than a defensive navy: she must command a force capable of ensuring her supremacy in the Far Eastern Pacific. All parties must be given the same number of ships of the same size. As this claim overreaches anything Japan has advanced until now, and tends to challenge British and American interests in China, the Philippines

and the South Seas, it may eventually develop tension in international relations.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, in the speech from the Throne at the opening session of the Imperial Diet, evinced an interest in the nation's international relations that was considered rather significant : he spoke of the " joy of intimacy in relations " with foreign countries, a statement that might be taken to suggest that this " joy " seemed in need of safeguarding. The statement may have meant little or it may have meant much. In Japan Imperial suggestion meets with immediate and positive response, and may have reacted in some measure against the Cabinet that has fallen, as its foreign policy was regarded as one of its most unsatisfactory aspects. The new Cabinet will be expected to deal gravely with this hint from the Throne.

It is difficult to anticipate very clearly what may be expected from the new Cabinet recently inaugurated in Tokyo. Apart from the veteran warrior, General Hayashi, who has been entrusted with its formation, the Cabinet has no one that would lend distinction to its personnel, which is what Japanese politicians would regard as rather mediocre. But, as has been indicated, it is distinctly a military government, under domination of the General Staff. It is somewhat ominous that the new Prime Minister, at the time of writing, has not succeeded in securing a suitable Foreign Minister, nor is the new Minister of Finance, Mr. Yuki, a financier that might be expected to deal with the problem of national finance, which seems almost insoluble. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance are the most important members of the Cabinet next to the Prime Minister and the Minister of War. As both will be under the direction of the military bureaucracy it will not much matter who they are ; and this is what makes it difficult for the Prime Minister to find the right men for these portfolios, since the right men will demand freedom to pursue a policy of co-operation with foreign countries and retrenchment in military expenditure. Mr. Sato, Japanese Ambassador to France, would prove an able minister with a wide experience. He had much to do with the conduct of Japan's case before the League of Nations at Geneva, and would be expected to pursue the policy that severed Japan from the League, though greater moderation will be essential to retrieve Japan's position in international

councils. The new Minister of Finance has to face the formidable task of reducing the budget in order to gain the approval of the Diet and the financiers, but as it is a military budget the War Office will have the final word. The new War Minister is simply an understudy of the Prime Minister. Admiral Yonai, who holds the naval portfolio, seems to be little known outside Japan, but he will be expected to stand firmly for the policy of naval expansion upon which his department is launched. The other members of the Cabinet will have the easier task of simply proceeding with the routine affairs of their departments, carrying on where their predecessors left off, the main work being in the hands of the permanent officials in office. If it be said that this is true of all Cabinets, let it be remarked that it is not true of Japanese Cabinets in regard to the ministries specifically named in this paragraph.

Those of us who have known Japan intimately for the past thirty years or more are not so much surprised at the present preference for military premiers ; for it is only in recent years that civilians have gained favour in that office, owing to the growth of democratic ideas and party government. Progress here was halted when party government proved the greatest obstacle to military expansion, for the political parties controlled the purse-strings ; and several statesmen had to be assassinated before party government could be disrupted. In the good old days when such men as Prince Yamagata, Prince Katsura and General Terauchi presided over the Tokyo Cabinet, great generals all, there was not the slightest suspicion of military domination, or a whisper of disrespect for the Imperial Constitution. These men never tolerated any reflection on the Imperial Rescript forbidding army and navy men to meddle in politics ; and as for assassins, they got short shrift. Why, then, should the present powers-that-be be driven to the anachronism of reverting to the tactics of the Shogunate days when Japan was practically under a dictatorship ? The influence of European dictatorships cannot be ruled out. Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini have made despotism hopeful, to say nothing of the Japanese bureaucracy having got away with free action in Manchuria. But, given enough rope, the end is certain. With the sincere sympathy of England and the United States, government in Japan may recover its poise, and the good old days be eventually resumed.

J. Ingram Bryan.

A RELIGIOUS ANTINOMY AND ITS SOLUTION.

THE Student Christian Movement Press has recently published an important and arresting book by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr of New York, entitled *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*.* The substance of the work was originally given as the Rauschenbusch Memorial Lectures, an American foundation for the investigation of the social significance of the Christian religion. The editor describes Dr. Niebuhr as " one of the prophetic voices of modern America," and says that " his challenge will leave few of us undisturbed." The book is, indeed, from every point of view remarkable. It is the fruit of extensive learning and deep reflection. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that almost every sentence is pregnant, profound and searching. The volume demands the careful attention of all who are concerned with the vital problem with which it deals. If its immediate object is the criticism of contrasted types of Christian outlook that are prevalent in the United States, it is of wider significance, since these types exist with certain modifications throughout the Christian world, and not least of all in this country. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the book will receive adequate consideration by British theologians and social teachers.

Dr. Niebuhr's polemic is directed equally against what he terms Christian Orthodoxy and Christian Liberalism.

> Orthodox christianity, with insights and perspectives in many ways superior to those of liberalism, cannot come to the aid of modern man, partly because its religious truths are still imbedded in an out-moded science, and partly because its morality is expressed in dogmatic and authoritarian moral codes (page 14).

On the other hand,

> the religion and ethics of the liberal Church is dominated by the desire to prove to its generation that it does not share the anachronistic ethics or believe the incredible myths of orthodox religion. Its energy has been devoted to the task of proving religion and science compatible, a purpose which it has sought to fulfil by disavowing the more incredible portion of its religious heritage and clothing the remainder in terms acceptable to the modern mind (page 15).

* *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics.* By Reinhold Niebuhr. Student Christian Movement Press.

In contrast to both these types, " the distinctive contribution of religion to morality lies in its comprehension of the dimension of depth in life " (page 15). Its effect is " to bring the whole of reality and existence into some system of coherence."

> This straining at an ultimate coherence drives high religion into depth as well as breadth, for the forms of life are too various and multifarious to be ascribed easily to a single source or related to a single realm of meaning if the source does not transcend all the observable facts and forces, and the realm does not include more than the history of the observable world " (page 17).

Hence there is tension between what is and what ought to be, a tension which must not be prematurely resolved. The attempt of liberal religion to do this results in its " thinness " and superficiality. " Failure to recognise the heights led modern Christianity to an equal blindness towards the darker depths of life " (page 26). Higher religions are of two types, " mystical " and " mythical." The former in seeking to be rational ends in such abstraction as to posit " an ultimate reality beyond all rational forms " (page 34). Prophetic religion, just because it finds meaning and purpose in history, becomes mythical, and for the most part mistakes the truths embodied in the myths for events in history.

The ethic of Jesus, which " is the perfect fruit of prophetic religion," sets forth " the ideal of love." " God is, therefore, love " (pages 47-8). It is, therefore, brought up against the inexorable fact of self-love, which is " the natural will to survive " (page 51), and this collision produces the sense of sin, which, while essentially bound up with man's finitude, is interpreted by religion as consisting in " an evil will." The consciousness of sin becomes " the tension between the principles of love and the impulse of egoism, between the obligation to affirm the ultimate unity of life and the urge to establish the ego against all competing forms of life " (page 77). Yet, in consequence of the actual conditions of human life, the perfectionism of Jesus is practically impossible, and attempts to apply it in the realm of human life reduce its meaning and lead to the subtle substitution of lower and less meaningful principles, alike in politics, economics, and personal life. It remains, therefore, " an impossible possibility,"

which has relevance to human life, but cannot be fulfilled in it. The Kingdom of God, as set forth by Jesus,

> is always a possibility in history, because its heights of pure love are organically related to the experience of love in all human life, but it is also an impossibility in history and always beyond every historical achievement. Men living in nature and in the body will never be capable of the sublimation of egoism and the attainment of the sacrificial passion, the complete disinterestedness which the Ethic of Jesus demands (page 42).

Perhaps the essential meaning of this book may be found in Dr. Inge's statement in his recently published anthology of the Christian Life (*Freedom, Love and Truth*).

> Christianity is a revolutionary idealism which estranges revolutionaries by its idealism, and conservatives by its drastic revaluation of earthly goods. Its function in social struggles is to take the sting out of such conflicts by setting its own standards before both sides.

What is to be said of this apparently fundamental *impasse* and of the antinomy between spirit and nature, with its outcome in contrasted types of religion, which are equally inadequate? To begin with, the hard-and-fast division of religious types into Orthodoxy and Liberalism, in emphasising extremes ignores the great intermediate realm in which both types, if not blended, qualify one another, not artificially, but in a living way. True catholicity of faith avoids both the rigidity and the fluidity, both the remoteness and the "thinness," which are justly criticised. In the next place, Dr. Niebuhr's account of mystical religion is too purely intellectual to do justice either to its hidden springs or to its ultimate objective. His description may, on the whole, be true of Neo-Platonism, but only imperfectly represents typical Christian Mysticism. It is more important to note that the book leaves the ethic of Jesus in a somewhat uncertain and indeed precarious position. Is Jesus the spiritually authoritative revealer and interpreter alike of the highest, inmost and ultimate Reality? Or is He the supreme idealist, the absoluteness of whose teaching is out of true proportion, being, indeed, incompatible with complete sanity, because out of keeping with the fundamental nature of the universe? If the latter, why does the idealism of Jesus so persistently press itself upon mankind and set up a permanent standard of what ought to be? Is not its relevancy

the sign that it manifests a higher and real order of being, which because it is the highest and most real, will eventually be fulfilled in human history, either under terrestrial conditions, or in a succeeding order, which will be at once the fruit and the transformation of the present? All this is left, to the mind of the present reviewer, in uncertainty, though this may possibly be due to the fact that the book is limited to an interpretation of Christian ethics and does not attempt such a philosophy of the Christian religion as would integrate ethics in a consistent and satisfying whole.

The question, however, goes deeper. The author apparently cannot accept what he calls "St. Paul's Christ-mysticism," because, according to him, it borders "on the very edge of the magical" (page 226). Yet without the consentient Christology of the Church, which is more than Pauline, the absoluteness of the ethic of Jesus remains doubtful, because it is insecurely based. Moreover, the New Testament is in accord with Dr. Niebuhr in treating the Christian ethic as "an impossible possibility" apart from the new birth, "the birth from above" of St. John, or the equivalent "resurrection" of St. Paul. This possible transformation of human nature is left out of the picture by Dr. Niebuhr, yet no account of the ethic of Jesus can be complete without it. When this is admitted, and indeed insisted upon, the limitations of existent human nature may well be transcended, men may yet rise to the sacrificial heights which Dr. Niebuhr treats as impossible, and even the supposed rigidity of cosmic conditions may yield to the transforming influence of the Spirit, exerting its power as perfect love.

The contrast between what Dr. Niebuhr terms mystical and mythical religion has been recently treated by Dr. Joseph Needham as the opposition of Greek neo-platonism and Hebrew apocalypticism in an article on "The Common Ground between Christianity and Communism" (*Spectator*, October 30th, 1936.) In regard to this Dr. Needham emphasises the importance of "the philosophical evaluation of Time."

> If Time is illusory, unimportant, or evil, the trend of other-worldliness in Christianity becomes fundamental, earthly affairs lose their significance, and the Kingdom of Heaven is interpreted as a realm of mystical experience unconnected with concrete human relationships.

If, on the other hand, Time be treated as significant, " The Kingdom of God is no unearthly conceptual realm, but a just and happy social order," which draws towards it " to work for its realization men of the most diverse types from all the peoples of the world." " These two widely divergent trends," Dr. Needham says, " have existed side by side in an uneasy union in the Christian religion since the first few centuries." Here again we are presented with two unreconciled extremes to the neglect of intermediate positions in which they are more or less completely harmonised.

In face of this antinomy, pressed upon us by two thoughtful and influential writers, it becomes necessary to examine the classic sources of the Christian religion in order, if possible, to discover an underlying unity, out of which both of these extremes have arisen, and by means of which the truth underlying both of them may be brought into organic spiritual coherence. It should be remarked at the outset that throughout the New Testament the mystical and the apocalyptic elements of the Christian religion are found side by side, and that the apostolic writers had no sense that they stood in " an uneasy union " with one another. For example, St. Paul in writing to the Church at Philippi and with the relationship of imperial Rome with its colonies in his mind, declares in the same sentence that " The state of which we are citizens [πολίτευμα] is in heaven, from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ " (Phil. iii, 20). Here the mystical and the apocalyptic are treated as the inseparable parts of one spiritual whole, and this is characteristic of the general tenor of his teaching. Moreover, the Apostle's practical injunctions are so closely bound up with both these aspects of the Christian religion as to form a vital bond between them and to dismiss any conception of an *Interims-Ethik* as entirely foreign to his belief. In consonance with the prophetic teaching of the Old Testament, Christian ethics rest upon the character of God, and are therefore unaffected, save in their application by the changes of the Cosmos. While their application is relative to the order of the world, in principle they are absolute and eternal, because they spring out of relationship, not so much to the creature as to the Creator.

On closer examination it will be found that there is a third element of which due account must be taken, namely the

Inward. " The Kingdom of God," St. Paul declares, " is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit " (Rom. xiv, 17). Thus the inward, the mystical, and the prospective are treated as three essential and mutually consistent parts of Christian faith and life. A more intimate study of the New Testament will reveal the nature of the bond that unites them.

1. In the first place must be set the inwardness of the Christian religion. Our Lord is reported to have said : " The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation : Neither shall they say, Lo, Here! or there! for lo, the Kingdom of God is within you " (St. Luke, xvii, 20, 21). It is, of course, possible to translate the Greek preposition as meaning " among " you, but this is seriously to weaken the force of the contrast that is so obviously intended. As Dr. Niebuhr remarks, the ethic of Jesus " has only a vertical dimension between the loving will of God and the will of man " (page 49). The Kingdom of God means His effective rule in the hearts of men and, therefore, throughout their life and conduct. It involves such spiritual union between God and man as makes, and can alone make, the sovereign authority of God the immanent spring of a response which makes " All's Law " to be " All's Life " because " the Love of God is shed abroad in our hearts." Yet throughout the teaching both of our Lord and of His apostles, this union between God and men in love is not left in this formlessness. It is everywhere set forth as the union and fellowship of the Father and His sons. Our Lord's life, teaching and spirit are throughout governed by this conscious relationship between God as His Father and Himself as the Son. This conscious experience is His specific gift to His followers. It is by the experience of this fatherly-filial relationship that the inwardness of the Kingdom of God must be explained. It is the inmost secret, the vital meaning, of the Christian religion. Theology, religion, ethics are all transformed, throughout the New Testament, by the illumination and inspiration of this supreme and all-embracing relationship. The human relationship of fatherhood and sonship is everywhere treated as so constituted in God that it is the most adequate representation of a mystic relationship in which the most intimate fellowship is enjoyed on the basis of personal distinction, divine creatorship, and such human subordination as contains within itself the sense of kinship and affinity with God.

2. This divine sonship gives to the inwardness of the Kingdom of God two essential characteristics. It is both transcendent and forthgoing. Its "treasure" is in heaven, but its immediate objective is on earth. It brings together the supreme values of the eternal order and the importance of the historic process in time. This twofold reference is the essential meaning of sonship. It seeks at once to pursue and to enjoy the highest and to manifest it by uplifting and transforming the terrestrial order. Only in this combination is the integrity and wholeness of spiritual life to be realised and displayed. Heaven is the sphere of absolute values that are realised and active in the living God and are participated in by those who are in fellowship with Him. Yet these values are implanted in true human life, are organic with it, and can only be pursued in so far as they gain practical expression in character and social conduct.

The typical example of this fundamental combination is to be found in our Lord, Who "went about preaching the gospel of the Kingdom" and "doing good." Hence His consciousness was at once mystic and apocalyptic because it was perfectly filial. The relationship of eternity to time remains a philosophic problem. Yet each is real, and God who "inhabiteth eternity" comes forth as Creator to fulfil an eternal purpose in time and history. He is both transcendent and immanent because He is Love. So, also, it is with His Son. Hence the life of His followers is also essentially twofold. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says, almost in the same breath, "Ye are come unto Mount Zion, the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem" and "to do good, and to communicate [that is to share], forget not, for with such sacrifices God is well pleased." This practical temper and conduct alone corresponds with the "vertical" relationship that exists for men with "The Father, from whom every family constituted by fatherhood [πατρία] is named"; that is, derives its nature.

3. Yet it is the characteristic faith of the Christian religion that, in thus combining the mystic and the apocalyptic, the followers of Christ are neither supreme nor alone in playing their part in human history. Christ is for them the supreme actor in human history. The world will finally be judged by the spiritual values of His perfect life. The age-long conflict of human history is between Christ and Anti-Christ, between self-giving and self-love. Human life, and even the cosmic

order, will eventually be transformed by the Spirit of Christ, and the discord between them will be finally harmonised, after the conflict has played its part in evoking and perfecting the eternal values of Divine Love. This final consummation will be the triumph, not of men, but of Christ.

This final triumph can for the present be only scenically depicted, if at all, with the inherent imperfections and externality by which such picturing must needs be marked. Yet even this picturing, though misleading when treated with fundamentalist literalism, enshrines great spiritual truths. Its " treasure " is held " in earthen vessels," for " we know not yet what we shall be." Owing to their limitations, men have presented as irrational alternatives what are to be held together in a spiritual whole. This whole, when truly apprehended, accepts " the one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves " as the goal of ethical conduct, and does so just because of the filial spirit, which " seeks the things that are above, where Christ is seated at the right hand of God."

J. Scott Lidgett.

FRANCE IN SYRIA.

RECENT developments in the French Mandate for Syria are of special interest in view of the Franco-Syrian treaty of October 22nd, 1936. The Treaty provides that the *status quo* is to undergo a radical change in the direction of independence. The country is passing through the same historical processes as Iraq, Egypt, and, to a certain extent, Palestine. It deserves all the more notice because it is the most advanced of the Arab countries. The Syrian nation adapted the principles of European culture sooner and at a more rapid rate than the other Arab nations. Even in Egypt, Syrian publicists, doctors, lawyers and intellectuals in general held a front-rank position for many years. Unlike the other Arab countries, Syria has a very strong Christian minority, composed of Maronites, Orthodox Greek Christians, Melchites, Greek Catholics, Armenians and so forth. Of the total population of 2,600,000 over half a million are Christians. France's strange policy has divided the Mandate territories into five "independent states"—Syria, Great Lebanon, Djebel-Druse, Alauiten and the Sandjak of Alexandretta.

The first period of Mandate government comprised three and a half years of General Gouraud's rule. On his appointment as High Commissioner in November 1919 he declared his principal task to be the economic restoration of the country. As he himself related, the words of the creator of present-day Morocco, Marshal Lyautey, hovered before him like a guiding star: "As long as the French flag floats over the country it remains our duty to protect it, not only by military force but also by increasing the contentment and prosperity of its inhabitants, as well as by strengthening its economic position." Fine words, without doubt. Unhappily they remained on paper. The High Commissioner's programme was to revive the exhausted agricultural system, whilst paying special attention to the interests of France. During the World War France was completely dependent on other countries for her cotton supply. Gouraud therefore took up the cultivation of the cotton trade, especially as the district around Aleppo is suitable for cotton plantations. What was the result? After three and a half years of activity his report could point only to very poor success. Of the 15,000 square miles of cultivated land, only one-fifth of the soil was being cultivated at

the time when he left the country. Despite the great interest which France professed for cotton plantations, the area under cultivation in 1924, a year after his retirement, amounted to only ninety square miles.

Serious difficulties, of course, both economic and social, stood in the way. For example, tens of thousands of young people were forced to emigrate for lack of the means of existence; great expanses of country, including some very fertile districts, either lay fallow or were under superficial cultivation; the war caused a catastrophic drop in agricultural production; many mulberry and olive trees were uprooted, causing a great decline in silkworm breeding and oil production, the most important branches of agriculture in Lebanon; finally, the country was suffering from lack of capital. But instead of finding ways and means of overcoming the difficulties, instead of pursuing a national economic policy, Gouraud relegated these serious economic problems to the background. The ambitious General, who had had a distinguished career in the war, devoted himself to sternly political aims. On September 1st, 1920, he proclaimed in Beirut, " in the name of the French Republic," the creation of the state of Greater Lebanon. Such was the fulfilment of France's efforts to extend her colonial rule to the eastern Mediterranean basin. As was to be expected, the creation of the new state came as a heavy blow to the Syrian Nationalist movement. Riots broke out in protest and spread.

The policy of Gouraud's successors, Weygand, Sarrail, de Jouvenel and Ponsot, followed, more or less, the programme of their predecessor, the pupil of Lyautey. The division of the country was continued, and by the summer of 1924 the five " States " already mentioned were in existence. The present High Commissioner, Count de la Martel, was unwilling to stop short at this division. By a decree of January 23rd, 1936, he ordered a further parcelling out of Syria into six, indeed eight, new " independent " provinces with independent financial and administrative organisation. The carrying out of this reform, however, was hindered by a rising in Syria in January-February 1936. The division of the country cannot be justified either on economic or administrative grounds. Precisely for reasons of economic and administrative usefulness, unity is a necessity. Every " State," every " Republic," has its special apparatus, the upkeep of which

is a heavy burden on a poor community. Political motives dictated the division, namely the desire to weaken the power of the nation as a whole; the "States," parties, religious denominations, minorities, were played off systematically one against another in the interest of French colonial policy.

According to the status of the Class A Mandates, the mandatory power enjoys no economic privileges, being placed on an equal footing with other members of the League. In reality, France deliberately attempted to gain a monopoly in the Syrian markets. One convincing proof is the fact that in the economic programmes of the High Commissioners, particularly those of General Gouraud and Count de la Martel, the need of native industry is never mentioned. The Customs Office in particular paid no heed to the requirements of the nascent industrial production of the country. French capital alone controlled the most important economic factors, such as the water supply, transport, electric power and the tobacco trade. The results of these monopolies, among others the very high prices, weigh heavily on the population. It is not without interest that, on account of the high prices, the inhabitants of Damascus in 1935 boycotted the trams and the electric light supply for several months.

An extensive system of irrigation—a crying necessity—was not carried out. The taxation of agriculture amounts to between 20 and 30 per cent. of the proceeds. Hardly any provision was made for the creation of normal means of credit, such as co-operative credit associations, for the smallholder, who predominates in Syrian agriculture. To-day the rate of interest for the peasant alternates between 12 and 50 per cent. or more. Nothing is done to substitute for short-term credit, usually limited to a year, one more rational and fair which would be as much in the interest of agriculture as in that of the poor farmer. Finally, no steps have been taken to spread expert agricultural knowledge. In such circumstances it is not to be wondered at that trade has been in a hopelessly stagnant condition for years. The poverty of these districts cannot fail to strike every foreigner.

Syria, as a Mandate country, was placed in Class A, and should therefore be granted all the advantages of self-government. In reality the French Mandatory administration followed a policy of autocracy. The Syrian people had, *de facto*, no right to shape its destiny. The Parliaments, Ministers,

Presidents, and all the native machinery of the "States" existed only on paper. French advisers, with the High Commissioner at their head, ruled everywhere. By his own decision Parliaments were dissolved for an indefinite period, constitutional measures and political liberties were suspended; even the minimum guarantees of personal liberty were rendered illusory. The French political secret service (*Service des Renseignements*) established a pitiless system of supervision. It is noteworthy that the secret service posts were held by officers who were also advisers to the District Governors, that is, local representatives of the Mandate Government. The worst abuses were rife.

With the exception of de Jouvenel, the High Commissioners pursued a policy, not of understanding and co-operation, but of the strong hand. Heavy responsibility for the steady deterioration of conditions rests with the French advisers, who, through their knowledge of the country, understood how to exercise decisive influence on the High Commissioners. It was especially in these officials' interest to treat Syria as a colony. The High Commissioners went away, but the advisers remained and ruled in the country as in a conquered fortress.

The Mandate policy achieved exactly the reverse of what was desired, namely the union of the national elements in the various "States." Generally mistaken were the tactics of employing the Christians as allies against the Moslems; for the Maronites, and also most of the other Christians, feel closely united with their Syrian home. They have proved this unity conclusively more than once. As already intimated, the dissatisfaction found expression in risings. The following major riots took place: The rising of Emir Faour in 1919 in the Huleh district; the rising in the Alauiten district under the leadership of Sheik Salih ibn Ali, which lasted from 1919 to 1921; the revolt in Northern Syria under the leadership of the recently deceased national socialist leader from Aleppo, Ibrahim Hanano; the insurrection in 1922 under Sultan el-Atrasch in the Hauran district; risings under Sheik Ismail Hariro in Hauran and in Damascus in 1922; the rising in 1923 in the Baalbek district, led by Melhem Kasim; the great rising under the above-named Sultan el-Atrasch in 1925; finally, the Syrian general strike, January-February 1936. It must be repeated that only great risings are included

in this catalogue. Less important outbreaks were much more frequent. Not only for months, but for years, French troops waged war against the Syrian people. The population was particularly embittered by the ruthless methods of suppressing the insurrection of 1925-6, when Damascus was bombarded by artillery and aeroplanes. This terrible bombardment, which lasted from October 18th to the 20th, reduced entire districts in the city to ruins. The impression left by the ruins is heart-rending.

Owing to the frequent riots and smouldering discontent among the population, France was compelled to maintain large military forces. Thus the expenses for the French army in Syria for 1929 amounted to 271 million francs. According to the statement of Pertinax in the *Echo de Paris*, the French budget has been burdened of late years by 160 million francs annually for the French troops. *Œuvre* also holds the view that the Mandate over Lebanon and Syria costs France a very great deal and requires 13,000 French troops. According to this paper the French commitments for these two countries amounted to about 350 million francs, whilst the troops alone devoured the gigantic sum of 160 million francs.

The last period under Count de la Martel failed to bring either order or peace into the country. Like General Gouraud, a man of the old diplomatic school, he planned great economic schemes, but soon abandoned them in order to devote himself to " high politics." In the sphere of internal policy, he started his " approaches " to the representatives of the nation with the dissolution of Parliament, without summoning it again. His rigorous police system led, finally, to the above-mentioned January rising. In the critical days he assumed an aggressive attitude which aggravated the situation. Almost the whole time he held office in an atmosphere of suspicion. In political circles in Syria it was considered practically certain that he would not return to Beirut. This, however, was not the case ; but it is to be hoped that he will now pursue a conciliatory policy in the spirit of the new treaty.

The basis of this policy is the idea of employing Syria's geographical and strategic conditions as a bridge between West and East. At the time when England's chief task in the Near East, even after granting internal independence to Iraq, was to guard the route to India at the strategic points between Suez and Basra, France's rule in Syria and Lebanon

bore a more localised character. It arose from historical and cultural motives and from a basis of prestige, rather than from France's political and economic interests as a colony-owning country and from the necessities of her world policy in general. This " omission " is now to be made good.

The scheme drawn up by Count de la Martel in 1934 contains two important points, a road between Damascus and Bagdad, and the extension of the railway between Aleppo and Tel Suan as far as the Syrian-Iraq frontier. The Damascus-Bagdad road means, besides the connection between Syria and Iraq, access to the Persian Gulf and thence to India, Indo-China and the Far East ; the railway from Tel Suan to the Iraq frontier opens up the route to Northern Persia and thence to the Russian Caucasus. France has great strategic interests in these new roads. Moreover, Syria is the most important station on her air service between Indo-China and the Far East. This connection is to strengthen the vital nerve of the traffic between France and Indo-China, by the development of the landing places in Beirut and the improvement of the other aerodromes existing in Syria.

In endeavouring to take advantage of the political tendencies in Iraq and Iran, which aim at liberation from English influence, France is seeking to divert the commercial traffic of these countries from the harbour of Haifa to Beirut, from the Haifa-Bagdad road or railway to the contemplated Aleppo-Gabo-Iraq railway and the Damascus-Iraq road. While Great Britain develops the harbour of Haifa and Italy is strengthening her influence on the Eastern Mediterranean coasts, France desires to secure a share of the Middle East and above all to utilise her position in Syria. This plan is to be brought into harmony with Syria's economic interests. Will it succeed ?

Syria's demands have been made known on various occasions. They were clearly formulated, for example, in the petition of the Syrian delegation to the Mandate Commission of the League on February 11th, 1927. " Above all the Syrians demand their full independence, like other civilised countries. They also demand the full exercise of their national sovereignty. They ask, therefore, to be admitted to the League of Nations, that is, they wish to be in possession of all the results of real juristic independence. In recognition of the

sacrifices made by France in Syria and Lebanon, the representatives of the Syrian and Lebanon people will recognise France's right to certain economic advantages, which may be summed up as follows : the issue of loans, the development of the Syrian army, the creation of a French naval base on the Syrian coast, and, finally, the drawing up of a treaty of mutual defence in the event of danger." These demands included all the items brought forward by the Syrian delegation at the treaty negotiations in Paris. The chief points were the restoration of the constitution ; abolition of the Mandate, the failure of which has become obvious ; a declaration of the absolute independence of Syria and recognition of the unity of the country in the territorial post-war divisions when the Mandate was introduced ; the concluding of a treaty with France after the pattern of the treaty between Iraq and England. These demands were accepted by Count de la Martel, after the fifty days' strike of the Syrian people in 1935, as a basis for negotiations.

After several months of negotiation the treaty was at last concluded. All the questions concerning the relations between Syria and France have been regulated. The chief clause contemplates the dissolution of the Mandate in three years' time, when Syria, supported by France, is to enter the League. Meanwhile direct French rule is to yield to native government. Syria is to be awarded the most far-reaching rights in administration, law, finance and customs. The management of the so-called mutual interests, which rested in the hands of the Mandate government, is to be transferred to the Syrian Government. Special clauses regulate the rights of the French and of French undertakings in Syria. French military occupation is to be maintained to defend the frontiers, but the troops are to be decreased and limited to certain districts. A committee has been appointed to raise money for the future army and navy. This organisation has decided to exact from every able-bodied inhabitant a minimum subscription of a franc per month ; no provision is made for a maximum subscription. Simultaneously, groups are being organised for military training.

It is recognised that the presupposition of the restoration of a relationship of confidence between France and Syria is the strengthening of the principles of a legally recognised State ; the Lebanon and Syrian Parliaments must be

summoned again; constitutions of the districts and political liberties must be restored; a general amnesty is also in prospect. One of the first duties of the Parliament, that is, of a National Assembly, is to be the ratification of the Treaty which opens a new chapter in the history of Syria.

The Blum Cabinet, needless to say, has no responsibility for the Mandate policy of its predecessors. On the contrary it has inaugurated a new era for the Syrian nation. It is regrettable that the Alexandretta question has arisen to complicate the situation. Historically, geographically and ethnically, the Sandjak is an Arab territory with a Turkish minority. The Syrians regard it as a portion of their homeland, which they are ready at any cost to defend. In this endeavour they count on the effective support of France.

PAUL OLBERG.

THE STORY OF THE SCARECROW.

FOR some time past historians and economists have been nibbling at various scientific theories of the social development of an earlier age, but like the knowing mice in their studies or class-rooms, they have not allowed themselves to explore these tempting baits too far. From time to time, too, less august persons may have had recourse to an impressionistic study of some neglected or forgotten analogy of old-world life, and one such adventure, though trivial, may amend the credit of the countryside as well as the meaning of a symbol of one of its activities through an unmeasured span of years.

Now that the "village museum" is attracting serious attention in the learned world, it might seem that among its typical exhibits the village scarecrow should be adequately represented and correctly labelled. The cult of the crow may be found among nations of the East and West, and a rustic patter of prayers and spells with a display of rude symbols, to ward off evil spirits or pests, may recall some earlier superstitions; but we shall not find here the inspiration that we are seeking, though a trace of it appears in Chaucer's malicious story of the caged crow, whose depravity provoked a curse of tuneless melanism, and reappears in Lafontaine's delicious fable. For already in the Tudor period the futile scarecrow of the fields was cited in the forum as a mere illusion. Indeed our dictionaries might have told us that, in those days, a guardian could suggest that a ward's importunate demands were "making a scarecrow of his studies"; while our publicists might be surprised to learn that then a statesman could justify a Turkish treaty as being meant "to make a scarecrow against Spain." Finally, the gaunt spectre of the scarecrow itself may remind us of the reproach and danger that beset a nation whose workers lack the means of securing their daily bread.

A somewhat austere definition of the "scarecrow" has been given in the dictionaries, and some further particulars seem desirable to complete and elucidate an outline of the evolution and devolution of this familiar spectacle. Even from a conventional definition it is obvious that the scarecrow is an object that inspires fear, and its display is commonly associated with the defensive operations of farmers and market

gardeners, whose wheat or walnuts may be attacked by flocks of feathered raiders among whom the crow family predominates in numbers, cunning and voracity.

It might seem that here we have traces of a hereditary feud between the cultivators of the soil and the denizens of the local rookery, a relic of that vendetta being the "scarecrow" itself as a forlorn feathered "object," suspended from a stake or flaunted among other exhibits in the keeper's "larder." This rustic object-lesson may have been needed, but it might be urged that the conventional scarecrow of the dictionaries was not meant to be presented in this obscene form.

In the course of time, improvements on a scarecrow of bones and feathers have been attempted and such devices as invisible entanglements and mystifying reflections of light or inflections of sound have been effective so long as the illusion was favoured by sunshine or wind. Occasionally too the effect of such "scares" has been sustained by mechanical contrivances, but in every age it must have been found that the terror inspired by an inanimate scarecrow is gradually succeeded by contempt, and even the illusion of induced movement is necessarily ephemeral. The next device, therefore, was for the terrorist, when not present in person, to display a sartorial effigy which became the conventional "scarecrow" of modern times. The real and only effective scarecrow was, however, the scarer of crows in his own proper person, animated by a sense of the duty of protecting his employer's crops by terrifying predatory birds and putting them to flight. And so we come to one who may once have been a hereditary scarer of crows as a "farm-hand" on the manorial staff, armed with sling, crossbow or shotgun (according to the period), and equipped further with a hand rattle, as an accompaniment to raucous shouts. From which it will be seen that the scarer of crows may have been confused with a victim or dummy by those who have not realised that the scaring of crows was contrived by means of counter-attacks, and not by a vindictive display of battle trophies as in savage warfare. But it was in the uncivilised borderland of North Britain that starving peasants discovered a means to save their crops by a parchment pouch containing pebbles, carried on a pole, and for the last two centuries the roar of gunpowder has helped to solve that problem once for all.

The writer of this article has preserved, besides an oral family tradition going back to Napoleonic times, a clear recollection of a " tenting lad," an envied companion of his boyhood (more than seventy years ago), as the bearer of a " tenting gun," a flint-lock fowling-piece of prodigious length firing a blank charge of gunpowder, without which the crows would only flap from one end of the field to the other, ignoring an artistic effigy, which should have reminded them that its original was also the fearless raider of the rookery nests. The gun itself, however, was sometimes useless, when the weekly allowance of powder doled out by the bailiff had become exhausted ; and then the tenting lad fell back upon a sling, from which he discharged pebbles with astonishing force and accuracy.

Seventy years hence our own great-grandchildren will probably know better than to shoot wild birds or to steal their eggs, while the manor house and its rookery may by then have become as rare as the wreckage of motor cars and aeroplanes in a generation which has learned to fly in air more easily than it can swim in water. However this may be, we should not allow the well-known objects of the countryside during our youthful days to be thrown on the scrap-heap of unremembered things without leaving any surer memorial than oral tradition to assist the scholarly and patriotic labours of the learned compilers of dictionaries and glossaries of our national and provincial speech or customs.

It is perhaps due to this neglect that the above conjectural reconstruction of the devolution of the scarecrow as a familiar institution of the English village needs to be qualified by more definite confirmation from manorial records. This can now be furnished, thanks to the interest that is being shown, up and down the country, in their preservation and use ; but it will also show that our scarecrows may have a rather tragic origin. It might seem that the very name of the rookery (*rokeria*) has a feudal flavour and, though the scarecrow can have no analogy with grim exhibits *in terrorem* of mangled remains of traitors in the " Four Quarters of England " or of felons left to rot in chains at the " place whence they came," the rookery may have been included among the " issues of the manor " and the rooks' nests in the lord's " grove " counted, like the hawks' nests in the King's forest.

The amenities and profits of the rookery continued to be

tacitly reserved to the gentry until modern times, but actually control of its inhabitants was transferred to the countryside when the industrial, social and religious lives of the subjects were regulated by the statutory injunctions of Tudor sovereigns and their obsequious Parliaments, with the result that stringent measures had to be taken to ensure provision of bread and beer, even at famine prices. This economic position was largely due to the conversion of cornfields into sheep-runs, and a schedule of ground vermin and "noisome fowles" (including the crow family) was issued for the information of manor stewards and leet juries. However, the rewards for heads or eggs of crows were less easily earned than those for hedgehogs or mice; and so the "crow-net" hung from the church tower unused, except in famine years, while the rook boy and mole-catcher were employed by progressive farmers as of old; and so "rook pie" was still a delicacy for the parlour when "Mr. Pickwick" visited "Dingley Dell" in the days before the repeal of the corn laws.

In still earlier days a plausible devolution of the "scare-crow" from an animate to an inanimate protection of the seed and crop may be deduced from the minutes of the manor court and vestry. The organisation of the medieval manor farm has been well described, as far as the hierarchy of the "courtyard" is concerned, but there is perhaps still something to be learnt about seasonal employment which kept the dairy woman occupied with poultry and dairy work in summer and winnowing in winter. The carter harrowed the ploughed land and the ploughman who "held" the plough also kept it in repair. The team was "driven" by a youth who "tented" the patient oxen less by the goad than by vociferation; and when the seed was sown he "tented" it in turn by "driving" off the crows with that same practised voice; in which capacity he has come down to us as the "tenting lad" or "rook boy." It might happen, of course, that the "driving" or "tenting," like the ploughing and carting, were largely performed by the customary service of the village, which had produced in course of time a professional craft of "drovers"; and so if the service of "tenting" rooks were due, it would often be commuted for "crow silver" with which the very modest stipend of the "rook boy" could be paid.

In spite of this elaborate organisation by means of which

the communal officers of the village and a permanent staff of skilled farm-hands were drawn into the headquarters of their lord's demesne, one serious problem remained unsolved. The experiences of modern small-holders will perhaps account for the scarcity of medieval fruit and vegetables within reach of the winged or subterranean pests of the jungle, though grain crops were largely protected by concentration in a central plain, intersected by thoroughfares. The corruption of " moth and rust " was, however, a far less serious evil, in a famished countryside, than a diminution, through incorrigible thieving, of grain which was the staff of life as " meat and drink " and also the basis of commercial values. This all-important seed of the nation's prosperity or very existence, whose reproduction in an unkind soil or climate could only be counted as threefold, was a constant temptation to hungry peasants and their herds, unless it were closely watched until it rooted, ripened and lay in measured heaps on the floor of the locked granary. An explanation afforded by unfavourable weather conditions or other damage to the growing crops might be accepted, though the risk of loss from wild birds had been eliminated by the precaution of the rook boy's vigil. In the last resort, however, a test might be imposed whereby one or more of the lord's officers would be charged with a fixed return from a certain quantity of seed.

We must not regard the elaborate test of the " wainage," or profit of the arable cultivation of a manor, as merely a desperate remedy against thieving. It was a deliberate expedient, in advance of the times, induced by the pressure of taxation, fixed rents and a rising standard of living, as well as by the increased costs and reduced profits of farming. To these losses the mismanagement and dishonesty of the manorial household and farm staff had materially contributed, and such " misdeeds " as the stealing of grain and maiming of live stock were symptoms of a servile mentality, which survived abroad in the *sabotage* so graphically described by Balzac in *Les Paysans*.

We find that little attention has been paid to these leakages, which were, however, a matter of the deepest concern to the manorial administration. Economic and social historians have indeed hinted darkly that the medieval villager was not so simple as some writers suppose, since he disdained the black bread beloved by monks and hankered after the

flesh-pots of the lord's kitchen, to the eventual embarrassment of the manorial budget. The pilferings that resulted from these aspirations have been ignored in recent instructive discussions on the respective uses of black bread and white, and thus the psychological problem has been obscured. Now this will not do, because the allegations of widespread dishonesty made by medieval and post-medieval writers appear to be confirmed by the evidence of official records. But though this evidence may seem damning, it will not enable us to understand the real mentality of early labourers settled on the manors or drifting into the towns, or even into the wilderness outside these cramping havens.

In the medieval story of the *Green Children* the two little visitors from another hemisphere, emerging presumably from some "Wolf Pits," appear suddenly in an Essex harvest field, where they are unable to eat the corn offered to them by the villagers, craving beans instead. This might seem to be a subtle allusion to their æthereal hue, but the reference to the beans may be still more significant. We are reminded of cases in those evil times in which beans were no sooner planted than they were dug up by thin trembling fingers groping through the night, even of that fearful but true story of crime in which the lord, watching by night with his officers to catch an outlying tenant who had uprooted the lord's beans "with his pigs," is lured to bed and drugged by a neighbour's wife and then slain by her son with an axe—the crime of parricide, for here we may see, incidentally, how a lord might be the father of his people.

The manor lords and their officers, finding their efforts to put a stop to the pilfering of grain ineffectual, were forced to take further measures to that end. All workers in the harvest field, in the stack-yard and barn, and in the granary itself, were watched and searched—as negroes, miners, ships' passengers and the guests of millionaires are even now liable to be searched, for nuggets, diamonds, matches, jewelry, or contraband. For we are told that thrashers more especially could carry off much corn in their long boots, gloves and "deep purses." The winnowers (women) were suspected of secreting corn in "great bags" hung under their skirts. And so after due allowance had been made for every possible issue and even for losses of grain in sheaf from vermin, if the total yield accounted for fell short of a previous estimate

per acre from given seed, some further cause of loss might be sought for as the result of this exhaustive scrutiny by manorial officers and auditors.

It might seem that we have here, at last, material for a full explanation of the origin and survival of our rustic scarecrow, but actually this is by no means the case. We are still unable to decide whether the "object" displayed was in fact a dead crow or merely some discarded garment suggesting the proximity of man; or again whether the "scarecrow" was in fact anything more than the "scarer" of crows, usually employed for that purpose under another title. Also there is the confident objection that the rook does not in fact steal seed corn in the spring, when scarecrows were and are much in evidence. Finally, what we know about the policy or husbandry of the medieval manor and village does not favour the supposition that rooks were generally displayed as scarecrows or that this device would have been regarded as an adequate protection for the crops, even if the killing of rooks for that purpose were feasible and permitted by general consent or by the lord himself as owner of the rookery.

It is useless to insist that we ought to know exactly what was done by the custom of the manor or of the "country" in such matters. Unfortunately this is one of the common incidents in the "Life of the Fields" that would seldom, if ever, be directly recorded and here we shall have to read between the lines of court-rolls and accounts: but, in the first place, it may be worth while to inquire whether the mentality of our forefathers could throw any light upon this matter. We have many notices of the kindliness that saintly men and women extended to the beasts and birds which they had charmed and tamed, and in medieval illuminations and frescoes the crows are seen helping themselves from the sower's seed-lip or solemnly listening to a sermon by a friar.

It is likely that the mentality of that age was not so acute and practical as this of ours in which the small-holder, with eager self-reliance, seeks to avert every danger to his crops, though he may have to pay a heavy price for this devotion in "Killingworth" or in any other soil where the spring brood of insects is the spring food of birds. A further hint may perhaps be furnished by the relations of the village with the forest and the rookery respectively. Our ancestors, who had to pass long winter nights in darkness listening for the wolf

at the door of the adjacent byre, or to keep watch lest their poultry should be scattered by the falcon's swoop from a blue sky, were more concerned with the ravages of forest beasts and birds than with the pilfering of parasites. Here then we may find an explanation of the toleration of the village rookery which would have been more significant if we had remembered that the village itself was once the appanage of a manor, and that their common institutions might be governed by Nature in her sternest mood.

The result of this attempt to investigate the cryptic origin of a familiar if unsavoury feature of the English countryside will at least justify one satisfactory conclusion. The medieval landlord, farmer and cottager would seem to have been guiltless of the slaying of rooks to serve as scarecrows since they had scarcely the time or means to obtain such trophies, while cheap labour made it unnecessary to experiment with a dead bird, a waste of food, moreover, which was almost as unpardonable as discarding old clothes. At the same time, it would be futile to suggest that our ancestors spared the rookery for æsthetic reasons, for even we who might prefer to display a disreputable coat and hat instead of a dead bird, merely to save trouble, would be incapable of wantonly chasing crows with idle hawks or (as in a recorded case) of employing farm-hands during Lent to banish the crows from their nests because their clamour disturbed the "Lord Bishop."

The moral of this inquiry may be that the townsman might perhaps take pains to acquire a better knowledge of the countryman's environment if only to further a common interest in the welfare of the countryside. The success of a movement during recent years for the protection of wild birds must be a matter for general congratulation, but that reform does not necessarily imply the reckless preservation and multiplication of birds whose depredations might cause serious damage to more than one depressed industry of this country. For some of us this will be the crux of the matter. Unfortunately many charming birds are destructive to food crops as parasites of man, all the more elusive because their proximity quickens the instinct of self-preservation by observation and suspicion. At the same time we must not forget that these denizens of our nearest groves and gardens have put themselves under our protection, and even if they

may abuse our hospitality, they can be valuable allies against some insect pests and may also help to repay us by graceful movements and cheerful song.

Since this was written the instinctive humanity of the countryside has been once more revealed by an outcry following the alleged poisoning of rooks in a Southern county. Myriads of "vermin," including suspect members of the crow family, are openly trapped or secretly poisoned every year without public disapproval; but when after the customary thinning of the new-fledged nestlings, to prevent a disastrous overflow, sacrilegious hands are laid upon the village rookery, this is, and we may believe has been and always will be, resented by virtue of the communal sentiment that still abides in us as the remote descendants of some ancient manorial community.

HUBERT HALL.

THE MYSTERY OF COLUMBUS.

AFTER more than four centuries floods of ink and heaps of paper have been expended by thousands of writers in discussing the problem of the origin and life of Christopher Columbus and the discovery of America. Why has such an extraordinary interest arisen ? I think that the history of geography owes much more to Henry the Navigator —the Portuguese Prince, son of an English Princess—than to Columbus, and that the exploit of Fernão de Magalhães is much more wonderful than the first known voyage to the Antilles. Notwithstanding, though Prince Henry and Magalhães have been duly praised and much written about, no other navigator, traveller or discoverer, has caused such huge interest and curiosity, which main reason, besides the importance of the universal knowledge of the discovery of America, is the mystery in which Columbus always involved his personality.

There are not many documents prior to 1492 referring to Columbus, and still fewer whose authenticity we can trust ; even among those dating after that year some are definitely recognised as apocryphal, and many others, of the greatest importance, are not considered as authentic for all the colombists. Yet at the last Congress of Americanists held in Seville in 1935, an Argentine professor tried to demonstrate that a famous letter of Columbus attributed to 1501 is simply a copy, and even this apocryphal. From the end of the fifteenth century until present times, the forgery of documents referring to Columbus has not stopped, being more intensified after his death—during the dispute of the inheritance of the majorate and the admiralty—and more recently when several writers have disputed the honour of being a countryman of the famous navigator. Many countries have been ascribed as his birthplace, such as Italy, Greece, France, Corsica, Estremadura, Galicia, Catalonia, Portugal, etc., even Denmark and Switzerland! It seems that after many centuries no historical question has been treated with more passion and dishonesty than the problem of the birth of Christopher Columbus.

Thousands of books and studies have been published, and hardly can there be found two authors agreeing with each other's opinions. The main reason for all this confusion was the deliberate intention of Columbus to veil with mystery his

origin and first years of life. He succeeded so well that even to-day the point of the veil can scarcely be lifted! And nobody can make any affirmation about his origin, birth or life before 1492 without being contradicted. Why did Columbus do this? What reason had he to hide his origin in such a dense mystery? Nobody can yet answer satisfactorily this question, which might illuminate one of the most important features of modern history: the discovery of America, not yet made fully clear. A very illustrious colombist, Henry Vignaud, who dedicated the greater part of his life to the study of Columbus, and who cannot be accused of partiality, arrived at the conclusion that Columbus was a middling cosmographer, a sailor without experience, liar, vain, avaricious, quarrelsome, revengeful, without any "*de ces traits de bienveillance qui sont la parure des grandes âmes.*" In great part this severe judgment is a consequence of the net of lies with which Columbus entangled his life. How could we believe a man who presented himself as a great sailor and cosmographer, saying in 1501 that he had passed forty years of his life at sea, when we remember that he made an error of 14 degrees in the latitude he had observed in Cuba, although the determination of latitudes was already fairly accurate at that time among the Portuguese sailors with whom he had lived?

Although he never said that he was a Genoese, it is admitted by the majority of his biographers that he was a native of Genoa, and after he appeared in Portugal and Spain he was so considered. His son Ferdinand, though considering him a Genoese, says that he did not know where his father was born. Pedro Arana, an intimate friend of the Admiral, brother of Beatriz Arana, the mother of Ferdinand Columbus, said that "he heard it said that Christopher Columbus was a Genoese, but he did not know where he was born." And how can we admit or explain a man of regular culture, who came from Genoa in about his twentieth year, never speaking or writing Italian, and when he addressed his friends at Genoa he wrote in Spanish? Also why, being a Genoese, he sought for help in Portugal and Spain, even in England and France, and never asked his native country? Henry Harrisse found at least 124 persons called Colombo living at Genoa in the fifteenth century, but not one of them could be a relative of the Admiral; and during the process of the majorate not any of the Italian pretenders was a native of Genoa, nor could they prove

relationship with the navigator. Many other objections can be found.

Although there were some documents which referred to Columbus as a Genoese, they were later discovered to be forgeries. Nevertheless, not long after the Congress of Americanists assembled at Paris in 1900 had settled on 1451 as the date of Columbus' birth, the Italian General Assereto in 1904 discovered in the Archives of Genoa a document of 1479 in which Columbus himself says that at this date he was 27 years old. It clears up many other doubtful points. It was an extraordinary coincidence, so great that several colombists consider it a forgery. It is amazing that such an important document had never been noticed before in the archives of Genoa, which had been searched by hundreds of investigators ; and that a notary document like this was not in a book, but in loose sheets. The skill of forgers is so great, especially in Italy, that one is not surprised at another forgery. This document has not been duly and scientifically studied. I do not contest the Genoese origin of Columbus for pleasure ; I simply want to show that in spite of the majority of his contemporaries, biographers and commentators considering him as a Genoese from the fifteenth century until to-day, there is serious ground to believe that this is untrue. He deliberately wished to hide his nationality, allowing it to be believed that he was from Genoa, but always avoiding any statement on the subject. Some of his biographers say that he wanted to conceal his plebeian and modest origin, but although he was vain and conceited enough to do so, the argument is rather precarious.

There are many other sides to the Columbus mystery. Shortly after his appearance in Portugal, Columbus married D. Felipa Moniz, a lady of the highest nobility and a distant relative of the royal family. How can we conceive that a young foreign adventurer, poor and of humble origin (it is said that he was a weaver in Genoa, belonging to a very modest family), could dwell in the splendid house of João Esmeraldo, a distinguished friend of the King, and marry such a noble lady, at a time when the prejudices of blood were even greater than to-day ? And how can we understand that the King of Portugal allowed this plebeian adventurer to be seated in his presence, when talking with him—an honour granted only to persons of the highest rank—and treated him as his " special friend," in the famous letter of 1488, when

Columbus was a simple pretender, four years before he sailed for his first voyage ? What is hidden behind all these astonishing contradictions of history ?

It is known that the Portuguese chroniclers kept a surprising reserve about Columbus, or distorted the truth in some events connected with him. Barros says that this man, " talkative, conceited and impertinent," was only " considered as a Genoese." In the *Diario* Columbus describes his arrival at Lisbon in 1493, after he returned from his first voyage to the Antilles, and the interview he had with the King of Portugal, referring to the cordiality of John II and the honours and favours he had received. Nevertheless, two contemporary chroniclers, Pina and Resende, paint the scene with quite different colours. They say that the King sharply reprimanded Columbus for discovering, in favour of Castile, regions which belonged to Portugal, and the navigator was so insolent to the King that some noblemen intended to slay him, which John II opposed because he was very God-fearing ; he, who did not hesitate to stab his brother-in-law the Duke of Vizeu, and beheaded his cousin the Duke of Bragança, when he thought it convenient to his policy of defending the Crown from the power of the nobles. In view of the friendly letter of 1488, the version given by Columbus seems more reasonable. Possibly the chroniclers had instructions to relate the events as more convenient for the " policy of secrecy," which was a characteristic of this King's reign.

My brother, Dr. Jaime Cortesão, has for the first time especially dealt with this problem of the policy of secrecy applied by the Portuguese rulers to navigations and discoveries during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Besides several documents which reveal how carefully the Portuguese authorities defended this secrecy, such as royal orders forbidding foreigners to go to Guinea on pain of death, and the cartographical representations of some of the newly discovered countries, the most important evidence is given by the study of the contemporary chronicles. In the *Cronica da Guiné*, of Zurara, we see references to some chapters dealing with the division of the eastern countries and their importance for the Portuguese, though in the sole copy known—from the fifteenth century, but not the original—we cannot find them ; they have obviously been eliminated from the original. We also know of the early existence of other contemporary

chronicles of Fernão Lopes, Cerveira, and Zurara, but they have disappeared. Other chroniclers, like Pina, are clearly remiss in the matter of contemporary discoveries; it is enough to remember that Pina makes no reference to the voyage of Dias to the Cape of Good Hope and that of Covilhan to the East. The great Barros, when describing the discoveries and navigations of the Portuguese during the reign of Alfonso V, said that there were many others, but he did not describe them because he did not know the dates and the captains' names. The limited space does not allow me to go further, and I can make but a brief résumé of the vast evidence accumulated by Dr. Jaime Cortesão in order to demonstrate the pre-Columbus discovery of South and North America by the Portuguese.

Ferdinand Columbus and Las Casas, the principal contemporary biographers of the Admiral, reproduce in several chapters of their works many of his notes about the voyages of the Portuguese to the West. These chapters, of the greatest historical importance, though Ferdinand Columbus did his best to corrupt the truth, thinking that to diminish the exploits of the Portuguese would magnify those of his father, had never before been duly studied and criticised. Las Casas, more honest, in spite of his natural enthusiasm for Columbus, headed his Chapter XIII " Many and several indications and signs that Christopher Columbus was informed by several persons, who made him very certain that there was land in this part of the West." The evidence of the pre-Columbus discovery of America by the Portuguese is seen by the following: (*a*) the notes of Columbus transmitted by his two biographers; (*b*) the diaries of Columbus' three voyages and several autograph notes; (*c*) the documentation assembled in the *Pleitos*; (*d*) many Portuguese documents of the fifteenth century unpublished or incompletely studied; (*e*) several other documents, such as contemporary maps, treaties, etc. From this we can arrive at the documental and scientific conclusion that the Portuguese had been in the South and North American continents before Columbus; also there is some evidence, though not so positive, that they were in the Antilles.

There are several documentary indications that after their first discoveries the Portuguese continued and extended their navigations towards the West during the fifteenth century.

We know of three of these voyages in the middle of that century and several documents granting the newly discovered western lands. In 1470 Alfonso V conceded the monopoly of "precious stones, tints of Brasil and laque" in the "parts of Guinea" which could hardly exist on the known coast of Africa, but could be found in South America.

The map of Bianco, dated London 1448, shows south-westward of Cape Verde an "*Ixola otinticha longa a poniẽte* 1500 *mia.*" Several writers identify this island with Brazil, which really lies 1,520 miles south-west of Cape Verde. Bianco undoubtedly obtained this information when travelling in one of the Venetian galleys which called yearly at Lisbon. This should correspond to the island of St. Brandon on Behaim's Globe (1492) or the "*isola descobierta por Portugal*" of La Cosa's map (1500). There is also the old map referred to by Bisagudo in his letter written in 1500 from Brazil to King Manuel, in which that land (Brazil) was already represented.

The policy of John II in the treaty of Tordesillas, requiring that the line of partition should pass 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde islands, comprehending a great part of the eastern coast of South America, is but one more proof of the knowledge of this continent's existence. Columbus himself reminds us in the *Diario* of his third voyage that "the King of Portugal was sure of the existence of famous lands there (South America) and so he sent to discover towards the south-west."

Estevão Frois coming from Brazil had to call at the Antilles. Sent to prison by the Spaniards he wrote in 1514 a letter to the King of Portugal saying that he came from near the Cape of St. Augustin, which had belonged to Portugal for more than twenty years. In 1531 a French ship attacked the Portuguese factory of Pernambuco; in the documents of the dispute which followed between Portugal and France we find the declarations of four sailors saying that the Portuguese had had there a factory and houses for more than forty years. All these documents agree in date and place. In 1527 Robert Thorne wrote from Seville to the King of England about the treaty of Tordesillas, saying that the King of Portugal knew of a southern continent which he wanted to include in his zone of partition.

The voyage of Antonio Leme in the middle of the fifteenth century and what Las Casas says, that the natives of Cuba told him that before the arrival of the Spaniards at Haiti

other navigators, white and bearded, had been there, are also indications of prior visits of the Portuguese to the Antilles. As much more evidence I could present showing the pre-Columbus voyages of the Portuguese navigators to North and North-East America.

Another side of the problem is the rivalry between Portugal and Spain in the fifteenth century in the matter of ocean discoveries. Since the first Portuguese navigations, Castile disputed their discoveries, beginning with the occupation of the Canary archipelago, a naval base for future expeditions. During the reigns of Duarte and Alfonso V of Portugal, Prince Henry tried to obtain from Castile the cession of the Canary Islands, but as he could not succeed he organised four military expeditions against the islands, which provoked two appeals of Castile to Alfonso V, in 1452 and 1454, and had it not been for the death of John II a war would have broken out on that account. However, Portuguese chronicles keep absolute silence upon these important events which the Spanish chroniclers Palencia and Las Casas largely describe. As a consequence of the war between Castile and Portugal, during 1475-80 the Castilians intensified their attacks on the Portuguese possessions. In 1476, for example, a Spanish fleet of thirty ships attacked the Cape Verde Islands, taking back to Seville the "*donatario*" and many Portuguese inhabitants as prisoners. During the reign of John II of Portugal the struggle was only more intense and the treaty of Tordesillas was the result.

In brief: (*a*) during the period of discoveries the Portuguese rulers adopted a strict policy of secrecy; (*b*) there is evidence enough to conclude that the Portuguese were in America before Columbus; (*c*) there was great rivalry between Portugal and Spain, which reached its climax during the reign of John II and conduced to the treaty of Tordesillas. In my book on early Portuguese cartography published in 1935, when dealing with the problem of Columbus (Vol I, Cap. IV), I already presented the thesis that he was a secret agent of John II. This king knew of the existence of the American continent, and possibly that his navigators could not find a passage through it towards the West; hence the impossibility or difficulty of reaching Asia from that side; he knew that this continent, inhabited by savages, was not the rich Orient from whence came the spices, and about which he

had exact information; in view of the rivalry of Castile he had the utmost interest in letting the kings of Spain "discover" America and keeping them convinced that this was the Far East, thus remaining free of competition (which he had every reason to fear) to proceed his way around the Cape of Good Hope, which possibility he knew already after the voyage of Bartholomew Dias, if not before. As a matter of fact the Spanish kings were furious when they knew of the successful voyage of Vasco da Gama and protested to the Portuguese Court. And Columbus always affirmed that he had reached the Asiatic continent when he went to Cuba, threatening his sailors with the cutting of the tongue if they dared to deny that this island was not a continent. Haiti would be Cipangu (Japan). Though many say that Columbus was always convinced that he had reached Asia, Vignaud wrote, shortly before his death: "Le résultat d'études poursuivies toute ma vie, c'est que Christoph Colomb ne cherchait pas à atteindre les côtes orientales de l'Asie et les îles des Epices par la voie de l'Ouest."

Whatsoever was his nationality and birth, there is no doubt that Columbus was an adventurer of not very high esteem, quite fitted to perform that role in the Portuguese king's play. Besides his ambition and tenacity, he was a man of regular culture, and with some sea experience, though had he been a great sailor or cosmographer it would have been more difficult for him to disguise his real origin. The mist which veils this origin, the first coming to Portugal, his marriage, flight to Spain, the letter addressed to him by John II in 1488, the silence of the Portuguese chroniclers, his fight to convince that he had reached Asia though he knew himself that he had not, disguise of his name in a cabalistic signature (he never signed as Christopher Columbus), the ignorance of the Italian language of this so-called Genoese, the impossibility of finding in Genoa any of his relatives, in short—the mystery of Columbus begins to clear through this hypothesis. The preparations of the voyage of 1492 cost about two million maravedis, one million being supplied by the Crown of Castile however, nobody knows whence came the other million; it is supposed that one or another Italian or Jewish banker or Spanish nobleman lent the money. But how could we admit that none of these generous lenders appeared afterwards to share the splendid benefits of the great enterprise? Perhaps

John II supplied that money whose origin, most extraordinarily, nobody yet could trace.

I have strewn my thesis with too many queries, perhaps, to which I am unable to answer, but maybe I have brought some new light into the darkness of the problem. The history of John II, the "Perfect Prince," the most remarkable king of Portugal, and certainly one of the most extraordinary men of the world, is still to be written. And I can hardly say otherwise about Columbus. There is a huge mass of documents in Portuguese and Spanish archives connected with Columbus which have never been observed or properly studied, and I am convinced that when this formidable work is undertaken the history of the famous and mysterious man will have to be rewritten from the first line. I think that the connection between John II and Columbus was very close, and that we cannot study one without studying the other. Only when this study is done jointly will there be a possibility of satisfactorily unveiling the mystery which still lingers over the famous so-called discoverer of America.

Armando Cortesão.

A VICTORIAN MAGAZINE.

THE appearance of *Bentley's Miscellany* in January 1837 was the first great literary event of that year and the story of its inception is worth recalling. The two Bentley brothers, Samuel and Richard, born in the latter years of the eighteenth century, were Londoners by birth and nurture, and from infancy were steeped to the eyebrows in printer's ink. Their father was part owner of the *London Evening Post*, which he printed, published, and practically edited. They had the good fortune also to be nephews of John Nichols, the printer antiquarian friend of Dr. Johnson, and compiler of the celebrated *Literary anecdotes of the Eighteenth Century*. Nichols was "Sylvanus Urban," editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, and his son John later became the sole owner, printer, and editor of this magazine, as well as being a Government printer and Master of the Stationers' Company. He inherited to the full his father's antiquarian interests, an inheritance which he handed down to his eldest son, a third John, who founded the Camden Society, and edited his grandfather's works, thus completing a family triad of antiquarians.

It was a foregone conclusion that, when school-days at St. Paul's ended, Samuel and Richard Bentley should proceed to the setting up of type, and they were severally apprenticed to their uncle John Nichols. Samuel, nine years the elder, was in partnership with his uncle when his brother Richard finished his apprenticeship in 1819. At Richard's desire Samuel surrendered his partnership, and the brothers set up a printing office in Dorset Street. Their successful work for the next ten years did not satisfy the restless energy of Richard, ever bent on progress.

Among the books the firm printed were those for Henry Colburn, publisher of the fashionable novels of the day, the names of which sound but faintly in the ears of twentieth-century readers. Colburn, once a bookseller and possessor of a Circulating Library ("that tree of diabolical knowledge," according to Sheridan), had resigned the mere distribution of books for their production. The Bentley firm printed for him in 1824 Theodore Hook's *Sayings and Doings*, and its success fired Richard Bentley with envy and determination to advance from printing to publishing books. Samuel, more interested in

typography, preferred to remain only a printer, so the brothers separated business relations, and Richard joined Henry Colburn in New Burlington Street as partner in his enterprises. The partners, with widely discordant tastes, did not long agree, and in 1832 the partnership was dissolved, and Bentley was left alone in New Burlington Street to begin his personal career. Here was his great opportunity and he did not neglect it. He obtained many works by well-known authors by making good offers in advance of other publishers, and his real genius showed itself in his ability to gauge latent talent. With far-seeing acuteness he secured as clients a number of unknown writers whose powers he recognised. Alive to the coming value of the writers of the New World, he made special terms with American authors, so was able first to introduce to English readers in the pages of his Miscellany Longfellow's *Wreck of the Hesperus* and the *Village Blacksmith*, Poe's *Fall of the House of Usher*, and others.

By the year 1836 his position as a leading publisher was secure, and he began to consider starting a periodical to further enhance it, the usual practice of publishers of the time. The "*Maga*" of Blackwood went on its majestic way, a little perturbed by the rise in 1830 of *Fraser's Magazine*, with Maginn's inimitable character studies, and Maclise's sketches; *Chambers's Journal*, started in Edinburgh in 1832, was to the front with its informative articles; and Bentley saw that there was room for an illustrated magazine of lighter character, staffed by the attractive band of humorists, American and English, that were at his command. He got together a nucleus of writers; his old school-fellow Barham, Minor Canon of St. Paul's, offered help; Tom Moore also proved amenable; and Hook, editor of Colburn's *New Monthly*, promised contributions. An editor was the chief desideratum. Early in 1836 Bentley, through his friend George Hogarth, had made the acquaintance of a young man of parts, then reporter to the *Morning Chronicle*, and was watching his career with interest. The publisher thought highly of the *Sketches by Boz*, and still more of the early numbers of the *Pickwick Papers*, and in August 1836 completed a contract with Charles Dickens for a novel, name unsettled, for the copyright of which he agreed to pay £500, and £500 for the novel, next written. Further, the young writer was offered the editorship of the yet-to-be-started magazine. Chapman

and Hall were by no means assured of the success of Pickwick, and Bentley, more skilful in appraising genius, obtained his editor without difficulty. The text of the agreements with Bentley, recently published by Mr. Walter Dexter in the *Dickensian*, show more to the credit of the publisher than is generally supposed.

Bentley had already definitely secured for the magazine George Cruickshank, the foremost illustrator of the day. Before the production of his first number the enterprising Bentley had determined to call the new venture the *Wits' Miscellany*, and it was advertised as a forthcoming magazine under this title. With fortunate prevision that the "wits" might not be self-evident, he changed the name at the last moment. "I have decided," he said to Barham, "to change the name of the Magazine from the *Wits'* to *Bentley's Miscellany*. "Why go to the other extreme?" said Barham. Bentley, unaffected by its spice of malice, passed on the jest with a good humour posterity has not failed to remember to his credit. This change of name occasioned some confusion when the *Miscellany* actually appeared. It was got over by the happy prologue to No. 1, by Wm. Maginn. "The fact is undeniable that we originally advertised ourselves—or rather our work—as the *Wits' Miscellany*, thereby indicating beyond a doubt that we of the Miscellany *are* Wits.—We massacred the title as ruthlessly as ever were massacred its namesake (De Witts) in Holland. Our path is distinct, a path of turf and flowers."

> Come round and hear, my public dear,
> Come near, and judge it gently,
> The prose so terse, and flowing verse,
> Of us, the Wits of Bentley!

The honours of No. 1 rest with three brilliant Irishmen, Francis Mahony ("Father Prout"), William Maginn and Samuel Lover, with Barham, the Englishman, as their able seconder. The editor's contribution, *The public life of Mr. Tulrumble*, was hardly up to standard, and other contributions were unimportant. These included verses by Haynes Bayly and Peacock, and sketches by W. H. Maxwell, Fenimore Cooper, Morier, Hook, and others. *Handy Andy*, the amusing tale by Lover, song-writer, novelist, and artist, began in this first number, illustrated by its author. "Father

Prout " gave some of his best work. The first page contained his *Bottle of St. Januarius*, to introduce the Month ; a few pages on came his *Sabine Farmer's Serenade*, an amazing rendering into Latin verse of Hudson's Irish song, *Barney Brallaghan's Courtship*, as supposedly written by a rustic of the Augustan Age, and disinterred by an antiquarian. Later in the number appeared the amusing alleged discovery of the French original of the *Burial of Sir John Moore*. The authorship of the poem was causing contemporary discussion. Mahony's French version, " *Ni le son de tambour, ni le marche funèbre* " was explained as " *Les funerailles de Col. de Beaumanoir*," brought to Ireland by Wolfe-Tone!

These delightful parodies would alone have ensured the success of No. I of the Magazine. They were supplemented by Barham's verse. He started on his long connection with the Miscellany as the anonymous author of the *Monstre Balloon*, describing the ascent of Charles Green, the aeronaut, from Vauxhall in November 1836 in a balloon inflated with coal gas. It landed safely at Nassau in Germany with Green and his passengers, Mason and Holland. In the same number Haynes Bayly versified the flight, but his effort is tame beside Barham's racy poem, with its tale of " portable soup," " pressed beef with the fat cut off, nothing but lean," and the final apotheosis at Vauxhall :

> There on a beautiful transparent screen,
> In the middle you'll see a large picture of Green,
> Mr. Holland on one side, who hired the machine,
> Monck Mason on 'tother, describing the scene ;
> And Fame, on one leg, in the air, like a Queen,
> With three wreaths and a trumpet, will over them lean ;
> While Envy, in serpents and black bombazine,
> Looks on from below with an air of chagrin!

No. I of the *Miscellany* was approved by the public, No. II even more so, and with No. III it became an assured success, every succeeding number for years to come consolidating its position. Cruickshank's cover illustration obtained special praise as a then unusual magazine adornment. In No. II, Dickens came to his own with the first chapter of *Oliver Twist*. A leaflet bound in with this number had a parody by Dickens of the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament, with a woodcut by " Phiz," showing Bentley weighed down

by huge bales of the magazine, "Boz" by his side, and crowds round holding out hands for copies. In this same February number, Barham made his first appearance under his famous "Ingoldsby" pseudonym, in the *Spectre of Tappington*, which obtained conspicuous success.

At the close of the first volume its editor was able to give an optimistic address as from a theatre manager opening a new season: "Mr. Cruickshank was to continue to supply the scenery, the beautiful machinery would still be superintended by Mr. Samuel Bentley of Dorset Street, Mr. R. Bentley would preside over the Treasury Department with his usual ability, and the stage manager would be your humble servant Boz." At the end of the year Boz becomes even more jubilant: "Every successive number has experienced a warmer reception than before—so that like the heroine of the poem descriptive of the faithlessness of Mr. John Oakham of the R.N. we look both ways at once." The allusion is somewhat cryptic.

The feature of the *Miscellany* during Dickens' control was *Oliver Twist*, and in addition there were valuable articles, notably the fine series of Shakespeare papers by Maginn. "Father Prout" gave each month an appropriate metrical introduction, and other contributions. That little *jeu d'esprit*, *An Austrian army awfully arrayed*, an historical reminiscence of 1837, generally attributed to Alaric Watts, appeared anonymously in an early number. "Ingoldsby" continued to supply his incomparable legends month by month, and so, adapting Dr. Wolcot's couplet,

> Dick's Magazine all magazines excels,
> And what's still better too for Dick—it sells!

Little intimacy apparently existed between the editor and his chief contributors. Barham states that he never met Dickens till long after the magazine had started. "Boz," all the world knows, was a sensitive man and, in this case, there is ground for supposing that he resented Barham's friendship with Bentley, with whom he was becoming dissatisfied, and also the power of gentle satire possessed by the Minor Canon. He was a Tory and a cleric, and Dickens, at that time, had no use for either. The irreverent clergyman in Chapter V of *Oliver Twist* may have originated in this underlying resentment. Barham belonged to the Cathedral clique that Moore describes in April 1837: "Conversation turned on Boz, the

new comic writer. Was sorry to hear Sydney Smith cry him down—whereas it appears to me one of the few proofs of good taste of 'the masses' that they like him. Hayward was the only one of the party that stood by me in this opinion." Moore's *Diary* gives us another glimpse of the editor in 1838.

> Dined at Bentley's. The company all very *haut ton* of the literature of the day. First, to begin *low* on the scale, myself, then Mr. Jerdan of the *Literary Gazette*, then Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Lover, Luttrell, and lastly, "Boz," and Campbell.—Forget, by the way, one of the cleverest fellows, Barham, my friend Hook's friend."

These dinners, in the Red Room at New Burlington Street, often occurred, Bentley, stout, rosy, with hair *en brosse*, presiding as a genial host. Moore realistically sketches him. "Talk with Bentley—Was amused at the sanguineness with which he seemed to consider the whole settled. The imagination of these matter-of-fact men beats poets hollow." The matter-of-fact, and imaginative, Bentley had cause for sanguineness in his successful *Miscellany*. Its editor was becoming daily more uneasy. He chafed at not being allowed full editorial control and his complaint here was justified. There was something to be said on the other side. The *Miscellany* was a monetary speculation; Bentley was paying the piper, and thought he had a right to call the tune. Dickens, in 1837, was a new writer, and it is possible to conjecture that Bentley was disappointed with his editor; humour did not seem to bulk as largely in the sombre "Mudfog" tale, *Oliver Twist*, as had been hoped for from the author of *Pickwick*. Later on, with Oliver's popularity, Newgate stories became the vogue, and *Jack Sheppard* was a welcome successor. For the moment the Irishmen and "Ingoldsby" led, in Bentley's opinion. Dickens' complaint that he was badly treated in monetary matters cannot be sustained. The original agreement was quite a fair one; Bentley had largely increased his editor's monthly salary, and also the original offer for a second novel, now definitely named *Barnaby Rudge*. Actually, Dickens was overworked, the quadruple strain of editorship; finishing *Pickwick*; writing *Oliver Twist*; and beginning *Barnaby Rudge*, was too great. He had also promised Bentley to edit the *Memoirs of Grimaldi*. Withdrawal from the *Miscellany* was an evident necessity. The Bentley quarrel was finally settled by dissolution of all the existing agreements and

payment of £2,250 by Chapman & Hall to Bentley for the copyright of *Oliver Twist*.

The *Miscellany* now found its second wind under the editorship of Harrison Ainsworth. In the number for March 1839, Dickens bade farewell in an epistle as from a parent to a child. "I contemplate your fair appearance, robust health, and unimpeded circulation with delight." Unable to refrain from bitter allusion, he closes: "I reap no gain from parting with you, you have always been *Bentley's Miscellany*, and never mine." This epistle included a topical paragraph:

> I returned by the Mail Train with the dejected Post-Office Guard, who sat, pistol in hand, ready to shoot the first man who should stop the horses, now *inside*. There may come a day when the mail-coach guard shall never have seen a horse.—Unlike the guard of the Manchester Mail, your new guard (Ainsworth) is quite at home with roystering highwaymen at call.

The first two issues of 1839 contained the conclusion of *Oliver Twist*, with Cruickshank's celebrated picture of "Fagin in the Condemned Cell." Cruickshank's illustrations, admirably printed by Samuel Bentley, had been an approved feature, and gave rise to the delusion of the artist in his old age, when he claimed to have suggested to Dickens the incidents of *Oliver Twist*. He made the same accusation as to Ainsworth's *Jack Sheppard*, which he illustrated with equal vigour. His connection with the *Miscellany* closed in 1843: and John Leech succeeded him as principal illustrator. The new editor was welcomed in a little poem, hailing the Three (Literary) Graces, the three leading magazines of the hour: "Madge Ebony, strictly called "Maga" (*Blackwood's Magazine*); 'Regina, a dame of pretensions and style" (*Fraser's Magazine*); and then:

> Here's to our Missy, the Missy of Mirth,
> In her habit of buff, with a quaint pattern graced;
> She flirts unrestricted with Tories and Whigs,
> And is only exclusive to prosers and prigs.

Under Ainsworth the *Miscellany* continued a successful career. The editor followed up *Jack Sheppard* with his historical tale *Guy Fawkes*, and excellent articles were contributed by American and English writers. "Ingoldsby" continued his series of *Legends*, and also proposed to Bentley

the whimsical idea of a novel, the *Modern Rake's Progress*, to be written in sections by different authors, and illustrated by Leech. It never took shape as intended, but John Hughes, one of the collaborators, whose son Tom was at Rugby, got him to write the school chapters, which are said to have been the germ of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*. The incomplete *Rake* was finally handed over to Henry Cockton, who embodied it in a tale in the *Miscellany* called *Stanley Thorn*.

1841 brought another change in the fortunes of the Magazine. Ainsworth, like Dickens, became restive under Bentley's control. He wrote: "Bentley is the real editor. The veto rests entirely with him. I am more restricted even than Dickens." He decided to start a magazine of his own, *Ainsworth's*, and resigned editorship of *Bentley's*. This action had a curious sequel. On the first page of *Ainsworth's* appeared an article by George Cruickshank, "A few words about Richard Bentley," in which he accused Bentley of describing his magazine as "illustrated by Cruickshank" when only one etching a month was supplied. He added various remarks derogatory to the publisher. That Ainsworth allowed this notice to appear was injudicious, to say the least of it, and Bentley's friends rallied round him. "Father Prout," from Genoa, rushed into the fray, and sent a humorous ballad to the *Miscellany*, *The Redbreast of Aquitania*, making Bentley the murdered cock-robin; Ainsworth, the delinquent sparrow. John Hughes, as "Mr. Buller of Brazen-nose," retorted in *Ainsworth's* with *The Magpie of Marwood*. The Homeric duel of bards continued some time, and ended with a mock-heroic poem in the *Miscellany*, *The cruel murder of Old Father Proutte, by a Barber's apprentice, Mr. Duller of Pewter-nose*.

The *Miscellany* by 1846 had ceased to be a special preserve of "wits." The illuminators of its early numbers had departed, and left no equivalent successors. "Butterfly Bayly" died in 1839; Theodore Hook in 1841; "bright broken Maginn" passed away in 1842; Hood, Barham and Sydney Smith in the same year, 1845; Tom Moore at Bromham had sunk into decrepitude; Mahony was permanently settled abroad, and on Lover had fallen the curse of blindness and other ailments. Shirley Brooks as editor, with Albert Smith and Cockton, produced readable serials, and there were good illustrations by Leech and "Alfred Crowquill." During the

'fifties, Ainsworth, its former editor, bought it, and with political and topographical articles of a solid kind it took a short fresh lease of life. It issued some historical novels of Ainsworth, illustrated by Gilbert, then beginning his brilliant career. Mrs. Henry Wood and "Ouida" were Ainsworth discoveries. A rollicking Oxford novel, *Vincent Eden*, by Dickinson, began publication and abruptly ceased, owing to pressure, it is said, from the University authorities.

The Magazine was no longer financially a success. There were now many of similar type, and it paled before the rising star of *Cornhill*, under Thackeray. Ainsworth resold it to Bentley, and in 1868 it was absorbed into *Temple Bar*, another Bentley periodical, and so faded into oblivion. Of its old brown volumes the early years are the only ones worthily to support that hopeful Bentleyan title, the *Wits' Miscellany*.

L. M. Littlewood.

THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMAMENTS POLICY.

THE military tension in Germany, the enthusiasm shown at the breach of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno, the jubilation over the march into the Rhineland, present no element of surprise to anyone acquainted with recent German history. Time and again in the course of the recent past has the world experienced an outbreak of German militarist mass enthusiasm of striking intensity—in 1813, 1840, 1859, 1870, 1914, that is to say in the years of the Wars of Liberation, of the Eastern crisis, of the war between France, Italy and Austria, and of the Franco-Prussian and World wars. It is usual to presuppose the existence of like causes behind similar phenomena, and therefore it is natural to inquire into the social foundations whereon this " war spirit " and " will to war," flaming up ever and again, has been enabled to spread itself.

The history of the German army is indissolubly bound up with that of the Prussian nobility. The Prussian nobility, a nobility of the sword occupying conquered colonised territory, was at first more powerful than the Hohenzollern dynasty, which only began to rule in North Germany in the fifteenth century. As a result of the absence of important cities the dynasty did not possess, as elsewhere, allies who might have permitted it to break the social power of the nobility. In these circumstances the Prussian crown tended more strongly than other princes to concentrate on the continual acquisition of new territories, a policy that was readily supported by the Prussian nobility, which was glad to be free of the king in home affairs and to see its younger sons provided for as officers in the army. A condition of this support was naturally that the Prussian aristocracy remained master in its own house. Whenever the crown sought to attack, it always suffered a defeat. The efforts to reform Prussia into a modern state after the defeat of 1806 in the struggle against Napoleon foundered for the most part on aristocratic resistance, or—as in the case of the liberation of the peasants—were deflected to serve aristocratic interests. The attempt of German democracy and liberalism to erect, in alliance with the crown after the revolution of 1848, a German liberal unitary state foundered likewise on the Prussian aristocracy. In the long

run, of course, Prussia was unable to avoid participating in the national development. The Prussian crown's policy of power had, amongst other things, brought under its sway the industrial and bourgeois Rhineland, which involved the obligation to give some sort of expression to the bourgeois desire for German unity. Despite this, however, it still remained bound to the wishes of the Prussian aristocracy, above all in military matters. The Prussian army fulfilled for the Protestant Prussian nobility the same function as the monastery for the Catholic nobility of the middle ages ; it formed, as we have already said, a kind of employment institution. At the same time the privileged place at the head of the Prussian army guaranteed an absolute right to the foremost place in the state and society. The creation of the German Reich by Prussia was necessarily bound up with the condition that nothing was to be changed in principle in the position hitherto enjoyed by the Prussian officer in the state and in society. The policy of Bismarck, who himself belonged to this aristocracy, did in fact achieve this end. He succeeded, in vigorous struggles with the Prussian bourgeoisie at the beginning of the 'sixties, in ensuring that the Prussian aristocracy, the Prussian officer, should remain master of the Prussian army, in destroying the plans for the creation of a bourgeois officers' corps, and in making the army itself, by the system of the three-year service period, acquire or rather retain the character of a reliable professional army with conservative ideas. Workers on estates, cottars, artisans and other " socially reliable " elements were to form the backbone of this army, so that the politically doubtful consequences of the arming of the masses, the possibilities of a revolt on the part of armed bourgeois and workers, might thereby be prevented.

Strangely enough it was through this policy—the first great achievement that made him famous—that Bismarck, at the beginning of his career, dug the pit into which he was finally to fall. Not long after the founding of the new empire it turned out that a continual expansion of the army—necessarily involving democratisation—could by no means be avoided in the social and international conditions that prevailed. The political situation grew continually worse ; Germany broke with Russia and concluded the alliance with Austria. Already a group of members of the general staff and younger officers, moved by strategic considerations, began

to work for a permanent increase—but thereby simultaneously also for a social change—of the army. The struggles of Bismarck with these officer circles, which belonged only in part to the aristocracy, and amongst which were many non-Prussians, appear throughout the whole ministry of the great Chancellor. The officers' party, led by the Chief of Staff, Count Waldersee, finally brought about the fall of Bismarck in 1890 through its influence on the young Kaiser. In this struggle Bismarck defended the old Prussia ; the victory of the " new school " over the Chancellor signified at the same time the victory of the party advocating the increase of the army. One must not allow oneself to be deceived by the fact that immediately before his fall, just as in the last act of *Hamlet* the adversaries exchange rapiers in the heat of the duel, Bismarck finally demanded an increase of the army in order to set up a kind of sword dictatorship, whilst the opposition party, in order to bring him down, remained darkly silent.

The great expansion of the army of 1892-3, introduced by Caprivi, who was mortally hated by the old Prussian aristocracy, was an immediate consequence of Bismarck's fall. The anger with which the fallen giant greeted the new armament programme of his successor will only be fully understood if one realises that the increase of the army—and the shortening of service involved in it—aimed at the foundations of the old Prussia and threatened to engulf the Prussian officer corps' monopoly of predominance in state and society in a democratic mass rule.

Of course matters did not go so far as that. The broad masses of the German nation, instead of amalgamating, dissolving and absorbing the Prussian officers' corps within themselves, became its willing myrmidons. Modern armies are indeed in themselves, from the social point of view, usually far too mixed for a social revolt to develop in them. But three factors have decisively contributed to the especial pliancy of the German pre-war army and of the modern German army, to the extension of Prussian discipline (so to speak) over the people as a whole.

Firstly : The German people has never experienced a successful social revolution. The feeling of independence acquired by the English people as a heritage of the revolution of the seventeenth century, and by the French as a heritage from the great Revolution, has been lacking in Germany. In

the middle and lower middle class there still lived the spirit of bygone times, the respect for the aristocracy and the " lord of the estate " who has always remained the ideal of the ever-dependent German bourgeoisie and also, in recent times, of that part of the working class that is amalgamating with the bourgeoisie.

Secondly : As far as the German middle class, and the Prussian middle class before it, is especially concerned, its desire for emancipation was finally throttled at the beginning of the 'sixties by Bismarck's struggle with the Prussian Chamber. The independent middle-class officer of the territorial army (*Landwehr*), such as the Prussian liberals wanted to create, became the royal Prussian reserve officer who knew of no higher aim than to emulate his aristocratic model in dash and doughtiness.

Thirdly : The existence and increase of the German army was of immense importance for the progressive development of German industry, of an importance that possibly far exceeded the corresponding relationship in other European states. Germany was poor, but the instruments of production were powerfully developed. She was far inferior to the other Great Powers in colonies and markets. The idea, therefore, of creating zones of influence with the help of military power was obvious. A second cause was that the armaments preparations financed by the State contributed also, if not to remedy the above-mentioned incompatibility between the expansion of German productive machinery and the possibilities of markets at home and abroad, at least to counterbalance its effects for a time.

The way to the marriage between German industry and the strengthening of the German army based on this social combination was prepared quite consciously. The man who took over this task was, as may be understood, a bourgeois and not an aristocrat, a member of the party advocating increase of the army, of whose struggle against Bismarck's cautiously conservative policy we have spoken. The person in question was the then Major Keim of Darmstadt, an officer who became of outstanding importance for the history and sociology of the German armaments policy, and who in some ways may be regarded as a forerunner of the " *Führer*." Keim, like his comrade von Liebert, was hated by Bismarck as one of the moles who had undermined his position, but he was the

darling of the War Ministry. In 1892-3 he carried on successfully at Caprivi's behest the official propaganda for the great Arms Bill. To ensure success, as he writes in his memoirs, he had deliberately attracted great business and industrial circles with his propaganda.

In conservative officer circles people, it is true, often turned up their noses at the gigantic propaganda developed by Keim, but he was never allowed to be completely overthrown. Such fellows were useful in ensuring the support of the heavy industries for the Arms Bill ; besides, it was through a man like Keim and through the spreading of the necessary will to war and war spirit that there could most easily be avoided the unpleasant social consequences that might result from the army expansionist plans at a time when social democracy and the other political parties were still of some significance in Germany.

The alliance between the army-expansionist wing and industry, prepared by Keim, seemed more like a betrothal than a marriage. Shortly after the first organised co-operation between expansionist propaganda and industry in 1893, relations visibly cooled. A competitor to the army entered upon the scene to woo for industry's favour : under the ægis of the enterprising naval captain, Alfred von Tirpitz, a " department diplomat " of high rank, preparations were begun in naval propaganda. In the same way as Keim, Tirpitz fostered with conscious calculation the alliance of his department with heavy industry. Before the second Navy Law of 1900 he visited the most important foundries in order to assure himself of their support. In this race for industry's favour the naval department naturally had the advantage : it was a question here, as in our own days, of the building up of a completely new power involving gigantic contracts for ironclads.

We are well informed of the interplay between industry and the navy up to 1901 by a too-little known work by the late Eckart Kehr (*Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik*, 1930). But Kehr failed to notice a detail that is symptomatic of the whole German armaments question. Keim must sorrowfully have realised that there was not much more use in the land army in this period for his specialised knowledge of industrial and military co-operation, and that on the other hand the hopeful naval department already possessed a

competent expert in this sphere in the person of Tirpitz, who was a departmental and propaganda chief in one. In these circumstances Keim, now promoted general, but retired from active service, could make use of his specialist qualifications only if he supplanted Tirpitz in the race for industrial favour and overtrumped his naval plans. In some extremely interesting letters which he sent to Essen by a middleman soon after the acceptance of the Naval Bill of 1900, and whose genuineness he afterwards admitted in a press controversy, he offered to rehabilitate the reputation of Krupp, which had suffered through scandals in the course of the armaments propaganda, by exercising influence on the Reichstag and the public. The General simultaneously had himself elected to the presidency of the German Naval Association (*Flottenverein*); he reorganised the association into a huge propagandist weapon, undertook advance after advance in co-operation with heavy industry and its press, and finally forced his rival Tirpitz, half against his will, to the famous naval innovations of 1908, which brought the tension between Germany and England to its zenith.

It may strike one that the land army suffered the Wilhelm predilection for the navy without overmuch grumbling. The riddle is not difficult to solve. The conservative shyness of overmuch expansion of the army—with its democratisation—still continued. The development of the navy was viewed even in some feudal circles—despite understandable competitive envy—not without pleasure. It directed attention away from plans of increasing the army. Of course, immediately before the world war international differences became so tense that, just as in the 'nineties, an expansionist party was formed in the General Staff. This time it was under the leadership of the then Colonel Ludendorff, a Prussian, but not an aristocrat. The new increase of the army—the great Bill of 1913—had also, like its predecessors, to be wrung from the Prussian nobility and its representatives, the Prussian War Ministers, by dint of hard struggle. A social radicalisation of the army through progressive democratisation was, however, as little desired by the General Staff party as by the old Prussian aristocracy. And so it was with pleasure that there was found, in the person of General Keim, against whom his rival Tirpitz in the meantime had stolen a march by suddenly increasing the fleet, a proved agitator able to fulfil

a twofold task, viz. to force the old aristocratic Prussia to an army increase by demagogic incitement of the masses, but simultaneously to instil into the masses of the people the spirit of the old Prussianism and so paralyse the social results that it was feared the Arms Bill might produce. It was through the great Arms Association (*Wehrverein*), founded but a few years before the outbreak of the war, but rapidly attaining to a great importance, and through its "*Führer*," General Keim, that for the first time the spirit of the old Prussianism was spread beyond Prussia and planted deep in the German people.

The Keim movement was destroyed by the World War and its outcome. The royal Prussian army was replaced by the Reichswehr, formally commanded by the republic. General Keim, now old, died; but the social function that he had fulfilled for the development of the old army, the implanting of subserviency and militarism in the masses, now possessed increasing importance, since these masses had in the meantime become inordinately rebellious and withdrawn themselves politically as well as spiritually from the control of the old Prussianism. In the eighth chapter of *Mein Kampf*, Hitler describes how he began his political career as the propaganda emissary of the military power. His political task corresponded therefore, in the beginning, to the position of Keim. Around Hitler, however, there swarmed figures like Captain Roehm, militarily of the first rank, but socially inferior—that is to say, people whom the wielders of military power could—just as in the case of Keim—drop and repudiate whenever it served their needs. Naturally there were also marked differences. The new military weapon was after all, at least formally, the army of a republic, and indeed of a state that was pledged by international agreements to disarmament. The relations, therefore, between the military power and its new propaganda machine, the Nazi Party, were necessarily still looser than were in their time the bonds between General Keim and the superior departments, which had often enough already been extremely tense. Further, the social situation had changed. The tasks of the new propaganda machine were far greater than those of the old one, and so it was driven by absolute necessity to become a new, independent political party.

Herein lay the problem. In 1923 the Reichswehr and the

Nazi Party fired on each other in Munich. The propaganda machine of the military power had made itself independent and flew off on its own. The whole history of the Nazi Party in its essentials is a history of the attempt of the military power to catch again this propaganda wing that had flown away. This task was complicated by the fact that the functions of the propaganda machine were becoming ever more important for the continuance of the military power and its ultimate rearmament. Without the gigantic political labours of the Nazis the problems would never have been solved in favour of the military power. Only when the republic was overthrown, the way made clear for rearmament, tottering industry saved from socialisation by an armaments programme, and the masses of unemployed swept from the streets by armaments programmes and relief work schemes, could there be any approach to a final solution. In this matters did not proceed without some concession ; in order to draw from the rival propaganda machine the poison fangs of its own claims to political power, the *Führer* of this machine had to be retained and separated from his troop. The S.A. chiefs, the choice troops of the party, and also General von Schleicher, who was aspiring to govern the Reich, fell in the shootings of June 30th, 1934, and Hitler became Hindenburg's successor.

Since that day harmony has again been established in Germany, in the sense of the military power, which if it is no longer, as it once was, completely controlled by the Prussian aristocracy, still preserves the best relations with it. The official introduction of conscription has to-day lost its horrors for the Prussian junker ; for political opposition parties, that might have been able to exploit on their own behalf the arming of the people, no longer exist. In any case, the Reichswehr's old kernel of 100,000 men, which the introduction of conscription has suddenly raised—partly formally, partly in fact—to the rank of officers, would forbid objections to the military system. In the present-day German army, " Arms Psychology " has been raised to the rank of a science to which the greatest attention is paid. Any kind of a " disruption " of the army seems, therefore, to be practically excluded, even if armaments should swell so high as to embrace the whole people.

Thus, from the social point of view, the further and unhampered development of rearmament has been facilitated

and ensured in every way. One of the chief factors in this is the tremendous importance of armaments for the further development of the present-day German economic system. The "marriage negotiations" between industrial and military interests, once an outstanding feature of the Keim period, are merrily in progress, and one can hardly conceive any "relief work programme" that might replace or excel the importance of armaments. If one also realises the importance of conscription for the abolition of unemployment, and remembers that the German masses have been roused to white heat by the gigantic machine of Nazi armaments propaganda, which has obediently returned to the service of the military power, one must ask oneself with justifiable anxiety whether the *Führer* will be able to get rid of the spirits he has summoned from the deep.

WOLFGANG HALLGARTEN.

THE WORLD-WIDE SCOURGE OF MALARIA.

A RECENTLY issued survey of *Malaria in Ceylon* by Colonel C. L. Dunn,* formerly Director of Public Health in the United Provinces of India, must remove any lingering doubt that may still be harboured in political and medical quarters as to the urgent necessity for a widespread extension of the approved methods of malaria control. Sir Malcolm Watson in his Preface reminds us that the terrible epidemic which swept Ceylon from October 1934 till April 1935 cost the government £350,000 and the people an incalculable amount in sickness, misery and cash. At least 100,000 people died, but it has been estimated that more than a quarter of Ceylon's population of 5,313,000 caught the disease, which means at least much danger of minor epidemics still to follow.

Not the least valuable feature of Colonel Dunn's impressive survey is in his moderately worded remarks upon necessary health organisation by central government and local authorities, from which it is evident that the disaster of 1934-5 was to some degree inevitable owing to the inadequacy of the measures already adopted. He is very conscious of the financial difficulties in the way of ideal schemes of malaria control, but in the light of his own experience in India and that of many other malariologists the Ceylon Government is confronted with evidence that cannot be ignored of the immediate need for more effective mass therapy and a greater reliance upon efficient anti-mosquito measures rather than drugs. In irrigation work and the reclamation of jungle breeding-grounds a very great deal obviously awaits organised planning.

While we may justly take Ceylon as an object-lesson which is receiving special attention just now from the experts, the problem of malaria is urgent elsewhere. Indeed, to call it world-wide is scarcely an exaggeration, for more than one-third of the world's population is malarious. The British people must be especially concerned, since in respect of population the Empire is so largely subtropical and tropical. The holocaust in Ceylon forced itself upon the attention of the British public and every popular newspaper reported it with big headlines. This, however, was quite exceptional, and

* Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1936.

the unpleasant truths about malaria want bringing home forcibly to the people in England, who, while they read of such a disaster as that which overtook Ceylon, should be made to realise two terrible and disgraceful truths. One is that epidemic malaria in thickly populated countries can be almost completely prevented, and that the total figures for the extraordinary ravages of the disease in Ceylon are vastly exceeded every year in India alone, with scarcely a word being said about it in the British press at home. Certainly the size of the figures for India may be put down to the vast population, but no reasonable defence is possible of the failure to reduce malaria progressively by methods that are within the cognisance of the authorities.

Malarial fevers were first distinguished from others when it was discovered that quinine served as a good prophylactic against them. The commercial production of this drug began last century, but the use of cinchona bark (from which quinine is derived) spread to Europe through the Spaniards, during their South American conquests in the sixteenth century. The efficacy of the bark had long been known to the Peruvians. Any scientific knowledge of the nature of malaria, beyond this useful fact that it could be held at bay by a drug taken regularly in sufficient quantities, had to await the efficient microscope and the development of bacteriology. In 1880 a French army surgeon, Laveran, observed the parasite of malaria in human blood. The worm-like parasite of elephantiasis had been discovered by Bancroft in 1876 in human blood, and in 1877 Patrick Manson, acting on a suggestion of Bancroft that the worm could be carried by mosquitoes, examined mosquitoes that had fed on the blood of a patient, and found the parasite. These were outstanding among several notable discoveries of last century. The process, which Sir Ronald Ross subsequently named "metaxeny," by which the parasite changed its host was not yet understood. Manson's suggestion was that mosquitoes after feeding on blood died on the surface of water. The developing embryos of the parasite then left the dead insects for the water, and were so swallowed by human beings. The truth, that the parasite (*Filaria bancrofti*) was transmitted to other human beings through the mosquito's proboscis, was discovered in 1900 by G. C. Low and S. P. James, who had studied the work which Ross had meanwhile accomplished.

Ross, as an obscure army surgeon in India, was stimulated and encouraged by Manson to pursue his researches into the secret of malaria. How he at last discovered the malaria parasite in the tissues of certain anopheline mosquitoes is one of the epics of medical research. Between August 20th, 1897, which he afterwards celebrated as "Mosquito Day," and the summer of 1898, Ross had not only demonstrated the "metaxeny" of malaria but had thrown light upon the transmission of other diseases, such as elephantiasis, which has been referred to, and yellow fever, carried by other species of mosquitoes. To call Ross's discovery "epoch-making" is to use a threadbare phrase which in its full meaning is both ironic and no more than adequate. It did seem as if the discovery were going to usher in a new era of tropical hygiene and the development of vast fertile countries long moribund in the grip of endless fevers. Ross lost no time in studying the practical application of the new knowledge, and though it made him unpopular with the authorities in India and elsewhere, he pleaded unceasingly for sanitary measures to be directed principally against mosquitoes in crowded areas.

The desire to complete his work by demonstrating how malaria could be suppressed—the great work which India of all countries most badly needed—possessed Ross so soon as he started to make plans in England for his future. He went to British West Africa with the object of organising mosquito control work. But although the mission was going out to a region which had earned its popular name of "the White Man's Grave," Ross's aims and efforts were received at Freetown with amused incredulity and contempt. At Lagos, where the governor, Sir William MacGregor, was already cognisant of the mosquito theory, the mission received every possible assistance, and much valuable work was accomplished. After the Sierra Leone expedition Ross was requested by the Suez Canal Company to investigate the malarious conditions at Ismailia, and as a result the town was subsequently freed of the scourge. A few years later the most important British effort in malaria control was begun by the Federated Malay States, Ross's disciple, (Sir) Malcolm Watson, being in charge of the work. The task was difficult and long, and much more was to be learnt about the habits of malarial mosquitoes, which vary according to the nature of the *terrain* and climate.

The most complete and dramatic confirmation of the importance of mosquito control was due to the Americans. The story of the investigations which followed upon an outbreak of yellow fever among American troops at Havana early in 1900 is an example of the grandeur of human courage applied to humanitarian research instead of to warfare. A commission was appointed to study yellow fever, especially the possibilities of transmission by mosquitoes, in the light of Ronald Ross's work. Doctors and volunteers among the troops subjected themselves to nerve-trying experiments to see if they could catch the deadly fever, and by what means. Several men died of it to secure the proof that the culprit was a mosquito, the *Stegomyia*. Repressive measures against mosquitoes were decided on. The result was not merely the conquest of yellow fever in Havana, but the dramatic success of a new Panama Canal scheme. On the site of the ruined schemes of de Lesseps, where heaps of derelict machinery testified to the conquest of mosquitoes over man, the Americans decided to put hygiene before engineering, and under the supervision of Colonel Gorgas established a mosquito-free zone as a preliminary to cutting the Canal. Even to-day the Canal zone is but a healthy oasis in an extensive region of mosquito-borne disease, proving the efficacy of mosquito control and answering the pessimistic arguments of those who complain that mosquitoes cannot be exterminated throughout a whole country.

Unfortunately such pessimism is not ancient history and claims have been made since the war in favour of using quinine instead of mosquito control in India. Even the chief protagonists of quinine in India have been silenced by hard facts, and the British and Native governments are now faced with the necessity of more energetic measures against malaria. In India as elsewhere increasing transport adds greatly to the risk of infection spreading from one crowded region to another when an epidemic begins, and there is no hope in quinine, though the drug is a great boon to Europeans in malarious countries.

In Ceylon, when the great epidemic was sweeping the country, the authorities quickly learnt the truth of certain remarks made to the writer by the late Sir Ronald Ross :

> " Drugging is a hopeless expedient," he said, " for the general reduction of malaria. For one thing there is not enough quinine,

and the cost of wholesale dosing of big populations would be prohibitive. Moreover the dosing must be continuous if it is to keep down the fever throughout a given area. If it is given up for a time and the mosquito carriers remain plentiful the epidemic begins again. I say nothing about the difficulties of compelling a big population of ignorant natives to take the requisite doses. Many a British Commissioner in tropical countries could tell amusing stories of such attempts. Since we learnt how to cope with malaria not one-tenth of the necessary measures have been taken by the authorities concerned. I can only explain the lamentable slackness of the British authorities in applying the approved methods of mosquito control by the immunity and indifference of the people at home."

According to the *British Medical Journal* (September 1935), Colonel James, in opening a discussion at a meeting of the Chemistry Section of the British Association on September 9th, 1935, stated that we disbursed annually nearly £500,000 on the purchase of quinine, yet our expenditure for malarial research amounted to barely a two-hundredth part of this sum. In Ceylon recently, said Colonel James, £20,000 was spent on atebrin, the German synthetic drug.

The latest available figures underline Sir Ronald Ross's most outspoken comments upon governmental apathy in dealing with humanity's greatest scourge as it can be dealt with. The latest statistics collected by the League of Nations Health Organisation* show that increased incidence of malaria is world-wide. The registered cases of malaria for 1934 were as follows, compared with the preceding years of 1933 and 1932 :

	1934	1933	1932
Africa	265,558	198,836	187,938
America	441,580	423,258	456,822
Asia (without India) ...	1,042,517	1,118,111	956,975
Europe	230,412	175,213	203,219
U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R.:			
In Europe	1,896,559	1,457,122	1,284,222
Ukraine	658,159	318,681	260,596
White Russia	4,031	9,081	2,932
Railways and Waterways	203,549	36,763	55,267
Oceania:			
Australia	1,090	72	66
New Zealand	1	1	—

* *Annual Epidemiological Report: Malaria.* Geneva. 1936.

By far the heaviest figures in the American totals are those for Peru (home of cinchona) and Mexico. The European total is almost entirely due to Italy's 222,171 cases for 1934, which figure has probably much increased since the Abyssinian campaign. The heaviest Asiatic figures are accounted for by the Uzbek Republic and the Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia, but we may surmise that the Chinese figures would be much higher if they were more reliable. In European Soviet territory, however, the figures reveal a dangerous state of affairs that calls for extensive and organised measures under difficult geographical and social conditions.

The picture of a malarious world which the League of Nations statistics offer is gloomy when we consider that the actual incidence of malaria is much greater than these totals of notified cases indicate, but we have to look at India to realise the appalling nature of the scourge. The 1936 annual report of the Public Health Commissioner with the Government of India supplies the figures for 1933. We learn that over 12½ million diagnosed cases of malaria were treated in hospitals and dispensaries in 1933, compared with less than 11 million cases in 1922. Most provinces recorded increases, the largest being Punjab (plus 1,186,544), Bengal (plus 633,020), and North-West Frontier (plus 188,814). The well-cared-for British troops in India suffered from an increased incidence of malaria amounting to 19·2 per 1,000 compared with 1932, but 1932 was climatically a better malaria year than 1933. The 1933 figure for the British troops, of 103·3 cases per 1,000, has only been improved on in one other year prior to 1932. That was 1929, when the figure was 91·3. There is here a warning of the danger to Europeans of widespread malaria among natives of tropical and subtropical countries.

An important problem in India which has recently been investigated is the relationship between malaria incidence and rice cultivation. Since the 1931 report of the Commissioner in India was issued the breeding of anopheles mosquitoes in relation to rice fields has been investigated in Lower Bengal by Mr. Purnondu Sen, Entomologist of the Public Health Department of Bengal. In the 1936 report he is quoted as saying :

> There has been a tendency during recent years among certain malariologists to associate the paddy fields in the proximity of

> human habitations with the malariousness of a place. That is to say, the rice fields have been considered by many as the chief source of anopheline output in a locality, the water accumulating in these fields furnishing the necessary breeding surfaces for these mosquitoes. This suspicion has naturally induced certain municipalities and other corporate bodies responsible for public health to prohibit wet cultivation within a mile of their jurisdiction.

The non-committal note of the official entomologist is maintained in his further observations, which are the fruit of five years' consideration by the authorities. He points out that, as rice is the staple food of the province, municipalities should beware of causing hardship to the people by such prohibition, since

> unfortunately we are not fully aware what exact rôle is being played by the rice swamps under normal conditions on the life and distribution of these carrier species of anophelines. Wide divergence of opinion on this point exists amongst different workers, some claiming their dissociation in the causation of malaria while others consider the rice fields as the main source of troubles.

Comment upon this official statement of ignorance is hardly necessary. One can only wonder how frequently elsewhere short-sighted views of the economic interests of rich provinces will prevail over uncomfortable conclusions and the ample experience of malaria control measures and the habits of anopheline mosquitoes already available to health authorities.

In India especially the gravest problem is the paralysis of native life. Thousands of villages are moribund every year. The most fertile districts, gifted apparently with every blessing of Nature, are often almost inaccessible to Europeans except at great risk of infection. " Those who have never been out of England," said Ross, " can scarcely credit the pictures of misery presented by populations in an epidemic of malaria."

Human history has been more influenced by malaria probably than by any other human or natural cause. There are good grounds for assuming that the decay of many ancient civilisations was due to the unchecked increase of the disease. It has been shown by W. H. S. Jones (*Malaria and Greek History*) that such an explanation is more than plausible applied to ancient Greece, and it has been advanced also to account for the decay of Rome. The lethargy of Spain after its rise to wealth and culture in the sixteenth century can also

be explained by malaria, which is known to have been prevalent there when the Napoleonic troops invaded the country.

The modern world suffers from economic depressions, mostly due to want of enlightened collaboration, but none the less injurious to prosperity, yet by far the greatest potential increase of world wealth is neglected by the failure to combat man's greatest affliction. Nearly forty years after the secret was laid bare and the means of controlling malaria placed in our hands, about a third of the world remains in the grip of the disease. It is not using words carelessly to declare that if mankind will make full use of the knowledge gained by medical science vast deserts of misery and want can be made to blossom into prosperity and great new civilisations at present undreamed of may rise up again from " darkest Africa " and the rich Orient.

R. L. Mégroz.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Mr. Stalin at Bay.

IT may not be true that Russia is the only country to have attracted recent attention by indulging its taste for ritualistic confession as a political rather than a religious exercise. China, for example, whose national genius is never far behind in any competitive exhibition of the oddities in political life, has given us the fair analogy. When the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang kidnapped and then released the Generalissimo and President of his own country he followed his liberated victim back to Nanking and voluntarily—in this case there was no doubt that the act was voluntary—wrote to him a letter of apparently morbid self-abasement. He confessed that he was "naturally rustic, surly and unpolished"; that he had committed an "impudent and criminal act"; that he was "penitent"; he invited death as a punishment and begged his judges not to let "sentiment or friendship" deter them. Or rather it appeared to be morbid. It was probably a put-up job designed to impress the Japanese enemy with a sense of the recaptured Chinese unity.

An immediately striking difference between the scenes enacted in Nanking and in Moscow is that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Piatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek and the rest need hardly have worried about the danger of any sentimental weakening towards mercy on the part of Vyshinsky or Stalin or the G.P.U. There is a grim element in Moscow that is not to be found in Nanking.

There have been so many of these Moscow trials that certain of their attributes are now accepted by general opinion outside. Revolutions, of course, devour their infants; dictators are driven by fear to the very technique of murder that may, probably will, one day rebound against themselves; and "Trotskyism" is the most convenient bogy available to Mr. Stalin as a pretext for killing off his former colleagues and present enemies and as a method of frightening the peasant masses into continued loyalty towards himself. In every case the standardised method has been, first, the identification of Trotsky intrigue with foreign intrigue; second, the unanimous confessions of the accused, their

spontaneous resultant desire to be shot, and the prompt satisfaction of that desire.

In China, whose customs rest upon a long tradition of civilised and humane intelligence, no one expected, least of all General Chang Hsueh-liang himself, that he would be shot. In the event he was perfunctorily sentenced to a few years' imprisonment ; that sentence, of course, was immediately rescinded and the culprit was freely pardoned and released.

In Moscow these men confess and demand to be shot, knowing that they will be shot. Few things more curious are known to students of modern history. Why these abject confessions and how are they engineered ? Everybody knows that since the first great Moscow trial was filmed and broadcast throughout the country, each succeeding pantomime has been as carefully prepared as any pantomime at Drury Lane : if pantomime be the right word for a play that ends in the wholesale murder of the principal players. But it seems reasonable to assume that a man who knows he is going to be shot does not publicly debase himself and demand to be shot, unless there be some strong inducement for such behaviour.

Drugs ? The suggestion is absurd. Seventeen drugged men are no more capable of unanimous self-abasement than of unanimous or coherent anything else ; and men not immediately under the influence of drugs, but demoralised by a cumulative course of drugs, would be as likely to throw something at Vyshinsky as to cringe in unison before him. Torture ? That theory in its turn does not fit all the facts. It probably did explain the " confessions " of the British engineers tried in 1933 ; but not any of the Russian confessions. The Russian prisoners have for the most part known that they were to be shot forthwith after the trial. If they had been tortured, were now in no fear of further torture, and knew quite simply what was at last coming to them, their attitude would be almost anything but the sprightly unanimity of remorseful confession we know so well. Can it be that Zinoviev and the rest were not shot after all ; that they were deported under other names and under the most rigid control to some isolated Siberian prison as their reward for complying with the Stalin stage directions at the trial ? It seems a far-fetched and unconvincing theory.

If any fact emerges more indisputably than another from these bizarre performances it is that Stalin is himself in mortal terror, and that in his panic he shoots his way to what he imagines will be the security of isolation. Such a man must kill, not imprison, those he fears. What then is the explanation of the system of confessions? The answer must be left obscured in its impenetrable mystery. No one outside the Kremlin can throw light on it.

Yet something may be gained by recalling the main common features of the many "trials" that have already been staged in Moscow. It was at the beginning of 1929 that the even then chronic personal quarrel between Stalin and Trotsky came to a head. Trotsky was banished for what were called his "anti-Soviet activities" unearthed by the G.P.U., and his followers were rounded up in large numbers. In Moscow alone 150 arrests were made, including prominent stalwarts of the communist party. Trotsky and his family were put aboard a Russian steamer at Constantinople.

In the early days of the "purge" the simple expedient used was the shooting of Stalin's enemies. On May 24th, 1929, for example, it was officially announced in Moscow that three well-known Russian engineers (by name Meck, Palchinsky and Velichko) had been shot the day before by order of the G.P.U. on the charge of conspiracy against the Soviet Government. Even before the technique of the trials themselves was fully evolved, the practice of elaborate confession began to be cultivated. At the end of 1929 the conference of the Central Committee of the Communist party formally expelled Bukharin from the Political Bureau and administered a "first warning" to Rykov (President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars) and Tomsky. Those three men wrote, or in some way were made to write, a public confession and recantation. They promised in the future to abandon their tendencies towards the "Right" and to revert to true Leninism according to the gospel of Stalin.

An experimental trial, as it were, of another kind was held in Kharkov in the spring of 1930, the prisoners being forty-five Ukrainian "separatists" alleged to be plotting for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian Republic on non-Soviet lines. But it came to be recognised in the Kremlin that a xenophobe element was indispensable to the full propagandist value of the trials. In December 1929 several

of the Russian employees of the Lena Goldfields Concession were arrested on charges of wanton damage together with economic and political espionage in the interests, and at the instigation, of the British owners. The trial started on April 18th, 1930, at the Supreme Court in Moscow. The sentences were announced on May 8th. Two of the accused—Kolyasnikov and Muromtzev—were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, but the sentence was ostentatiously reduced by virtue of the prisoners' "sincere repentance." The third culprit was in the first instance sentenced to death and was let off with ten years in the like sense.

The perfection of the technique of trial and confession was not, however, achieved without setbacks. In September 1930 the G.P.U. ran amok and dispensed again with even a trial. Forty-eight specialists employed by the food supply organisation were suddenly arrested and shot without more ado. They were accused of disorganising the supply of meat, fish and vegetables with the ulterior object of undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the end of 1930 the G.P.U. even discovered eight Russian experts who were planning a foreign intervention in Russia's affairs involving no less dramatic an element than action by the British naval forces. A solemn trial was staged in Moscow. Something like a war scare was being fanned from the Kremlin at the time. The most fantastic allegations were made at the trial. MM. Briand and Poincaré and the French General Staff were featured as the chief agitators for the overthrow of the Russian régime. Mr. Winston Churchill and Colonel Lawrence were represented as having undertaken that the British fleet would attack Leningrad and would land an expeditionary force on the shores of the Black Sea.

At the trial itself the prisoners indulged in an orgy of self-accusation. They competed with each other in heaping abuse on their own heads and in demanding punishment for themselves without mercy. They gave a terrific description of the ramifications of their own treachery, so that by the end of the trial every industry in the country appeared to have been systematically undermined for several years past, and the number of the traitors ran into thousands. Meetings were held all over the country passing resolutions that the traitors be shot. Five of the eight experts were duly sentenced to death and the other three to ten years' imprisonment. The

naïve motive in that particular case was at once made apparent. The sentences were commuted to ten years' and eight years' imprisonment respectively, the Kremlin explaining that the prisoners deserved to be rewarded for having by means of their confessions disclosed the serious nature of the general plot against the U.S.S.R. and that "the Soviet Government cannot be guided by a spirit of revenge."

The trial was followed by an intensive propaganda urging the people of the U.S.S.R. to prepare for an imminent war of defence against an encircling attack about to be launched by the massed forces of all the "imperialist" Powers.

By the spring of 1931 trials had become a regular feature of Kremlin politics. Groups of wreckers were discovered almost as a routine in every industry and in every walk of life. In March 1931 fourteen Socialist experts were tried for plotting a foreign intervention, this time the outside villain of the piece being the Second International in the place of the French General Staff.

A slight modification was introduced into the Kremlin's practice in the early months of 1932, when a new series of trials was begun, this time the victims being alleged "wreckers" in the timber industry. Their particular offence was that their wrecking activities had been conducted in the interests and at the instigation of "foreign capitalists." The bogy had been changed from a diplomatic to a financial form. Concurrently the normal series of trials was proceeding against wreckers in the meat and vegetable trades.

The fact that in the spring of 1932 the government for the first time admitted that there was a shortage of bread partly explained the prevailing obsession with wreckers in the food industries. At the Trades Union Congress held in Moscow at the end of April Mr. Molotov openly admitted that until the next harvest was reaped food shortage would be one of the chief difficulties to be faced. Only in the December before, however, he had protested, when addressing the Z.I.K. (Central Executive Committee) that the partial failure of the crops could not affect the food supply.

It simply does happen to be the case that in all the dictatorship countries the ruling authorities have to be constantly on their guard against any loss of prestige, no matter how small. The dictator's power appears always to be absolute, because it must be maintained at such a pitch the whole time

if it is to continue. The slightest crumbling of prestige may at any moment mean the total immediate collapse of the whole structure. While Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini have maintained their authority by " hitting the high spots " in their foreign relations, the ruling authorities in Russia have concentrated on sidetracking the peasants' suspicions by the continuous legal tracking down of " wreckers " who, to the alleged prescription of the foreign enemy, have deliberately ruined the peasants' food supply.

During the first half of 1932 the government had to issue solemn appeals to " the workers " not to rely exclusively on the State distribution of foodstuffs, but to organise their own kitchen-gardens, and to breed their own rabbits in the factories to meet the shortage of butchers' meat. To encourage the peasants to produce food in quantities large enough to enable the town workers to live, the dictators of the proletariat threw to the winds another batch of their bolshevik principles. By a decree of May 20th, 1932, all peasants, except " kulaks," were permitted to sell as much of their produce as they chose, direct to the consumer in the open market at current market prices, their profits to be free of taxes of all kinds.

In their panic the bosses of the communist racket were forced to invoke capitalist practice in a fantastically exaggerated form to save their own skins. They had reduced the country to such straits that they had to concede not only the incentive of private gain, but to promise that capitalist profits would be wholly sacrosanct even against State taxation. In that summer decree after decree was issued to induce the peasant, by more and more attractive baits of private profit, to supply the towns with food.

It was during the 1932 phase of the Kremlin's own crisis that the Central Executive Committee relieved Mr. Sokolnikov, Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, of his post, appointing Mr. Maisky (then Minister to Finland) to succeed him. It was announced of course that Mr. Sokolnikov had been recalled at his own request. At the beginning of October a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist party and the Commission of Control drew up a list of about twenty members who were then and there expelled from the party for " counter-revolutionary activities," for advocating " surrender to the capitalist régime " and for making friends with

" class enemies " outside the party. The list included the names of Zinoviev and Kamenev. The " purge " had become a weapon of gigantic range. In 1921, in 1929, in 1932 good old communists were expelled from the party in incredible numbers. At the end of 1932 the Central Committee announced that a " general purge " was about to be undertaken which would take twelve months to carry out. During those twelve months no new members were to be admitted and existing members were to be tested for loyalty before disciplinary tribunals which would investigate the members' lives down to the smallest detail. A system of internal passports was introduced into all cities, towns and industrial centres. Those who were refused passports for any reason were deported, and every single person's every movement was strictly controlled by the G.P.U.

The G.P.U. was by far the hardest-worked organisation in the U.S.S.R. It worked ever harder and harder. At the beginning of March 1933 the G.P.U. arrested seventy persons whom it accused of " wrecking " the agricultural industry ; on March 12th the G.P.U. announced that it had shot thirty-five of those persons ; on March 24th the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., filled presumably with the spirit of the chase, issued a bloodthirsty decree " on the responsibility of employees in state institutions and enterprises for acts of wrecking." The decree urged the G.P.U. to act " with the utmost severity " against all state employees " convicted " of sabotage or wrecking.

The excitement was apparently so intense that it produced a first-rate incident with the British Government. On March 11th, 1933, four British engineers, by name Monkhouse, Thornton, Cushny and MacDonald, employed by the Metropolitan-Vickers firm, were arrested in Moscow by agents of the G.P.U. and conveyed to the G.P.U. prison in Lubianka. The Moscow and Leningrad offices of the company and the private residences of the men were raided for documentary evidence. Two days later two more engineers of the same firm, by name Gregory and Nordwall, were arrested, as well as a large number of Russians, including six women typists, employed by the same company.

On March 15th Mr. Baldwin announced to the House of Commons that the British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed vigorously to protest against the retention in

prison of British subjects against whom no charge had been made. On the same day the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. declared a state of emergency and invested the G.P.U. with powers of summary punishment without trial. Mr. Litvinov saw Sir Esmond Ovey on March 17th, and with his typical taste for dialectical quibble informed him that British browbeating could not save British subjects from compliance with Russian law, adding the observation that if Sir Esmond were so certain of the innocence of the prisoners, what was he afraid of? It happened that the existing Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was due to expire on April 17th, and negotiations were in progress for a new treaty to take its place.

That circumstance suggested to the British Government that the Trade Agreement might be used as a lever for forcing Moscow to release the prisoners. On April 3rd Mr. MacDonald announced in the House of Commons that on April 5th the Government proposed to pass through all its stages an enabling bill to give the Government power to issue Orders in Council prohibiting all Russian imports except under licence. The bill duly passed its second reading on April 5th and its third on April 6th, both Sir John Simon and Mr. Runciman having emphasised the point that its only purpose was to safeguard the "life and liberty" of British subjects in Russia, and having given an undertaking that it would not be used for any other purpose. The bill was to be valid for only three months in the first instance.

In the meantime Mr. Monkhouse, manager of Metropolitan-Vickers, had on April 1st been formally charged with economic sabotage, military and economic espionage, and bribery. Mr. Litvinov has said and done so many things that have betrayed in him a certain light-hearted contempt for consistency that one hardly any longer noticed new examples: but he seldom contradicted himself so gaily as when on March 28th, 1933, he told Sir Esmond Ovey that the operation of Russian law in Moscow was no concern of the British Government, and then within a week (on April 3rd) himself formally protested to the German Ambassador against the arrest of Russian subjects in Berlin.

The trial of the engineers began on April 12th and ended on April 19th. The proceedings were "talky-filmed." The judge acted undisguisedly as a sort of second prosecutor,

and showed his hostility against the prisoners by a stream of flippant insults. He knew, of course, that what he said was being recorded and would in due course be relayed throughout the provinces. Moreover, it was proved during that particular trial that the prisoners were subjected to something like mental torture. At one point, when one of the prisoners refused to confess his guilt, the court was suddenly adjourned. When it reassembled some hours later the said prisoner, looking physically distressed, at once confessed. During the adjournment he had been confined in his cell with officers of the G.P.U.

By July 1st the hot air was deflated, the prisoners were released, the embargoes lifted, and arrangements made for a prompt resumption of the negotiations for a new trade agreement.

The chief charge against the engineers had been that of "sabotage." Sabotage of what? Of their own work. The charge, of course, was absurd. In the Kremlin the absurdity of the charge was beside the point. All they really wanted was a "confession" of sorts, such as would prove to the peasant masses of Russia that the foreign enemy was plotting against the Soviet system and that the Russian Government was doing its heroic best to defend the Russian peasant and to provide him with food.

Food shortage indeed became so acute in many parts of Russia during 1933 that the digging up of seed potatoes just planted, the gleaning of half-ripe corn and such desperate acts were punished as "counter-revolutionary activities." Picked bands of communists from the towns were stationed in country districts and given punitive powers against "grain thieves." It clearly was not possible for the G.P.U. to shoot every one of the thousands of "wreckers" who were being unceasingly arrested. It was equally impossible simply to let them starve in concentration camps. They were made to work. The dogmas and practices of the "world revolution" is clearly not the most promising breeding ground of a sense of humour. In July 1933 "the Comrade Stalin White Sea-Baltic Canal" was opened for navigation. It was 227 kilometres long. It had been built wholly by convict "wreckers." It was an immense enterprise and took twenty months to carry out. Even the engineering staff were "convicted wreckers," the workmen were a medley of wreckers,

counter-revolutionaries, political offenders, kulaks, financial speculators, saboteurs and the like. As a reward for services rendered, about 75,000 of the convicts who had done the work were released from the convict camps, whereby the pressure on the accommodation of those camps was somewhat relieved.

By the end of 1933 the communist party had been "purged," according to the official estimate of that party, by about 20 per cent. As the membership was over 3,000,000, the expulsions numbered about 600,000. Sabotage or wrecking is probably the last charge that will ever be laid against the industry of the G.P.U.

The full bloom of the period of trials dates from July 10th, 1934, when a decree of the All-Union Central Executive Committee incorporated the G.P.U. in the newly created Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The G.P.U. was thereby deprived of its power to shoot people out of hand. It was to continue its detective work, but was to hand over the culprits to the judicial authorities for punishment. As if to show that the change was not intended as an indication of relaxing severity, the series of trials and death sentences continued unabated. Three engineers, for example, employed by the Kusnetsk Metal Combine were promptly sentenced to death, and shot, for alleged espionage in the interests of foreign countries.

Yet in its new form the punitive organisation was less convincing than in the days when the G.P.U. could themselves shoot anybody without trial. A spirit of laxity, almost of freedom and defiance began to stalk abroad. On December 1st, 1934, a wayward communist, Nikolaiev by name, formerly employed by the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, went and shot one of Stalin's chief henchmen, Sergei Kirov, in the Smolny Palace itself, the headquarters of the Leningrad Soviet. Kirov was a member of the Political Bureau and of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, or Red Parliament, Secretary of the Central and Leningrad committees of the Communist party and in general a big shot himself.

The Kremlin became so alarmed that it started a purge of the Commissariat of the Interior itself. The chief officials of the Leningrad department of that Commissariat were arrested and sent for trial for neglect of their duties. Wholesale

other arrests were promptly made among members of what were alleged to be " white-guard terrorist organisations." New decrees were promulgated to the effect that terrorists must be tried without delay, must not be allowed to be defended by counsel, nor to appeal against the death sentence, and if convicted were to be shot without delay. Within a fortnight 103 such alleged terrorists were shot in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk and the charge against them was the uniformly comprehensive one of having been " preparing to organise terrorist acts " against Soviet officials.

Zinoviev, Kamenev and other old guard bolshevists were arrested at that time. Zinoviev had been President of the Communist International. Kamenev had been one of the ruling Triumvirate set up after the death of Lenin. Nikolaiev and thirteen other members of the " Leningrad terrorist centre " were tried before Vyshinsky and sentenced. They were all shot on December 29th, 1934.

The trial technique was by then complete. The prisoners were alleged to have received money from a " foreign consul " and to have been intriguing with Trotsky. They all abjectly confessed. Outside indignation meetings passed resolutions describing the culprits as " counter-revolutionary vipers," demanding their death, and protesting eternal loyalty to Stalin.

Zinoviev and Kamenev were both sentenced to imprisonment for " ideological " connection with Kirov's murder and with the " anti-Stalin " plot. By the summer of 1935 those two old guards were accused by a member of the Political Bureau of being the real organisers of the Kirov affair and of being in full agreement with the " traitor Trotsky." They got what was coming to them a year later. On August 19th, 1936, they and fourteen others were tried before the Supreme Military Tribunal in Moscow on the charge of plotting terrorist acts against Stalin.

They confessed that in the period 1931-6 they had been the real organisers of the " Moscow and Leningrad terrorist centres," had organised attempts against the lives of Stalin and other Soviet leaders, had worked under directions from Trotsky, whose orders had been conveyed from abroad into Russia through the agency of his son and other emissaries travelling under false passports. The " foreign power " this time that was put up as a bogy before the Russian peasant

was Germany, it being alleged that Trotsky was in touch with Herr Himmler, of the German secret police. The abject competitive confessions were duly made. After a five-days' trial what Vyshinsky, the All-Union prosecutor, exultantly called " the sixteen mad dogs " were all condemned to death and were shot.

Preparations were at once made for the next big trial. Partly as a result of denunciation by the confessing August victims several prominent old Bolsheviks were promptly arrested. Among them were Rykov, Commissar of Postal Communications, Sokolnikov, former Ambassador in London and Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Bukharin, former President of the Comintern and Editor of the *Izvestia*, Karl Radek, foreign leader writer of that paper, and Piatakov, Assistant Commissar of Heavy Industry. Tomsky, former Chairman of the Central Trade Union Council, shot himself rather than wait inevitably to be shot.

The new batch of " Trotskyist wreckers " faced their trial in Moscow on January 23rd of the present year. The Russian Press and public meetings clamoured for their death, as by rote. On January 30th the sentences were announced. Radek and Sokolnikov were surprisingly let off with ten years' imprisonment, and two others with eight years. The other thirteen were shot. Of the well-known names connected with the original Lenin revolution there now remain at large only three: Trotsky (exiled in Mexico), Rykov and Bukharin. After the Zinoviev trial Rykov and Bukharin had been exonerated from complicity.

The day perhaps approaches when Stalin will have shot his way through to the security he imagines will result from the total isolation of himself within the Kremlin and the total extermination of his rivals. By that very process he places even himself at the mercy of the G.P.U. The very achievement of isolation proves his danger. The G.P.U. may yet, for lack of other game, turn upon him. What then? For nearly twenty years this Russian revolution has been devouring its children. There are not many left.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 15th, 1937.

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LITERARY DEPARTMENT.

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THE EXECUTIVE.*

Dr. W. Ivor Jennings' new work, *Cabinet Government*, will be welcomed as a valuable contribution to the study of the Executive Power in the British system of government. He is concerned particularly with the growth of Cabinet control during the last century as a guide to the functions and practice of "His Majesty's Government" to-day. Being primarily a work on political structure, the book contains only a general survey of the actual administrative machine, its distribution of functions and inter-departmental relations. It is, however, unfortunate that Dr. Jennings can give no systematic examination of the encroachment of the administration upon the legislative and judicial spheres; a process which is of the utmost significance in constitutional development. In viewing the constitution from the angle of government, the function of Parliament is treated simply as providing "a forum for the criticism of the Government," an organ of public opinion and the means through which a party achieves power.

* *Cabinet Government.* By Dr. W. Ivor Jennings. Cambridge University Press.

The basis of the administrative system, with its apex in the Cabinet, is not, of course, founded upon any comprehensive enabling law. It is spread over a complex mass of statutory provisions and constitutional conventions. Dr. Jennings remarks that "the conventions are not really very different from laws." It is true that both ultimately are supported by sanctions, but there remains a vital distinction which gives to the constitution a flexibility which the average legal rule forbids. The American constitution is notoriously rigid and President Roosevelt is having extreme difficulty in avoiding restrictive and out-of-date provisions. In theory conventions are based on precedent, but in reality they are closely related to the prevailing political idea of government, and as the latter is modified by events, so the precedent is discarded. As Dr. Jennings says, "precedents create rules because rules are necessary; and the rules are established by precedents which accord with the developing principles of constitutional government. It is necessary to justify a constitutional convention not merely by precedents but also by reason." He thus properly omits most precedents prior to the Reform Bill of 1832, and indeed many of the instances given since that date are of little immediate value to-day.

Dr. Jennings appreciates fully the influence of imponderable elements, such as personality and intellectual and physical capacity, in determining at any particular moment function and practice within the corners of the constitutional edifice. The author has extracted from published records, biographies and memoirs a great quantity of material which illustrates these variable factors. A knowledge of contemporary Cabinet practice is, of course, limited by the strict rules of secrecy, but Dr. Jennings has been able to add something to our general information "by casual conversations with persons possessing special knowledge." He discusses at some length the position of the Prime Minister whose actual relations with his colleagues, his supervision of administration and his direction of policy have inevitably ebbed and flowed with the holder of the office. Sir Robert Peel, according to Lord Rosebery "the model of all Prime Ministers," was conversant with, and in control of, all important departmental questions. While the vast development in the sphere of government has made such supervision physically impossible, the degree of interference varies, and in this respect

Dr. Jennings has reason to compare Mr. Baldwin with Mr. MacDonald. Again, the Premier's control of policy has varied enormously. Disraeli dominated his colleagues; while the author points to a contrasting situation in the Coalition Government of Mr. Asquith. "It is said that, when a discussion in which he was not interested was proceeding, he would proceed to write letters until the discussion appeared to have worn itself out. He would then remark, 'Well, gentlemen, as we are now agreed, shall we pass on?' Whereupon it would be asked on what they were agreed, and a new discussion would arise over this question."

Similarly the influence of the sovereign in the exercise of his constitutional right to warn and advise his ministers inevitably varies with each particular monarch. Dr. Jennings remarks that "the King can, if he so wills it, become a mere cipher. He can, on the other hand, take an effective part in government; if he desires to do so, he must devote himself to the business of government like Queen Victoria." But, of course, any interference beyond the limits of Bagehot's definition, as in the partisan intrigues of Queen Victoria, is to-day clearly unconstitutional. Democratic political theory requires, and the security of the Throne demands, an attitude of independent impartiality; and impartiality ends where political responsibility begins. "If he is to become," says Dr. Jennings, "a definite supporter of a particular party, then the Constitution must provide alternate monarchs as it provides for alternate Governments." The danger of an apparent, even though unintentional, partiality, arises in particular relation to the sovereign's rights to dismiss his ministers and to dissolve Parliament against advice. This question has already raised acute controversy in the Dominions, particularly in Australia when in 1932 the Governor of New South Wales dismissed the Lang ministry while it retained a majority in the popular assembly. The successive appointments of Governors favourable to the party in office have been pointed to as the ultimate result of such initiative. In the Mother Country the consequences would be disastrous to the Crown. As Dr. Jennings points out, "a king who insists on a dissolution or, what is really the same thing, compels the resignation of ministers, will be attacked as a partisan in the House and in the country." The solution urged by Mr. Justice Evatt, of the Australian High Court,

deserves the closest consideration. He argues that the exercise of the reserve powers of the Crown, including Dominions Governors, which are not subject to any precise and generally accepted conventions, should receive statutory formulation, in accordance with democratic principles. Here is an instance where certainty becomes a valuable safeguard and outweighs the advantages of conventional flexibility.

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A GERMAN BOOK ON QUEEN VICTORIA.*

It was not a bad idea to present letters and diaries of Queen Victoria to the German public of to-day because it is high time to interpret impartially her life and personality to German readers as that of a great and good friend of Germany and her best traditions. This well-bound bulky volume includes many reproductions of contemporary pictures and engravings, among which Winterhalter's water-colour portrait of the young Queen is of special interest. The original is in Emperor William's palace, Unter den Linden. Unfortunately, the favourable first impression of the book cannot be maintained after more intimate study. Three hundred and ninety-one letters and 170 extracts from the diaries are published, but I believe only 145 items are new. It is well known that the Queen's papers are carefully preserved at Windsor. Up to the year 1861, the date of the death of the Prince Consort, there are 600 volumes. The new letters from German archives seem comparatively unimportant. Some few to King Frederick William IV obviously drafted by Prince Albert, and some to King William I, drafted by ministers, discuss political matters such as the Crimean War, the Neuenburg affair, and King William's conflict with his Crown Prince. All letters addressed to the Princess of Prussia, later Queen and Empress Augusta, which comprise most of the new material, are of a private character. The two royal ladies became friends long before the marriage of their children. After the death of her half-sister Feodora, there was nobody except Augusta who was equal in rank and congenial in ideas. It is known from

* *Queen Victoria—ein Frauenleben unter der Krone—eigenhändige Briefe und Tagebuchblätter 1834-1901.* Herausgegeben von Dr. Kurt Jagow. Verlag Karl Sigismund. Berlin, 1936, xvi + 539 pp.

other sources that Queen Augusta occasionally tried to play the rôle of a mediator between England and Prussia in the interest of a political rapprochement.* Towards such attempts Queen Victoria behaved as a correct constitutional sovereign. She was very fond of the Prussian Queen, but did not hesitate to cancel her usual visit to England when politically inopportune, as in the spring of 1866.

After the Franco-German war the Empress became more reserved. Queen Victoria was quite right to write to her daughter during the war scare in 1875: "As for anyone working upon me in the sense Bismarck thinks, it is too absurd. I am not worked upon by anyone; and though I am very intimate with the dear Empress, her letters hardly ever contain any allusion to politics, certainly never anything which could be turned against her or me. . . ."† Travels and theatre, visitors and country life, personal and family health, marriages, baptisms, births and deaths—these are the usual subjects of the letters exchanged between the two royal ladies. Augusta, the more sophisticated, displays more learning and sharper criticism. Victoria admired her, this born princess of Weimar, who reminded her of her own Thuringian memories. Her melancholy resignation found an echo in the mind of the German Empress, whose resignation had different and more bitter causes. After all, Queen Victoria's indefatigable practical interest, her simple instincts, her motherly care for a great empire, give her a higher position in history.

The editor's introduction and commentary are obviously dependent upon the well-known English biographies of the Queen. Some of the notes reproduce those of the great English edition without adaptation to the German point of view; others are superficial and unreliable. Some mistakes are absurd, for instance the invention of "Lord Naplan." This is no misprint, for the same unknown peer is to be found in the index. Was it so very difficult to guess Lord Raglan's existence? There are some regrettable mistakes in the translation into German, and even the royal pedigree is not free from blunders.

VEIT VALENTIN.

* *Horst Michael, Bismarck, England und Europa, 1866-70.* München, 1930, p. 72.
† *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 2nd series, ii, p. 405. Balmoral, June 8th, 1875.

THE NILE.*

The most celebrated literary portrait painter of our time has chosen a new and unexpected theme for the practice of his art. It is, as the dust cover informs us, the biography of a river—the greatest and most historic in the world. Books on Egypt abound, but Emil Ludwig is the first to describe the river which gave it birth from its sources to the sea. No one has a more eager or many-sided interest in life—the life of forest and lake, of flower and tree, of bird and beast, of man civilised and uncivilised. He has been over the ground, not as a globe-trotter but as a student with plenty of time to take it all in. It is an entrancing story, brilliantly told, excellently translated and lavishly illustrated, glowing with the opulent colours of the East.

By far the larger portion of the book is devoted to the two streams, the White and the Blue Nile, before their meeting at Khartum. We witness the first rising in the heart of the Dark Continent, tumbling out of Victoria Nyanza, threading its way north through regions inhabited by wild animals and primitive tribes. Nowhere in the world is the contrast so arresting between the rise and the outflow of a river as in the case of the Nile, with its pigmies at one end and cosmopolitan Cairo at the other. And nowhere has a mighty river a more romantic cradle than Lake Tana, in the highlands of Abyssinia, whence the Blue Nile emerges with its life-giving silt to sustain the millions who crowd its banks thousands of miles away. The wilder brother, as our author calls it, is more difficult to follow, and there are gorges which are likely to remain unexplored. He writes with greater sympathy of the primitive folk of the Great Lakes than of the Abyssinians with their veneer of civilisation. Among the animals he speaks with particular affection of the giraffe—a creature without enemies.

> When two giraffes affectionately lay their necks together and stroke each other, it looks as if a giant toy has come to life. When they raise their heads and run, they are a miracle of grace. When they drop their heads, they look as pedantic as professors of philosophy.

No part of the narrative is so thrilling as that which tells the familiar tale of the rise of the Mahdi, the annihilation of the

* *The Nile from the Source to Egypt.* By Emil Ludwig. Allen & Unwin.

Egyptian army, the long siege of Khartum, and the heroic death of Gordon. Was our author thinking of somebody nearer home when he wrote the following sentences ?

> Mohamed Achmed was poor in his childhood, and had suffered humiliation in his youth. . . . When he discerned the stupidity of the authorities, the disputes of the party leaders, and the growing distress of the masses around him, when he saw that he only needed to believe in himself to make the others believe in him, he resolved to ordain himself Mahdi. . . . Hundreds were ready to believe in him at once, but he needed a million to lead his party to victory. In Arabic Mahdi means " The Leader."

He lived long enough to take Khartum, and his successor ruled the Sudan till his power was destroyed at Omdurman in 1898. A cruel and devastating régime, born out of suffering and fanaticism, came to an end a year later when the Khalifa and his chiefs, refusing to surrender, were killed by machine-gun fire as they said their prayers on a carpet in the desert.

The closing section is entitled " The Struggle with Man." " The Nile's struggle with man was decided in Assouan : only so mighty a work could conquer the mighty river." No dam in the world can compare with it in the quantity of water stored. If the English have done nothing else of an enduring character during the half-century of the Occupation (amicably terminated since this book was written by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty), they have harnessed the swollen waters to the service of man. Thus

> the old Nile, at the end of all its adventures, conquered yet wise, calm as an aged philosopher, becomes a source of help to the human beings swarming on its banks, and with carefully hoarded strength achieves more than was granted to it in the fire of its youth.

G. P. G.

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POLICIES OF THE POWERS.*

The author has for many years been a student of foreign affairs in general, not specialising on one country or one continent. Circumstances have given him a rather unbiased outlook. He was born an Austrian, brought up a German, and naturalised an Englishman. England he calls his second home

* *Zero Hour.* By Richard Freund. Methuen.

and third nationality. His book starts with the words, printed in tall capitals, " " WAR IS NEAR." If one's flesh begins to creep, one soon realises that the author's own beginning is unfair to the book. It is nothing like so crude as that. It is indeed a rather well-balanced and well-informed survey of conditions and policies in Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and in America.

There is nothing startlingly new in the book. How could there be? The facts of the present-day world are too well known. What the author does claim he thus expresses :

> The object was to provide a compressed guide to the present world crisis ; and though I believe that the outline is accurate, I do not pretend that the picture is complete. Dealing with almost the whole of the political world, I was compelled to reduce the story to its essentials. And the essentials, in my view, are the national policies of the principal powers.

He attains that object with commendable skill. His judgments, his perspectives, his sense of values are as good and true as his writing is clear and simple. He explains the original argument of *Mein Kampf* in this way :

> " To a certain extent, Herr Hitler's scheme was undoubtedly determined by the strength of the West and the weakness of the East. He took the line of least resistance " ; but in a later chapter he adds this interesting rider : " Under the Nazi régime the German people are being trained in a collectivism which has many points in common with that of Soviet communism. As long as Hitler remains Dictator of Germany, his intense hatred of the communist doctrine must prevent a close approach to Soviet Russia. Hatred, however, often yields to convenience. A future modification of German policy towards Russia, and perhaps a slow return to the early Bismarckian tradition of co-operation with Russia, should not be entirely ruled out."

In his survey of world conditions he touches upon all the countries whose problems or controversies may have an effect on world peace ; and he gives us two good maps, one of Europe and one of Asia. He omits any consideration of the League of Nations as a factor in the world's destiny on the typically level-headed argument that the League in the future will be what the nations make it, and before they make it anything they must first shape themselves. " I decided to exclude [he writes] a chapter on the League of Nations which

was already written. Personally, I believe that a revival of the League holds out the best hope of continued peace in Europe. But whether or not the League can rise from the ashes of defeat depends entirely on the working out of national policies, and to these I have confined myself." The book is a thoroughly reliable quick guide to contemporary conditions throughout the world.

G. G.

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POST-RESTORATION LETTER-BAGS.*

Mr. Bryant, already known as an authority on Charles II and his time, here fills in the background for a study of latter seventeenth-century England by this anthology of letters dealing with private and domestic life. Correspondence relating to public affairs is reserved for a later volume. In the present collection, some series of letters come from family Memoirs, such as those of the Verneys and Shakerleys; they recall the Pastons of an earlier day. Others are by famous persons, for example Pepys and Evelyn, Sir Thomas Browne and Dryden, Ken and Baxter, William Penn, Nell Gwyn or Rochester. In some, the interest lies chiefly in the subject, whether it be childhood or university life, religion, sport and good fellowship, social and family events, recipes or prescriptions, or the discomforts of travel by sea and land—the public stage-coach had been recently introduced. Evelyn advises Pepys what he should see in Paris, and is himself consoled in bereavement by Jeremy Taylor. Dress and other commissions are executed in town for country friends; marriages are arranged, often on a mercenary basis. One young man, looking for a bride, tells his uncle "£6,000 is not so much as I could wish. . . . I have heard of a young lady near Nottingham worth £10,000," and asks him to find out more about her. Much true affection is, however, shown in letters between husbands and wives. Smallpox is an ever-present terror, and Sir Thomas Browne gives advice for preventives in the Great Plague. The conduct of Winchester and Westminster schoolboys is reviewed; the pranks of a fast girl are detailed by her indignant stepmother. The less reputable side of the life of the period is represented by the section headed "Men of the World." Several instances prove how completely a father's

* *Postman's Horn.* By Arthur Bryant. Longmans, Green & Co. 1936.

power over the family descended, on his death, to the eldest son. In the correspondence between Peter Shakerley and his half-brother at Oxford the elder reproaches George for being "so excessively expensive" and for his "ridiculous treats in chambers"; after a series of nagging letters one's sympathies go out to the undergraduate, who at last tells his senior roundly that his "continual chiding" has been "one of the greatest obstructions" to his own application. A familiar note is struck by young Verney, who has excellent reasons for cutting lectures, but cannot explain them to his tutor! In sharp contrast to the typically English topics comes the pathetic despatch from "a poor Plymouth captive in Algiers."

The spelling throughout has been modernised: the squires and gentry of the day were apparently beginning to come into line on orthography, but their ladies were still hopelessly and erratically individualist; it must have taken all their editor's ingenuity to decipher them. Sprightly or serious, affectionate or worldly, these letters well repay study, and all will be grateful to Mr. Bryant for bringing them together.

E. G. S.

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THOMAS SHERLOCK.*

Mr. E. C. Carpenter has written a notable biography of Thomas Sherlock (1678-1761). He has been successful in handling new material, and he has not allowed this material to master his biographical skill. In particular he has been fortunate enough to consult the family records of Sir Thomas Gooch, containing thirty letters of Sherlock, and he has also made extensive use of the reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission. The author has been so considerate as to append a helpful bibliography to each of his ten chapters. Sherlock is of course an eighteenth-century bishop, and his biographer affords strong reasons for believing that he could have lived more agreeably under Laud. With this view we are disposed to agree. The eighteenth century is commonly described as an age of cold calculation, of selfish aims, of contracted interests. It indulged, we are often told, in no enthusiasm; its religion was without ardour, its politics

* *Thomas Sherlock, Bishop successively of Bangor, Salisbury and London.* By E. C. Carpenter. The S.P.C.K.

without aspiration, and even its poetry never sought to express deep feeling. There is only a measure of truth in this. The spirit which Walpole typifies in politics, which Warburton typifies in religion, which Shenstone and Gray typify in poetry, could not satisfy the needs of human nature in any age. A reaction was certain because it was necessary. Passion was beginning to assert its sway in poetry, however the prevailing fashion might run in favour of stateliness and formality. The first stirrings of romance were making themselves felt, and breaking through the reserve of convention and common sense. It is from a background like this that we can best understand the career of Thomas Sherlock, and grasp why he endeavoured to escape from his own time to the mid-seventeenth century. The very limited aims and ideas of the Common Sense School of moral philosophers were being displaced by a bolder and more critical school of metaphysics, and Sherlock approved of the change. The cold and rationalistic attitude of the religious apologists was exchanged for the wider and more comprehensive efforts of a religious revival, which in its higher forms was scholarly, imaginative, and poetical. In short, the outer coating of formalism was a mere husk, useful, indeed, as representing a protest against uncurbed and irrational fanaticism, but in no way crushing out the warmth and impulse of the national genius. So Sherlock felt, and so he harked back to the past.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Dr. Mackinnon has followed up his book on *Luther and the Reformation* by a volume on *Calvin and the Reformation*,* in commemoration of the four hundredth anniversary of the beginning, in 1536, of his career as a Reformer. He has fulfilled his task with the same fulness of knowledge and impartiality as marked his work on Luther. It may be well that so competent a scholar should have dealt with both outstanding leaders of the Reformation. Otherwise, Calvin has surely received adequate treatment in other authoritative works. Of course, Dr. Mackinnon's treatment sets forth the impressive greatness of Calvin's personality. He makes the most of the amiable traits which undoubtedly existed in his character. At the same time, such more

* By James Mackinnon. Longmans.

attractive features cannot disguise his intolerant dogmatism and its consequences in ruthless persecution of those who differed from him. With French logic, Calvin intensified the rigour of the Augustinian theology which he and Luther held in common. Luther, however, took refuge from this severity by magnifying the tender humanity of the Manger of Bethlehem. No such tempering of inexorable logic is to be found in Calvin. Dr. Mackinnon's book deserves careful study, not merely as the biography of a great religious leader, but for its careful outline of the Calvinist system as it was enforced in thought and applied in practice during its author's supremacy in Geneva.

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Dr. Prestige has published a work on *God in Patristic Thought*,* which is marked by fulness of learning and lucidity of exposition. His book traces the doctrine of God throughout the early centuries of Christian thought, culminating in the work of Athanasius and the Cappadocians. The volume is a valuable handbook on this important subject which may well find a place in the library of such theological students as seek to be well informed on the subject without devoting to it the close study of the writings of the Christian Fathers.

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It would be difficult to overpraise Professor William Langer's massive volumes, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*.† Continuing his previous work, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, it presents the fairest and most authoritative picture of the period that we possess. It describes with a wealth of fresh evidence the disintegration of the Bismarckian system and the reappearance of the Balance of Power in Europe. For when the Iron Chancellor fell in 1890, his successors were unable to keep France in quarantine, and in the very next year the foundations of the Dual Alliance were laid. One of the outstanding merits of this masterly survey is the author's knowledge of Russian sources such as the Lamsdorff diary, which compel us to revise a good many accepted notions. Fresh light is also thrown from Armenian, Serbian, Bulgarian and Japanese materials on movements and events not hitherto fully understood. The Armenian massacres in particular take on a new complexion. Standing aloof from our European quarrels and ambitions, the Harvard Professor brings a singularly calm intelligence to bear on the most controversial issues. He has no love for the outburst of overseas expansion which we call Imperialism, but his narrative is never polemical or partisan. The story ends with the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the opening of 1902, and a closing chapter contains the author's reflections on the country through which he has travelled. The value of the book, in which there is not a superfluous page, is enhanced by ample bibliographies in many languages at the end of each chapter and by a series of serviceable maps.

* By G. L. Prestige, D.D. Heinemann.

† Alfred Knopf. New York and London. 1935.

*India Recalled** is a further series of reminiscences by Cornelia Sorabji of her visits to the women of the Zenana in her office as representative of the Court of Wards. It is a delightful account of the old customs and ceremonies in connection with birth and death, with the growing-up of children, adoption, friendship, garlanding, head-shaving and "thread," ear-boring, rice-taking, the feast of lights, all interwoven with pretty stories and real human joys and sorrows. "Beloved and important children-people they were, all of them; the performance of Hindu religious ritual . . . taking the place, in their day, of games and fun in the life of the normal English child." One of her characters is Prithivi Maharani, placed "at the high-water mark of possibility among the keepers (as opposed to the flouters) of the law of Hinduism." Her story in this book opens at the age of fifteen, when she was expecting her first baby. Her husband idolised her. Later we see her with her three children keeping all the old ceremonies that were not harmful, skilfully avoiding others. "There came a day when her gay little world lay in ruins around her. Her Maharaja . . . was stricken with a sudden illness, and lay dead in a night. 'God's rod makes no noise,' said Prithivi, quoting an Indian saying." Years later we see her again, arranging for the marriage of her daughter, "watching through a hole in the purdah . . . the absurd 'march past' of likely bridegrooms put forward by the priests, and saying in confidence at the end: 'I have already chosen my son-in-law and—he is none of these.'"

In a brief chapter the subject of widow remarriage is discussed. An example is given of a boy aged twelve on his way home from school coming upon a marriage procession of a widow. "He stumbled home almost blind with horror and emotion, and was physically sick. He would speak to none of the family about an experience which he said was devastating; death was all that was left for him." Miss Sorabji, after advising and helping him to a new school course in the attempt to cure him "after so profound an experience," says: "We dare not lightly dismiss the thrills or shudders of any single person born with inhibitions and raised in circumstances to which we ourselves are strangers."

In contrast with the poetry of *India Recalled* is a little book by D. K. Karve, called *Looking Back*.† In a Preface Mr. Frederick J. Gould says: "If I wanted to stir lazy lads by a tale, I would tell them of the youthful band, of which our D. K. K. was the leading spirit, who tramped 110 miles from Murud by the sea to the examination-room at Satara in a four-days' pilgrimage, and on the third night slept uneasily under the stars in a rocky glen where wild beasts perhaps growled. The narrative is a parable of his career. He saw his goal, he walked, he persisted, he achieved."

Professor Karve developed first a great concern for widow marriage. He himself married a widow for his second wife and wore down a mountain

* Nisbet. † Aryabhushan Press, Poona.

of opposition. Then he started a Widows' Home at Poona and spent all his spare time from his profession as a teacher in collecting funds for it and for a girls' high school. Later in life he saw a vision of a women's university and rested not till he established one in Poona. In looking back over his career, with its sudden inspirations and its fortunate happenings, he says: "I cannot but feel gratitude for the help I received from seen and unseen sources to make me happy and successful in life."

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*Far East in Ferment** is the most recent work of Mr. Guenther Stein, whose able exposition of the Japanese industrial system in *Made in Japan* is widely remembered. He now covers a larger field in an analysis of the international situation in the Far East, with Japan as the focal point. If his book contains little new material, it provides a vigorous and valuable estimate of the aims and outlook which influence the policies of Japan, Russia and China. As a guide to this he pays particular attention to internal conditions. Recent events in Japan have clearly demonstrated the predominance of the military leaders, and it is evident from Mr. Stein's lengthy survey that the whole life of the nation is directed to the attainment, through armed strength and expansionist fervour, of a free hand in China and a general hegemony in the Pacific. In her claims to be "the only stabilising factor in the Far East" Japan regards Russia "at least as a dangerous competitor" and is fearful of Sino-Soviet co-operation. The incorporation, or control, of North China is regarded as a strategic necessity as well as an essential requirement for Japanese economic self-sufficiency. Mr. Stein notes the disillusionment over Manchukuo. The country has proved a poor market for Japanese products, while becoming a competitor of the farmer in Japan. Her raw materials are insufficient, and few immigrants have been absorbed. To offset these disadvantages North China is claimed to be essential. Meanwhile China itself is awakening. Mr. Stein was much impressed by the rapid growth and cohesion being achieved by Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he enjoyed an interview. The author's general conclusions are, inevitably, pessimistic. A Russo-Japanese conflict remains "a constant possibility" while mutual distrust continues; and there is no sign that this bitter antagonism is likely to end.

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The British Empire before the American Revolution† is a remarkable contribution by an American historian, Professor L. H. Gipson, to the study of the old Empire in the eighteenth century. As the product of extensive and detailed research, this work reviews the principal political, economic, religious and social features which characterised the various units of the Empire during the six years following the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Professor Gipson has selected this

* Methuen.

† In three volumes. Caxton Printers Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, U.S.A.

period as being the last one of tranquillity prior to the final upheaval of the American Revolution. The first volume is devoted to Great Britain and Ireland; the second and third, which include surveys of the West Indies, the American plantations and settlements, Newfoundland and the African slave trade, contain a mass of material which the student will appreciate. The author's conclusions are reasoned, balanced and sympathetic to the general nature of the mother country's policy. For example, he regards the economic regulations imposed upon the colonies as a courageous attempt at a planned economy of imperial self-sufficiency. Upon this ground he defends the famous Iron Act of 1750. It was, he concludes, an imperative rule of British statecraft in the eighteenth century that the welfare of England itself depended upon the prosperity of the Empire. "For every demand made upon the dependencies an attempt was made to provide a reciprocal return of benefits either direct or indirect." The text of the work is annotated but is without a bibliography, which the author intends to publish in a separate volume.

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Old Nurse,* by Barbara Barclay Carter, tells the story of a noble woman who found perfect happiness in the service of others. Her love for her nurseling was fully returned while she was alive, and now that she is gone it has inspired a very tender and touching memorial. "An early life of quiet, rich experience," writes Viola Meynell in a Foreword, "is quietly and beautifully recorded here." That Miss Carter knows how to write was discovered by readers of her Dante novel, *Ship Without Sails*. There are passages of quiet beauty, of intimate revelation, in every chapter. Brecon and its bare hills, the life and characters of the little Welsh town, the echoes of the World War, Nanna's glimpses of Germany and America, her homely wisdom, her uncomplaining fortitude, her utter fidelity—these things go to the making of a portrait painted in delicate colours by a skilled and loving hand.

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A final definitive estimate of Hindenburg's life is not possible in this generation; but Mr. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett effectively shatters the "Hindenburg legend" in his recent work, *Hindenburg, the Wooden Titan*,† which is remarkable for its grasp and analysis of the crowded and critical events during the last twenty years of the Marshal's career. The author approached his task as a genuine believer in the myth, but exhaustive research among available official documents, memoirs and biographies and particularly personal contacts with some of the leading German figures, brought disillusionment as to the real character of Hindenburg, which is here unfolded in all its dramatic and tragic intensity. The will to serve was the mainspring of Hindenburg's life, but was unfortunately coupled with a simple and pliable intellect

* Jonathan Cape. † Macmillan.

which allowed itself to be controlled successively by dominating partners; first by Ludendorff and subsequently by such men as Meissner, von Schleicher, von Papen and finally by Hitler. Once persuaded of his duty, and persuasion became easier in proportion to his years, Hindenburg could abandon without a qualm the very personality upon whose achievement his own reputation had been enhanced; as Hoffmann, Ludendorff, Gröner and Brüning successively found to their cost. The story of Hindenburg's life is thus largely the unravelling of policies and plots which circled round his person, a figurehead too often blind to reality. For example, in the High Command with Ludendorff he became "a greatly respected zero," ignorant even of the situation of his army corps. In dealing with Hitler's advent to power in 1933, Mr. Wheeler-Bennett remarks that "the Old Gentleman had no conception of how terribly he had betrayed his trusteeship." It is remarkable that, in spite of the vicissitudes of his erstwhile associates, it was not until then that the popular belief in his strength and leadership was severely shaken. Yet there were, as the author shows, noble moments in his life as when, for example, he retained the command after the Emperor's abdication; and his continued support of Stresemann for five successive years, albeit at the instance of Meissner, deserves the utmost praise. The tragedy of the whole story is what might have been had the President lived up to the height of his reputation.

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The particular interest of the new fourth and cheap edition of Mr. and Mrs. J. L. Hammond's life of *Lord Shaftesbury** lies in a new Appendix relating to the mutual feelings of Gladstone and Shaftesbury for each other. The great philanthropist thought hardly of most politicians, and his bitter opinion of Gladstone's conduct and motives was revealed clearly in the extracts from his diaries published in Hodder's biography of 1886. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond discuss briefly some of these attacks, and have printed by way of contrast a memorandum and notes composed by Gladstone after reading the biography and which hitherto have remained unpublished. In these Gladstone combined self-defence with a remarkably generous tribute to Shaftesbury's work and "noble character," showing a combination of conviction with tolerance and appreciation which Shaftesbury so signally failed to display.

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A short version of Lord Tweedsmuir's four-volume *History of the Great War* has been compiled by Mr. Adrian Alington in *Episodes of the Great War*.† He has selected passages which cover mainly the chief phases on the Western Front. The extracts, which are published without revision, are so arranged as to provide a complete and continuous narrative within four hundred pages. The volume includes maps and portraits of the great war figures, but omits an index.

* Longmans. † Nelson.